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Abstract 
The primary focus of this study is to investigate the relation between Earnings 
Management (EM) and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in the UK. While there 
are few studies in the existing literature that examined the relationship between EM 
and CSR, there is a lack of studies examining this relation in the UK. Furthermore, the 
existing academic literature appears to provide inconsistent results. 
These considerations motivate this study to bridge this gap in the literature by 
providing evidence of whether or not EM and CSR are related in the UK. The present 
study carried out through three empirical stages based on the data obtained from 
the FTSE 350 Index between 2008 and 2010.  
The first stage examined the EM practice using three EM models to estimate 
discretionary accruals as proxy for EM. The models were the Jones (1991), modified 
Jones (Dechow et al. 1995) and performance - matched (Kothari et al. 2005) models. 
Firstly, these models were tested using multivariate analysis; the findings revealed 
that the performance - marched model has been identified as the model that could 
most accurately measure the presence of EM. Secondly, by applying univariate 
analysis, the study has found insignificant differences between the high and low EM 
practices in UK firms and that the highest and the lowest levels of EM were in 2008. 
Similar results were discovered when comparing the differences between income - 
increasing and income - decreasing EM.  
The second stage tested CSR by applying both content analysis and disclosure index 
approaches to identify the level of Corporate Social Responsibility Disclosure (CSD) 
as proxy of CSR. The findings from the content analysis revealed that the employees 
(EMP) theme had the highest level of CSR information, followed by community 
(COM), environment (ENV), others (OTH), products and services (PRO), and 
customers (CUS). Similar results were obtained when the disclosure index approach 
was employed. 
The relationship between EM and CSR was tested in the final stage by using 
univariate and multivariate analyses. The findings revealed that firms with more CSR 
information reported lower EM. Further tests were performed to investigate the link 
between EM and CSR themes and the findings revealed that firms with more 
information of EMP, COM, EVE and PRO reported lower EM. However, no evidence 
suggested that CUS and OTH information affect EM. Overall, the findings suggest 
that the level of CSR improve financial reports’ quality. This study aspires to 
contribute to our understanding and knowledge on the issue related to the role of 
CSR regarding the quality of reported earnings.  
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1 Chapter One                                                               
Introduction 
 
This chapter provides an introduction to this research and begins by discussing 
its background and justification. Section 1.2 explains the research’s aim and 
questions. Section 1.3 presents the research methods. Section 1.4 outlines the 
study contribution and Section 1.5 reports the research structure. 
1.1 Research Background and Justification 
Accounting earnings are one of the most significant components in the financial 
reports that can be used to convey information about a company’s value to 
outsiders (DuCharme et al. 2004). In addition, investors can use accounting 
earnings to assess the company’s future uncertainty with regard to its economic 
performance. According to the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles 
(GAAP), managers can use their judgement over accounting earnings to make 
financial reports more informative for users (Prior et al. 2008). In such a case, 
managers can use their knowledge to select reporting methods, estimates and 
disclosures that reflect the underlying economic conditions of the firm (Beneish 
2001). However, when the interests between managers and shareholders 
conflict, the former can exercise some discretion over accounting earnings 
either to mislead shareholders about the firm’s underlying financial 
performance or to gain some private benefits at the expense of other 
stakeholders (Healy and Wahlen 1999). This opportunistic behaviour can be 
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practised by managers through choosing reporting methods and estimates 
which do not accurately reflect the company’s underlying economic conditions.  
Over the last few decades, the opportunistic Earnings Management (EM) 
practice has become a major concern among investors, practitioners, regulators 
and scholars, especially since the revelations of massive accounting scandals 
involving large corporations (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, etc.). It has been argued 
that EM is more likely to reduce the financial reports’ reliability and quality, 
their usefulness for investment decisions and the shareholders’ confidence in 
the financial statements (Chen et al. 2010). In addition, Fombrun et al. (2000a) 
argue that if EM is detected by outsiders, a company loses its stakeholders’ 
support, legal actions could be taken by regulators against the firm, the firm’s 
products and services may be boycotted, it is likely to be deemed as illegitimate 
by the local community and it could be exposed by the media. 
On the other hand, it has been argued that several advantages can be gained 
from a company’s involvement in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) activities 
(Branco and Rodrigues 2006; Orlitzky et al. 2003; Gray et al. 1988). Such 
activities assist firms to enhance their transparency and build a positive image 
among the stakeholders which, in turn, help them to gain support from the 
society in which they operate. In the same vein, Fombrun et al. (2000b) argue 
that a positive image helps managers to establish social bonds between the 
company, its employees and the local community and generates reputational 
gains that improve the firm’s ability to attract resources, enhance its 
performance and build a competitive advantage. Similarly, Branco and 
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Rodrigues (2006) demonstrate that, by engaging in social activities, firms can 
gain support from their various stakeholders and obtain more favourable 
regulatory treatments, endorsements from activist groups, legitimacy from the 
community and favourable coverage from the media. Despite the advantages of 
engaging in CSR, it has been argued that managers may do so to  pursuit  their  
own  self - interests  rather  than  the  interests  of  the  company’s stakeholders 
(Carroll 1979). In addition, CSR can be used as an entrenchment mechanism by 
managers to protect their own job security and achieve  their  personal  
objectives (Prior et al. 2008). 
In terms of EM, previous studies have suggested two contradictory theoretical 
perspectives to explain the link between EM and CSR. These perspectives are: 
long-term (ethical) and managerial opportunism (opportunistic behaviour) 
perspectives (Choi et al. 2013). According to the long - term/ethical perspective, 
firms with strong commitments to CSR are less likely to manage earnings since 
they do not hide unfavourable earnings realisations and, therefore, conduct no 
EM (Chih et al. 2008). Since EM is perceived as an act of irresponsibility and is 
inconsistent with CSR principles, Choi et al. (2013) argue that firms with strong 
commitment to CSR are more prone to act in a responsible way when reporting 
their financial statements. Likewise, Kim et al. (2012)  point out  that  companies  
that  expend  their efforts  and  resources  in  designing  CSR programmes  and  
implement  these  programmes  in  order  to  serve  the  ethical  interests  of 
stakeholders in society provide transparent and reliable financial reporting to 
their various  stakeholders and are, therefore, less likely to manage earnings. 
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Inversely, the managerial opportunism perspective suggests that managers who 
manage earnings may strategically use CSR information to disguise their 
opportunistic behaviour (Prior et al. 2008). According to Prior et al. (2008), 
managers who engage in EM may resort to CSR to deal with their stakeholders’ 
activism and vigilance. In line with this argument, Choi et al. (2013) argue that 
managers who act in pursuit of private benefits by distorting earnings 
information are able to entrench themselves through engaging in CSR activities. 
Empirically, few studies have attempted to explore whether or not EM and CSR 
are related. However, the existing academic literature on the link between EM 
and CSR has provided contradictory results. For example, several studies have 
found that EM and CRS are negatively related (Choi et al. 2013; Pyo and Lee 
2013; Kim et al. 2012; Hong and Andersen 2011; and Chih et al. 2008). They 
have interpreted a negative relationship between EM and CSR as that firm with 
strong commitment to CSR is less likely to engage in EM. On the other hand, 
other studies have found that EM and CSR are positively related (Jiang et al. 
2013; Yip et al. 2011; Gargouri et al. 2010; Prior et al. 2008; Patten and 
Trompeter 2003). The positive relationship between EM and CSR indicates that 
firms with a higher level of EM resort to CSR activities to disguise managerial 
opportunistic behaviour. The contradictory results with respect to the link 
between EM and CSR provide the motivation to look further for evidence 
regarding the nature relationship between EM and CSR. Therefore, the 
fundamental concern of this study is to shed more light on the association 
5 
 
between EM and CSR and to attempt to provide empirical evidence regarding 
this area in accounting research. 
Although EM and CSR have been investigated in previous studies in Canada 
(Gargouri et al. 2010); China (Jiang et al. 2013); South Korea (Choi et al. 2013; 
Pyo and Lee 2013); the US (Yongtae et al. 2012; Hong and Andersen 2011; Yip et 
al. 2011; Patten and Trompeter 2003); and multi-national datasets (Chih et al. 
2008; Prior et al. 2008), the review of the literature reveals that no single study 
has explored this field in accounting research in the UK, apart from the study 
conducted by Sun et al. (2010), who addressed the link between environmental 
disclosure and EM for the year 2007 and found that the two variables are 
unrelated. This consideration provides the motivation to the present study to 
bridge this gap in the literature by providing evidence on the nature of the 
relationship between EM and CSR in the context of the UK.  
It has been argued that the economic conditions affect a company’s economic 
performance which, in turn, may motivate managers to manipulate earnings. In 
this regard, Berndt and Dipl-Kfm. (2011) and many other researchers have 
found evidence that managers practise EM during economic crises. Thus, one 
might expect that EM is more prevalent in a period of uncertainty during the 
global financial crisis in 2008 (Rolland and dirigé 2013; Berndt and Dipl-Kfm. 
2011). Likewise, Rolland and dirigé (2013) argue that, during and after financial 
crises, managers may have had a need to manage earnings in order to increase 
the shareholders’ confidence in the firms’ financial performance. Considering 
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this, the present study has chosen the years between 2008 and 2010 as the 
study period.  
1.2 Research Motivations  
This research is motivated by three major considerations. Firstly, opportunistic 
EM is more likely to produce financial information that does not reflect an 
accurate economic picture of the firm. Thus, it is likely to reduce the quality of 
reported earnings and its usefulness for shareholders decisions, which in turn, 
reducing shareholders confidence in the financial reports. However, accounting 
earnings are more reliable and of higher quality when managers’ opportunistic 
behaviour is reduced by monitoring systems Dechow et al. (1996). Hence, EM 
has received much more attention among investors, practitioners, regulators 
and scholars, especially after the collapse of several large firms in last few 
decades and they have responded by enhancing corporate governance and 
disclosure as monitoring tools. Therefore, without appropriate monitoring 
system, the separation of ownership and control of a company might create 
serious problems. 
One important monitoring system that can be used by investors and regulators 
is corporate disclosure and its main aim is to reduce information asymmetry 
between managers and investors, which in turn, reducing the agency problem 
(Huang and Zhang 2011). In this regard, Eng and Mak (2003) state that 
disclosure is recognised as one of corporate monitoring system that its objective 
is to reduce the agency problem since well-informed investors are expected to 
scrutinise firms based on the information provided to them, and this 
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subsequently reduces the agency costs. In addition, Sun et al. (2010) indicate 
that companies can use different methods such as disclosure to reduce the 
conflict of interests between managers and investors. 
Given that that financial transparency and accountability are vital principles of 
CSR (Chih et al. 2008), EM is expected to occur less in companies that disclose 
more information on their social activities. In other words, when the 
information transparency is increased, it is expected that the information 
asymmetry between managers and investors will be decreased, which will 
enable investors to detect EM (Jo and Kim 2007). Inversely, EM is more likely to 
be occurred in those companies with limited or low levels of CSR, as a result of 
which information asymmetry is expected to be high (Jo and Kim 2007). 
Therefore, the present study has a strong incentive to shed more light on the 
potential impact of CSR on EM. 
Secondly, a review of the literature reveals a scarcity of research regarding to 
the phenomenon of EM and CSR. This review also shows that most of the prior 
studies relating to this area of research have been conducted in the US and 
there is no single study has been conducted in the UK. This offers different 
institutional settings from UK market and thus limits the generality of their 
findings for contexts beyond the US. Although the UK and the US share some 
common features, there are differences in many ways that could affect the 
inferences of such research (Toms and Wright 2005). For example, US 
companies are required to disclose more detailed information about corporate 
social activities and corporate governance than are UK firms (Lennox 2003). 
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Moreover, UK companies are subject to different corporate governance 
recommendations and listing requirements. Another area of divergence is the 
notion of EM practice. In this regard, Brown and Higgins (2001) indicate that the 
extent to which US managers manage earnings is significantly higher than by 
their counterparts in the UK. For these considerations, the current study is 
motivated to examine the link between EM and CSR in the context of the UK.   
Furthermore, a review of the EM literature reveals a scarcity of research relating 
to EM in the UK and there are very few studies that have examined UK 
companies (Habbash 2010). In addition, Habbash (2010) indicates that the 
existing few UK studies have some methodological limitations, such as using 
misspecified EM and neglecting some fundamental control variables, such as 
performance and growth. Therefore, a comprehensive study that considers the 
limitations of previous studies is needed to improve EM research in the UK.  
Thirdly, as discussed earlier, a limited research has been conducted on the link 
between EM and CSR. Thus, it is expected that this study sheds more lights on 
how CSR extends to other aspects of corporate behaviour, in this case, financial 
reporting quality and transparency.      
1.3 Research Question and Objectives   
The primary focus of this research is to answer the main question: “Is there a 
relationship between the magnitude of EM and the level of CSR in the UK? This 
will be addressed through three empirical stages. The first stage examines EM in 
9 
 
UK companies, while the second stage investigates CSR in UK firms. The final 
stage tests the link between EM and CSR.  
To address the research primary question, the three empirical objectives are 
formulated. The first objective is to identify which of the existing EM models is 
most suitable for measuring EM practices in the UK. This is achieved by 
reviewing the use of different models in assessing EM. This study reviews and 
critically evaluates three different models, namely the Jones (1991), modified Jones 
(Dechow et al. 1995), and the performance - matched (Kothari et al. 2005). 
These models are applied in the previous studies. In addition and under the first 
objective, the level and the direction of reported earnings is also exploring. The 
second objective is to investigate the total and sub-themes levels of CSR. This 
objective is tested using alternative measurements such as content analysis and 
disclosure index. The third objective is to investigate whether or not 
discretionary accruals (as proxy for EM) and Corporate Social Responsibility 
disclosure (CSD) (as proxy for CSR) are linked in the context of the UK. 
1.4 Research Methods 
This section presents a brief summary of the research methods used in this 
study. A detailed specification of the methods, including the justification for the 
selection of the research methodology and methods is provided in Chapter 
Four. Considering the first research objective, which is addressed in Chapter 
Five, the three most common EM models in EM literature were tested to 
identify which one is the most powerful in detecting EM in terms of the study 
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data1. These models  were the Jones (1991), modified Jones (Dechow et al. 
1995), and the performance - matched (Kothari et al. 2005) models. In addition 
to using multivariate analysis, the study has employed univariate analysis based 
on the t-test to determine whether the level and the direction of EM are 
different from zero. The FAME and Thomson One Banker databases were used 
as the main sources from which to collect EM data for a sample of 515 listed in 
FTSE 305 Index year-observations during the fiscal years of 2008 to 2010. 
Like the previous studies of Hassan and Harahap (2010); and Haniffa and Cooke 
(2005), the second research objective has been addressed through using both 
content analysis and disclosure index methods to capture the level of CSR. With 
respect to content analysis, following previous studies (Aribi and Gao 2010; 
Haniffa and Cooke 2005), the number of words was applied to gather the level 
of CSR from firms’ annual reports and CSR reports, if available during the period 
2008-2010. Since content analysis cannot capture pictures and graphics, which 
are potentially powerful and highly effective methods of communication 
(Haniffa and Cooke 2005), it was decided that using both content analysis and 
disclosure index would be an effective way of capturing all the CSR information. 
Therefore, following Haniffa and Cooke (2005) and many other studies, 
disclosure index has also been used in the present study to measure the level of 
CSR in UK firms’ annual reports and CSR reports. The second question is 
addressed in Chapter Six. 
                                                          
1
 The ordinary least squares (OLS) were applied in the three models to explain the relationship 
between the dependent variable and the various independent variables.  
11 
 
In order to address the third research objective, both univariate and 
multivariate analyses have been conducted to explore whether or not EM and 
CSR are linked. The univariate analysis has been applied using a correlation 
matrix, t-test and Mann-Whitney U test for the dependent (EM), independent 
(CSR) and control variables. These tests have been applied to provide the 
general statistical characteristics and the relationships between the variables. In 
addition to conducting univariate analysis, this study has employed multivariate 
analysis using multiple pooled regression analysis to test the relation between 
EM and CSR.  
In addition to the use of univariate and multivariate analyses, the present study 
applied the multi-methods approach to test the association between EM and 
CSR. This statistical approach involves the use of the multiple pooled data of 
515 year-observations of firms in the UK FTSE 350 Index from the period 
stretching from 2008 to 2010. This involves the use of OLS regression with 
robust standard errors (Huber-White standard errors) to test whether or not 
the findings on EM and CSR are robust with different regression estimators. It 
also involves the use of two-stage least square regression (2SLS) to control 
endogeneity and to test whether or not the findings on EM and CSR are affected 
by the problem of endogeneity between EM and CSR variables. Furthermore, 
the multi - methods approach involves the use of different proxies for EM and 
CSR. Regarding EM, discretionary accruals using the performance - matched 
(Kothari et al. 2005) model has been used in the main analysis, while for the 
sensitivity analysis the modified Jones (Dechow et al. 1995) model has been 
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applied as an alternative measurement of EM. In respect of CSR, the total level 
score of CSR has been used as the primary measurement of CSR, while in the 
sensitivity analysis the total number of words has been employed as an 
alternative measurement of CSR.    
1.5 The Contribution of the Study 
This thesis represents a comprehensive study of EM and CSR, specifically in the 
UK market. Using the current data of the FTSE 350 Index firms for the fiscal 
years from 2008 to 2010, the first empirical stage of the thesis has investigated 
EM practices. The second stage has examined the level of CSR information, 
whilst the third empirical stage has tested the link between EM and CSR. Several 
contributions to knowledge are made through this research. Firstly, very limited 
research has addressed the relationship between EM and CSR, therefore this 
study highlights that issue such as financial transparency and accountability can 
induce managers to produce high quality financial reports. This is a new and far-
reaching addition to EM literature. In addition, it sheds more lights on how CSR 
extends to other aspects of corporate behaviour such as financial reporting 
transparency and quality.  
Secondly, as stated in the motivations for the study, previous research in this 
area has predominantly been undertaken in the US and, to the best of the 
researcher’s knowledge, no study has been conducted in the UK. This offers a 
different litigation environment, institutional setting and disclosure 
requirements, thus limits the generalizability of the findings to other countries. 
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Therefore, the investigation of UK firms expands the existing literature by 
providing evidence on the link between EM and CSR in UK context.  
Thirdly, prior research has used CSR score to investigate the link between EM 
and CSR, and, to the best of author’s knowledge, no study has used multiple 
proxies for CSR. The present study is the first to use alternative measurements 
(content analysis and disclosure index) to estimate CSR with the aim of 
providing a better and deeper understanding of the nature of the relationship 
between EM and CSR. In addition, using multiple proxies approach enhances the 
validity and reliability of the study findings.    
1.6 The Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis, including the introductory chapter, consists of eight chapters. The 
current chapter has provided an overview of the research study background, 
outlined the study’s aim and questions and briefly discussed the methods to be 
used. Chapter Two provides a general review of the literature on EM. It 
discusses the definition, motivation and techniques of EM. The chapter also 
presents a review of the approaches and models used in the literature to detect 
EM. This thesis has adopted the aggregate EM approach to measure EM using 
the three most common models in the literature to estimate discretionary 
accruals as a proxy of EM. These models are the Jones (1991), the modified 
Jones (Dechow et al. 1995), and the performance-matched (Kothari et al. 2005) 
models. 
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Chapter Three presents a review of the literature on CSR and CSD. It presents 
the debate on the concept and definition of CSR and also discusses the 
importance of practising CSR activities as well as the link between CSR and CSD. 
It then set outs definitions and various theories to not only explain why firms 
engage in CSR activities but also to provide an understanding of how CSR 
information can be linked to EM practices. 
Chapter Four outlines the methods used to measure the study’s dependent 
(EM), independent (CSR) and control variables. The present chapter discusses 
and justifies the study sample, data sources and the research period. It then 
outlines the measurements of dependent, independent and control variables 
and explains the empirical research models and hypotheses used to test the link 
between EM and CSR information. The analytical procedures and choice of 
analytical methods are illustrated and justified in this chapter. 
Chapter Five presents and discusses the results regarding the EM practices in UK 
companies. It starts with descriptive statistics of all the variables used to detect 
EM and then presents the results by comparing the EM models’ findings (i.e. the 
Jones, the modified Jones and the performance-matched models). Finally, the 
chapter presents the results pertinent to the compression of the level and the 
direction of EM.  
Chapter Six provides the findings related to the total level and sub-themes of 
CSR. It starts with the general findings regarding the total level and sub-themes 
of CSR based on the number of companies and then presents the findings from 
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the content analysis approach in terms of the number of words for the total and 
sub -themes of CSR. Then, using disclosure index, it provides the descriptive 
statistics for the findings on total level and sub-scores of CSR. Lastly, it presents 
the total level and sub-themes of CSR in different industries using both content 
analysis and disclosure index approaches.     
Chapter Seven reports and discusses the study’s results as to the association 
between EM and CSR. It begins with descriptive statistics, correlations, and 
multivariate analysis results. This is followed by the presentation of the results 
of the tested models and those drawn from hypotheses-testing. Further 
analyses and sensitivity analyses are also presented in this chapter to check the 
robustness of the main results 
Chapter Eight concludes with an overview of the study, summarises the main 
findings of the research, highlights the study’s implications, explains its 
limitations and provides suggestions for future research.  
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2 Chapter Two                                                                                              
Earnings Management: Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Under the accruals accounting system, there are many ways in which managers 
might exercise their judgement in preparing financial reports. The flexibility of 
accounting standards allows managers to estimate accounting numbers that reflect 
the actual underlying economic conditions of a firm. However, when the interests of 
managers and shareholders conflict, managers may use some discretion over 
earnings reporting without violating GAAP either to mislead some shareholders 
about the firm’s underlying financial performance or to gain some private benefit at 
the expense of other stakeholders (Healy and Wahlen 1999). This chapter aims to 
provide a general review of the literature on EM. The remainder of the chapter is 
structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents a review of EM definitions. The 
motivation and techniques of EM are presented in sections 2.3 and 2.4 respectively. 
Section 2.5 discusses EM measurements.  Section 2.6 presents a summary of this 
chapter.    
2.2 EM Definitions 
Although the term ‘earnings management’ is widely used in the literature, there is 
no consensus on its definition. Healy and Wahlen (1999) define EM as follows: 
“earnings management occurs when managers use judgement in financial reporting 
and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some 
stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to 
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influence contractual outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” 
(p.368).  
Another definition suggests that EM is ‘’the process of taking deliberate steps within 
the constraints of generally accepted accounting principles to bring about a desired 
level of reported earnings.’’ (Davidson et al. 1987: cited in Schipper 1989, p.92). 
Similarly, Schipper (1989) defines EM as “a purposeful intervention in the external 
financial reporting process, with the intent of obtaining some private gain” (p.92).  
Although the key concept in the above definitions is the notion that managers 
practise EM to either mislead some stakeholders about the firm’s underlying 
financial performance or to maximise their own private gains within the firm, 
Beneish (2001) states that there are two perspectives of EM: opportunistic EM and 
informative EM. While opportunistic EM seeks either to mislead investors or to 
secure managers’ jobs, reputations, and compensation within the firm, the 
informative EM aims to provide private information to the investors about the firm’s 
future performance. In line with Beneish’s argument, Fields et al. (2001) indicate that 
managerial discretion can be either firm value maximisation or opportunistic 
behaviour. Furthermore, Parfet (2000) argues that EM is not entirely a bad thing if 
reasonable and proper practices of EM are used in a well-managed business and 
deliver value to shareholders.  
Dechow and Skinner (2000) criticise the above definitions for failing to clearly 
distinguish between ‘EM’ and ‘fraud’ and indicate that EM falls within the GAAP, 
while fraud violates the GAAP (see Figure 2.1). Dechow and Skinner acknowledge 
that there is only a fine line between the two concepts and, in the case of aggressive 
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accounting, it is difficult to differentiate between opportunistic EM and legitimate 
practices of accounting discretion without identifying the managerial intent to 
manipulate earnings. 
According to the above discussion, all the definitions indicate implicitly or explicitly 
that managers practise EM in two main ways: accounting choice and discretionary 
accruals. While accounting choice includes, for example, revenue recognition 
methods, inventory cost calculation, and research and development expenditure 
(R&D), discretionary accruals includes provisions for dubious accounts, provisions for 
obsolete inventories, deferred tax assets, and variation in the useful economic life of 
depreciated long-term assets (e.g. Bauman et al. 2001; Guidry et al. 1999; McNichols 
and Wilson 1988). In addition, managers can, to some extent, alter the timing of real 
decisions such as recognition of revenues and expenses by, for instance, accelerating 
recognised sales revenue via credit sales or delaying recognised losses by waiting to 
establish loss reserves.   
Another aspect of the above definitions is that the word ‘mislead’ in Healy and 
Wahlen (1999) definition precludes any form of informative EM practice, while the 
definition by Beneish (2001) indicates that EM occurs when managers seek to either 
mislead stakeholder perception or to provide private information about the firm’s 
future performance. Therefore, it is important to identify managers’ intent in order 
to determine whether EM is opportunistic behaviour or informative exercise. Hence, 
many attempts have been made in the previous literature to identify various 
motivations to manage earnings. 
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Figure 2-1: The Distinction between EM and Fraudulent Financial Reporting 
  Accounting Choices 
Within GAAP 
 "Real" Cash Flow Choices 
 
“Conservative’’ 
   Accounting 
- Overly aggressive recognition of 
provisions or reserves. 
- Delaying sales. 
 - Overvaluation of acquired in-
process R&D in purchase 
acquisitions. 
- Accelerating R&D or advertising 
expenditures. 
 - Overstatement of restructuring 
charges and asset write-offs. 
 
   
‘’Neutral’’ 
Accounting 
- Earnings that result from a neutral 
operation of the process. 
 
   
‘’Aggressive’’ 
   Accounting 
- Understatement of the provision 
for bad debts. 
- Postponing R&D or advertising 
expenditures. 
 - Drawing down provisions or 
reserves in an overly aggressive 
manner. 
- Accelerating sales. 
   
‘’Fraudulent’’ 
  Accounting 
Violates GAAP  
 - Recording sales before they are 
"realizable". 
 
 - Recording fictitious sales.  
 - Backdating sales invoices.  
 - Overstating inventory by 
recording fictitious inventory. 
 
Source: Dechow and Skinner (2000, p. 239). 
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2.3  EM Techniques  
2.3.1 Income-Smoothing Technique 
According to Barnea et al. (1976), income-smoothing is “the deliberate damping of 
fluctuations about some level of earnings considered to be normal for the firm” (p. 
111). This technique is a frequent form of EM because of its compatibility with 
several earnings objectives and it is used to reduce the variance in earnings over the 
years. Thus, managers might engage in income-decreasing EM when a firm seeks to 
defer excess incomes in profitable years to increase incomes in loss-making years. 
For example, managers may set high levels of provision for dubious debts and 
depreciations in profitable years, reversing them in loss-making years. This technique 
is known as “cookie jar” reserves because excessive provisions are recorded like 
cookies saved in a jar and are ready for use at the desire of the managers (Musfiqur 
Rahman et al. 2013).  
Conversely, when the current year’s profits are lower than the previous year’s 
earnings or the results for the current year are negative, managers may manage 
earnings upwards by engaging in aggressive income recognition in the current year 
or delay expenses to the following year. For example, managers may record assets 
for expenditures that should be met as they are incurred, such as research and 
development (R&D) expenditures (Stolowy and Breton 2004).      
2.3.2 Big Bath Technique 
This technique is used when a company’s current income is unable to meet earnings 
targets or when a company suffers from substantial losses it is unable to recover; 
hence, the company reduces the level of current earnings in order to increase the 
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level of future earnings. According to  Healy (1985), managers save the current 
earnings through income-decreasing EM when they realise that earnings are lower 
than the future bonus plan. In addition, when the bonus plan has already been 
reached, managers manage earnings downwards for use in the following year. 
Furthermore, when a company’s current earnings are negative and it is unable to 
meet earnings targets, it engages in income-decreasing for use in the following 
year(s). Similarly, McNichols and Wilson (1988) find that managers manipulate 
earnings by recording future expenses in the current year when they realise that 
current earnings  are insufficient to meet earnings targets.  
Moore (1973) argues that new managements tend to engage more in income-
decreasing in their first year to improve reported earnings in the future than do their 
counterparts with no management turnover. In a similar vein, Pourciau (1993) 
indicates that new CEOs may tend to engage in income-deceasing EM in their first 
year.  
2.3.3 Accounting Choices  
Under accounting standards, managers have alternative accounting choices for 
estimating one accounting practice. In this regard, Nelson et al. (2002) state that EM 
can be practised through various techniques such as revenue recognition, business 
combinations, intangibles,  fixed  assets,  investments  and  leases,  a frequently-
employed  technique.  
With respect to inventory-estimated methods, it is argued that managers prefer to 
use first-in first-out (FIFO) to measure inventory cost when they want to show higher 
earnings. In contrast, they prefer to apply last-in first-out (LIFO) when they want to 
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show lower earnings. In this respect, Sweeney (1994) finds that companies switch 
between inventory cost methods to manipulate earnings when they are in danger of 
loan default. Likewise, Aljifri (2007) finds that FIFO and LIFO are the most common 
methods of inventory cost methods for manipulating inventory and indicates that 
managers may use FIFO when they want to increase earnings, particularly when the 
price goes up. Furthermore, Aljifri argues that changes in accounting methods, such 
as a change from FIFO to LIFO or vice versa, are expensive, observable, and more 
easily detected by external auditors. 
Another accounting choice available for managers is depreciation methods (i.e. the 
straight-line method, sum-of-the-years’ digits method, and double-declining balance 
method). While the straight-line method offers an equal amount of annual 
depreciation expense, the sum-of-the-years’ digits, and double-declining balance 
methods present the highest amount of depreciation (lower income) in the first year 
and lowest depreciation (higher income) in the last year of asset life. Hence, 
managers may adopt or change depreciation methods to meet their earnings 
objectives. Furthermore, managers may adopt deferred tax to improve their 
earnings. They may also capitalise expenditure to defer expenses in the current year.  
As can be seen from the above, there are many techniques available for managers to 
manage earnings and it appears difficult for outside investors to observe it. 
Therefore, a significant number of EM studies have been conducted to detect EM. 
The next section will discuss the measurement of EM.     
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2.4  Measurement of EM 
Using statistical techniques, a significant number of EM studies have attempted to 
measure EM. In general, three main approaches have been used in the literature to 
detect EM: aggregate accruals approach (Kothari et al. 2005; DuCharme et al. 2001; 
Kothari 2001; Erickson and Wang 1999; DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Han and 
Shiing-Wu 1998; Dechow et al. 1995; Jones 1991; DeAngelo 1986; Healy 1985); 
specific accruals approach (Beaver and McNichols 1998; Beneish 1997; Beaver and 
Engel 1996; Petroni 1992; McNichols and Wilson 1988); and frequency distribution 
of earnings approach (Degeorge et al. 1999; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997). The 
following sections will briefly discuss each of these approaches. 
2.4.1 Aggregate Accruals Approach      
The aggregate approach is extensively used in the literature for measuring EM. Since 
the aggregate accruals consist of discretionary and non-discretionary accruals, the 
main difficulty faced by EM models is the identification and separation of the total 
accruals into the two components2. Therefore, several models have been introduced 
in the literature. These models range from simple models, in which the perceived 
change in aggregate accruals is used as a measurement of EM, to the more 
sophisticated models, in which total accruals are partitioned into discretionary 
accruals and non-discretionary accruals. The following subsections discuss the most 
popular models in the aggregate approach. 
                                                          
2
 Discretionary accruals are adjustments selected by firm’ managers, while non-discretionary accruals 
are adjustments mandated by accounting standards.  
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2.4.1.1 The Healy (1985) Model 
Healy (1985) estimates discretionary accruals using total accruals scaled by lagged 
total assets in the estimated period. Healy measures total accruals as the difference 
between reported earnings and cash flow from operations. Healy’s implicit 
assumption is that, in the absence of EM, the expected total accruals will be zero in 
the estimation period. In addition, although Healy states that total accruals include 
discretionary and non-discretionary accruals, he does not separate discretionary 
accruals from non-discretionary accruals. The study argues that systematic EM 
occurs in every period. The Healy (1985) model is presented as follows:  
               ⁄                             [2.1] 
Where   
         : Estimated discretionary accruals for firm   in year  ; 
     : Total accruals, defined as the difference between reported earnings and operating cash; 
      : Lagged total assets at beginning of year. 
The underlying assumption of Healy’s model that the level of non-discretionary 
accruals is zero during the estimation period has been criticised for several reasons. 
First, the level of non-discretionary accruals is not expected to be zero in any given 
period because it fluctuates depending on the firm’s economic circumstances 
(Kaplan 1985). Second, due to the impact of the depreciation expenditure, the level 
of total accruals as non-discretionary accruals is more likely to be negative for many 
firms (Perry and Williams 1994). 
2.4.1.2 The DeAngelo (1986) Model  
DeAngelo (1986) assumes that the difference between current and previous years’ 
accruals is due to changes in discretionary accruals, since non-discretionary accruals 
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may be constant over time. In order to test this assumption, DeAngelo defines total 
accruals as the sum of discretionary and non-discretionary accruals and calculates 
total accruals as the difference between net income and cash flow from operations. 
This model uses the last period’s total accruals scaled by lagged total assets as the 
measure of non-discretionary accruals, as follows:       
                        ⁄                    [2.2] 
Where   
         : Estimated non-discretionary accruals for firm   in year  . measured as the difference between 
total accruals in the event year and total accruals in the estimated year 
     : Total accruals, defined as the difference between net income and operating cash; 
      : Lagged total assets at beginning of year. 
 
DeAngelo (1986) model presumes that non-discretionary accruals follow a random 
walk and that the change in non-discretionary accruals is constant over time and is 
therefore approximately zero; however, it has been criticised by several EM 
researchers (see Section 2.5.1.1). 
Although the DeAngelo (1986); and Healy (1985) models are the simplest, they are 
also the most restrictive models for estimating discretionary accruals because they 
ignore the fact that non-discretionary accruals fluctuate with the firm’s economic 
circumstances (Kaplan 1985).   
2.4.1.3 The Industry (Dechow and Sloan 1991) Model 
Dechow and Sloan (1991) introduce the Industry model to capture EM. Due to the 
limitations of the DeAngelo (1986); and Healy (1985) models in that non-
discretionary accruals are constant over time, Dechow and Sloan (1991) assume that 
the variations in non-discretionary accruals are common across firms in the same 
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industry. Based on this assumption, Dechow and Sloan (1991) suggest that non-
discretionary accruals are equal to the median value of total accruals in year t scaled 
by lagged total assets for all non-sample firms in the same industry j. Therefore, non-
discretionary accruals are measured as follows:  
                                    ⁄                 [2.3] 
Where   
         : Non-discretionary accruals for firm   in year  . measured as the difference 
between total accruals in the event year and total accruals in the estimated 
year 
                    ⁄  : Median value of total accruals  industry j, firm i, in year t scaled by lagged total 
assets;   
     : Total accruals, defined as the difference between net income and operating 
cash; 
      : Lagged total assets at beginning of year. 
     and     : Firm-specific parameters as estimated by using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) on 
observations in the estimated period  
Although the Industry (Dechow and Sloan 1991) model attempts to overcome the 
limitations of the DeAngelo (1986); and Healy (1985) models, it has two limitations. 
First, it removes the variation in non-discretionary accruals that is common in the 
same industry. Therefore, if changes in non-discretionary accruals reflect responses 
to changes in the firm’s economic circumstances, then using this model may 
misclassify non-discretionary accruals as discretionary accruals. Second, it removes 
the variation in discretionary accruals that is correlated across firms in the same 
industry; thus, the model may misallocate discretionary accruals as non-
discretionary accruals (Dechow et al. 1995),   
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2.4.1.4 The  Jones (1991) Model 
Based on the assumption that total accruals are likely to result from managerial 
discretion and from changes in a firm’s economic conditions (Kaplan 1985), Jones 
(1991) proposes a regression-based model that controls for change in revenue and 
depreciation. Jones uses a two-stage producer to estimate discretionary accruals. In 
the first stage, Jones relates total accruals (TA) to the change in revenue (∆REV) and 
gross property, plant, and equipment (PPT) using time-series data prior to the event 
period t as follows:    
                    ⁄                 ⁄                ⁄⁄           [2.4] 
Where   
         : :Total accruals for firm i in year t. 
       : Change in revenues for firm i in year t. 
      : Gross property, plant and equipment for firm i in year t. 
      : Lagged total assets at beginning of year. 
            : Firm-specific parameters. 
 
In the second stage of estimating discretionary accruals, the parameters      
            from equation (2.4) are applied to data from the event year t to 
estimate discretionary (DA) accruals as follows:      
                 ⁄               ⁄                  ⁄                 ⁄      [2.5] 
Where 
     : Discretionary accruals for firm i in period t.  
The Jones (1991) model includes changes in revenue and gross property, plant and 
equipment to control for a firm’s economic conditions and depreciation respectively. 
However, controlling for change in revenue assumes that the revenue is non-
discretionary accruals. Given that revenue may be subject to earnings manipulation 
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by managers (e.g. increasing sales recognition near year-end period), using the Jones 
model will remove part of discretionary accruals. Jones (1991, p.212) recognised this 
limitation in her model and acknowledged that revenues, to some extent, may be 
affected by managers’ manipulation.    
2.4.1.5 The Modified Jones (Dechow et al. 1995) Model  
In response to the limitation of the Jones model, which assumes that revenue is non-
discretionary accruals, Dechow et al. (1995) developed a modified version of the 
Jones model by subtracting the change in receivables (∆REC) from change in 
revenues (∆REV) to exclude the element in the change in revenue that is expected to 
be managed through managerial discretion. The modified Jones model uses the 
estimated coefficients of equation (2.4) in the following equation:       
                 ⁄               ⁄                            ⁄  ⁄                 ⁄    [2.6] 
Where 
     : Discretionary accruals for firm i in period t.  
       : Change in receivables (debtors) for firm i, in year t. 
The modified Jones model assumes that the change in receivables in the event 
period is entirely discretionary accruals because it is the result of managers’ 
discretion, and that it is easier for managers to practise their estimation over the 
recognition of credit sales than of cash sales. However, the assumption that the 
entire change in receivables in the period is discretionary accruals overestimates 
these accruals to the extent that the change in receivables results from a firm’s 
economic circumstances.   
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It is worth mentioning that the Jones model (i.e. equation 2.4) was originally 
introduced in a time-series approach which in turn requires a long time-series of 
data sitting (e.g. at least 8-10 years) to produce efficient estimator coefficients. 
However, using a time-series approach has several limitations. First, a time-series 
approach raises the potential of survivorship bias problems (Peasnell et al. 2000a; 
DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). Second, it may result in specification problems in the 
form of serially correlated residuals (Peasnell et al. 2000b). To avoid these 
limitations, DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) use the cross-sectional version of the 
Jones (1991) model by estimating the equation 2.4 (‘stage one’) for each industry on 
a year-specific rather than a firm-specific basis and then the estimator coefficients to 
predict discretionary accruals for each firm through equation 2.5 (‘stage two’). 
Recently, a significant number of EM studies have favoured the cross-sectional 
approach over the time-series approach to avoid the limitations inherent in the time-
series approach (Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Sun and Rath 2010; Iqbala et al. 2009; 
Chen et al. 2008; Abdul Rashidah  and Ali 2006; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Xie 
et al. 2003; Kothari 2001; Teoh et al. 1998a; Teoh et al. 1998b). 
2.4.1.6 The Performance-Matched (Kothari et al. 2005) Model 
Kothari et al. (2005); and Dechow et al. (1995) evaluate the specification and power 
of the cross-sectional version of the Jones (1991) model based on both one-year and 
multiple-years measurements. The findings of the two studies are similar and reveal 
that the misspecifications of tests of the two models (i.e. one year and multiple 
years) is more extreme, specifically for firms with either higher book-to-market ratio 
or lower sales growth. In addition, they find that financial performance (measured as 
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return on assets (ROA)) is positively and significantly related to discretionary 
accruals, suggesting that the Jones models do not control for the firm’s economic 
conditions. To overcome this limitation, Kothari et al. (2005) suggest an extension to 
the modified Jones model by incorporating ROA as a control for the firm’s financial 
performance. According to Kothari et al. (2005) model, discretionary accruals are 
estimated as the residuals of the following regression equation: 
                    ⁄                           ⁄  ⁄                ⁄⁄             [2.7] 
Where   
         : :Total accruals for firm i in year t. 
       : Change in revenues for firm i in year t. 
       : Change in receivables (debtors) for firm i, in year t. 
      : Gross property, plant and equipment for firm i in year t. 
        : Lagged return on assets for firm i, in year t. 
      : Lagged total assets at beginning of year. 
                : Firm-specific parameters. 
2.4.2 The Specific Accruals Approach 
It has been observed that EM researchers rely on total accruals models rather than 
the specific-accruals approach to detect EM (Beneish 2001). This deficiency leads 
Healy and Wahlen (1999) to call for further research in the area of specific accruals. 
They point out that, “Overall, there is remarkably little evidence on EM using specific 
accruals, suggesting that this is likely to be a fruitful area for future research. By 
examining specific accruals, researchers can provide direct evidence for standard 
setters of areas where standards work well and where there may be room for 
improvement” (p. 372). Likewise, Beneish (2001) states that the difficulties faced by 
total accruals models suggest that specific-accruals studies are needed.    
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In general, two types of specific-accruals models have been tested in the previous 
literature: a single specific accrual and multiple specific accruals. Based on the single 
specific-accrual approach, McNichols and Wilson (1988) use the provision for bad 
debts rather than total accruals and then use the residuals as a proxy for 
discretionary accruals. They find that firms with unusually low earnings prefer to 
engage in income-decreasing EM, indicating that this behaviour is consistent with 
the big bath strategy. Other studies investigate other single specific-accruals 
approaches, such as loan loss provisions in the banks (Beaver and Engel 1996), and 
claim loss reserves in insurance companies   (Petroni et al. 2000; Petroni 1992). 
In respect of multiple specific accruals, Beneish (1997), for example, introduces a 
model to detect EM among companies experiencing extreme financial performance. 
The model includes variables such as capital structure, prior market performance, 
ownership structure, sales growth, time listed, and other incentives for managers to 
violate GAAP. The study finds a systematic relationship between the likelihood of 
violating GAAP and the variables (e.g. capital structure, prior market performance, 
sales growth) that are used as proxies for motivations to manipulate earnings. 
Although the specific-accruals approach has some advantages in estimating 
discretionary accruals in certain circumstances, it fails to estimate it in most 
circumstances (McNichols and Wilson 1988). In addition, the specific-accruals 
approach is insufficiently flexible for the investigation of additional variables such as 
corporate governance. Hence, for a researcher aiming to explore the association 
between EM and other hypothesised factors, the specific-accruals approach is 
meaningless because it requires a separate model for each specific accrual, which is 
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more likely to be influenced by the hypothesised factors. Furthermore, Beneish 
(2001) suggests that the number of companies for which a specific accrual is 
managed may be small relative to the number of companies with aggregate accruals, 
which in turn may result in limitations in the findings of specific-accruals studies. 
2.4.3 Frequency Distribution Approach 
Unlike the other previous approaches that attempt to measure EM through the use 
of discretionary accruals, the distribution approach is based on the conception that 
managers have motivations to meet specific earnings benchmarks such as avoiding 
losses and decreased earnings. Therefore, it tests the distribution of reported 
earnings around such earnings thresholds to identify whether the incidences above 
and below the thresholds are distributed smoothly or reflect discontinuities due to 
managerial discretion.  
 The study by Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) was the first to use the distribution of 
earnings and earnings changes to measure whether managers engage in EM to avoid 
loss and earnings decreases, respectively. EM to avoid losses is reflected in the forms 
of unusually low frequencies of small losses and unusually high frequencies of small 
profits. Likewise, avoiding earnings decreases is reflected in the forms of unusually 
low frequencies of small earnings decreases and unusually high frequencies of small 
earnings increases. The study findings reveal that firms with small pre-managed 
earnings decreases engage in income-increasing to report earnings increases, and 
firms with slightly negative pre-managed earnings engage in income-increasing to 
report positive earnings. Furthermore, it finds that cash flow from operations and 
changes in working capital are the primary tools for managing earnings.  
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Similarly, Degeorge et al. (1999) use distribution of earnings per share to test 
whether avoiding loss, sustaining recent performance, and meeting analysts’ 
forecasts motivate managers to manage earnings. The findings of their study reveal 
that the most important threshold motivating managers to manage earnings is the 
wish to avoid reporting losses; the second is to report profits at least equal to 
previous profits, and the third is to meet analysts’ expectations. 
Likewise,  Beatty et al. (1999) use the distribution approach to investigate incentives 
in terms of whether the desire to avoid earnings decreases motivates managers in 
public and private banks to engage in EM. They find that public banks report much 
smaller earnings increases and much smaller decreases than expected; however, 
there is only weak evidence that private banks report fewer small decreases in 
earnings than expected. In addition, they find that public banks report more small 
decreases in earnings than private banks, even after controlling for differences in the 
operations between the public and private banks (i.e., bank size, asset growth, cash 
flows, loan characteristics, and geographic regions). Their study finds that public 
banks may use loan provisions and realised security gains and losses for increasing 
reported earnings. Overall, they point out that the public banks have stronger 
motivations to manipulate earnings than private banks do. 
However, Durtschi and Easton (2005) criticise the approach of discontinuity around 
zero and the shapes of frequency distributions on which researchers rely as evidence 
of EM, and claim that these shapes are affected by deflation, sample selection 
criteria and/or differences between the characteristics of observations to the right 
and to the left of zero. They conclude that the shapes of distribution patterns are not 
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sufficient evidence of EM; therefore researchers must rule out these confounding 
factors before using the shapes of earnings distributions around zero as evidence of 
EM. In addition, Durtschi and Easton (2005) argue that there is no evidence to 
support the notion that the pervasive discontinuity of discretionary accruals at zero 
is due to the practice of EM.  
Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded that the total-accruals approach 
seems to have significant advantages over the other two approaches for detecting 
EM. These advantages may explain why a large number of EM studies rely upon 
total-accruals models to measure EM. Therefore, the present study will use the total-
accruals approach to estimate discretionary accruals as a proxy for EM.  
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2.5 Summary 
EM represents reported earnings that reflect opportunistic managerial behaviour 
rather than the underlying economic circumstances of the company. The incentives 
that induce managers to manage reported earnings include income-increasing and 
income-decreasing EM motivations. To achieve earnings targets, managers may use 
several accounting techniques without violating the GAAP; these techniques allow 
managers to choose alternative accounting methods to estimate the firm’s 
performance during a given period. Hence, alternative approaches and models are 
introduced in the literature to measure EM. Although total-accruals models, specific-
accruals models, and the frequency distribution approach are used as alternative 
approaches, the total-accruals approach is the most widely-used approach in the 
literature because it attempts to capture the total effect of accruals on earnings. The 
models under the aggregate accruals approach are based on classifying the total 
accruals into two components: discretionary and non-discretionary accruals. While 
non-discretionary accruals are adjustments mandated by accounting standards, 
discretionary accruals are adjustments selected by managers. Although there are 
several suggested models for measuring EM, the most common models used by 
previous studies are the Jones, modified Jones, and performance-matched models. 
Therefore, the present study will compare the findings of these three models in 
order to determine the most powerful one; this will be used as the primary model 
for investigating the association between EM and CSR.   
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3 Chapter Three                                                                                     
Corporate Social Responsibility: Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter presents a review of CSR and CSD. The chapter is divided into two main 
parts. The first section covers the relevant literature on CSR in general, while the 
second section presents a literature review on CSD.  
3.2 Concept and Definition of CSR  
Although the term ‘CSR’ is widely used in the literature, there is no generally or 
commonly-agreed definition of it. Therefore, the term ‘CSR’ can appear under a 
variety of terms, such as corporate social performance, corporate citizenship, 
corporate accountability, and business ethics, to connote the social responsibility of 
business (Valor 2005). According to Votaw (1972), the term CSR ‘means something, 
but not always the same thing to everybody. To some it means “legal responsibility 
or liability”; to others, it means socially responsible behaviour in an “ethical sense”; 
to still others, it means socially responsible behaviour in a “causal mode”; some 
people see it as a social conscience; some others take it as a synonym for 
“legitimacy” in the context of being proper or valid; still some others see it as a sort 
of “fiduciary duty” that requires businessmen to behave at a higher standard; while 
many think it is simply `a charitable contribution' to society’ (p.25). Nevertheless, the 
key principle of these terms is that corporations have obligations to work for social 
betterment (Frederick 1994). 
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Although an essential element of CSR is the notion that a business entity has a social 
responsibility, there is no universal agreement on which kind of social responsibility 
a business should take. According to the classical viewpoint, a firm is only 
accountable to its shareholders and therefore its role in society is to maximise its 
economic value, which in turn increases the wealth of its shareholders. Hence, 
managers’ responsibility is to act in the interest of the firm’s shareholders and they 
have no right to engage in social projects that do not maximise the returns of the 
business (Friedman 1962). In line with this perspective, Lawrence et al. (1999) 
suggest that any social responsibility that does not lead to the maximising of the 
shareholders’ wealth should be considered an abuse of the firm’s responsibility to its 
stakeholders. In general, the perspective of the classical or shareholders’ viewpoint 
assumes that the only social responsibility of a business entity is to use its resources 
to engage in activities that increase its profits without resorting to deception or 
fraud (Friedman 1962, p.112). Although this perspective has been supported by 
scholars (e.g. Sundaram and Inkpen 2004; Jensen 2002; Freeman and Liedtka 1991), 
it has created a long debate about the concept of CSR, and it is not yet widely 
accepted.  
Alternatively, the stakeholder perspective assumes that a firm is accountable not 
only to its shareholders but also to its stakeholders, who may be affected by the 
firm’s achievements (Freeman 1994). In this regard, Mitchell et al. (1997) claim that, 
while the firm is pursuing profits. it should take into account the stakeholders’ 
interests. Under this perspective, the World Business Council for Sustainable 
Development (WBCSD) defines CSR as “the commitment of business to contribute to 
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sustainable economic development, working with employees, their families and local 
communities” (WBCSD, 2002, p.6). According to this definition, the basic idea of CSR 
is associated with the concern of the impact of a corporation’s activities on a wider 
society. The Commission of European Communities (2001) defines CSR as “a concept 
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in the business 
operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis” 
(p.6). Although the European Commission definition is highlighting the social and 
environmental aspects and interactions of a broader array of stakeholders, it 
perceives CSR as a voluntary concept that might seem far from settled. Therefore, 
several broader definitions have been introduced in the literature. One of the most 
widely accepted definitions was provided by (Carroll 1979) based on four 
responsibilities, namely economic, legal, ethical and discretionary (p.449): 
 Economic responsibility is the foremost responsibility that perceives an 
operation as an economic unit that assimilates providing sustainable returns 
for investors, producing goods and services demanded by society, providing 
high-quality products at fair prices, creating new jobs, and providing safe and 
fairly paid employment to the workforce (Matten and Moon 2008, p.405).    
 Legal responsibility requires all corporations within society to carry out their 
economic responsibility in accordance with legal requirements and social 
regulations.  
 Ethical responsibility requires businesses to be moral. Therefore, it covers 
constraints in the legal responsibility, such as ensuring compliance with 
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societal values and standards, not engaging in misleading advertising, and 
showing concern for environmental and sustainable development.  
 Discretionary responsibility focuses on the activities of corporations in 
respect of donations to the community. Such activities are voluntary 
engagements and they may, for example, include social programmes within 
the community, such as education and heath donations, and sponsoring 
community events.  
Carroll (1991, p.42) argues that these four responsibilities can be depicted as a 
pyramid, in which economic responsibility is the base upon which all the other 
responsibilities are postulated, as presented in Figure 3.1 below. 
Figure 3-1: Carroll Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Carroll (1991, p.42)  
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An important question regarding the relation between CSR and Corporate Social 
Responsibility Disclosure (CSD) is: how do firms provide or convey CSR information to 
a wide range of stakeholders? To address this question, previous studies have 
investigated the association between CSR and CSD (Belkaoui and Karpik 1989; 
Ingram and Frazier 1983; Freedman and Jaggi 1982; Abbott and Monsen 1979), 
based on an assumption that a firm which discloses its CSR activities must undertake 
such activities. The findings of these studies suggest that CSR and CSD are positively 
related. In accordance with these findings, several studies (e.g. Lanis and Richardson 
2012; Wibowo 2012) have used CSD as a proxy for CSR. Therefore, following the 
previous studies, the present study uses CSD as a proxy of CSR.            
3.3  Definition of CSD  
Corporate disclosure is defined as “the publication of any economic information 
relating to a business enterprise, quantitative or otherwise, which facilitates the 
making of investment decisions” (Choi 1973, p.160). Cooke (1989b) provides a more 
extensive definition and defines corporate disclosure as “those items in corporate 
annual reports that are relevant and material to the decision-making process of 
users who are unable to demand information for their particular needs” (p. 6).     
The term “social accounting” is sometimes used by various authors to refer to CSD 
(e.g. Gray 2002; Parker 1991; Zeghal and Ahmed 1990; Gray et al. 1987). In this 
regard, Mathews and Perera (1995) indicate that, “at the very least, social 
accounting means an extension of disclosure into non-traditional areas such as 
providing information about employees, products, community service and 
prevention or reduction of pollution” (p.364). Gallhofer and Haslam (2003) argue 
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that "social accounting is demarcated as an accounting going beyond the financial 
economist, notably in the assessing of business performance. It is differentiated from 
an accounting constrained to reflect what are conventionally assumed to be the 
interests of the shareholders. Social accounting here reflects a presumption, at least 
on the face of it, that the goal of the business organisation properly goes beyond the 
narrow and conventional focus upon profit or financial wealth maximisation in 
current or envisaged contexts. Social accounting goes beyond an accounting for the 
use of shareholders only, with other users, including the public at large, and hence 
multifarious usage, being envisaged" (p.113). According to Gray (2002), social 
accounting takes a wide variety of forms and appears under different names such as 
social responsibility accounting, social audits, corporate social reporting, employee 
and employment reporting, stakeholder dialogue reporting and environmental 
accounting and reporting. This may lead to some confusion as it may be used to 
indicate very different things.  
Elias and Epstein (1975) provide one of the earliest definitions of CSD and define it as 
“reporting on some aspects of the company’s social activities, performance or 
impact” (p.37). Since then, many efforts have been made to define CSD. Guthrie and 
Mathews (1985) define CSD as ‘’provision of financial and non-financial information 
relating to an organisation’s interaction with its physical and social environment, as 
stated in corporate annual reports or separate social reports’’ (p.78).   
One of the broadest definitions, which is still valid today, is provided by Gray et al. 
(1987, p.ix), who suggest that CSD is “the process of communicating the social and 
environmental effects of the organisation’s economic actions to particular interest 
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groups within society and to society at large’’. In addition, Gray et al. argue that 
these actions ‘’involve extending the accountability of organizations (particularly 
companies), beyond the traditional role of providing a financial account to the 
owners of capital, in particular, shareholders. Such an extension is predicated upon 
the assumption that companies do have wider responsibilities than simply to make 
money for shareholders’’ (Gray et al. 1987, p.ix).  
Based on the above discussion, it can be concluded that CSD is a broad term that 
may include various issues including community involvement-related disclosure, 
product and customer relations. environment and energy-related disclosure, and 
human resources-related information (Gao et al. 2005; Deegan 2002; Williams and 
Ho Wern Pei 1999; Hackston and Milne 1996; Gray et al. 1995b; Ng 1985).   
3.4  EM and CSR 
Agency theory provides an explanation that the agent (the manager) is responsible 
for making decisions on behalf of the principal (owner) and he/she must practise 
his/her duties in such a way as to increase the owner’s wealth and to fulfil his/her 
expectations (Jensen and Meckling 1976). However, the separation between 
ownership and control in modern corporations, together with the presence of 
information asymmetries within companies, spawn the possibility of opportunistic 
behaviour by managers from those of the owners, and hence pursue self-interning 
objectives (the agency problem) (Prior et al. 2008). Given that managers practice EM 
either to gain some private benefits at the expense of other stakeholders or to 
mislead shareholders about the firm’s underlying financial performance (Healy and 
Wahlen 1999), it has been acknowledge that EM is considered as a type of agency 
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cost because managers look after their own interests by releasing financial reporting 
that do not reflect an accurate economic picture of the company (Prior et al. 2008). 
On the other hand, corporate disclosure is viewed as a form of monitoring 
mechanism used by investors and other external users to reduce information 
asymmetry problem (Huang and Zhang 2011). Hence, disclosure is considered as one 
of the possible solutions to reduce the agency problem between managers and 
shareholders (Eng and Mak 2003). 
Given that that financial transparency and accountability are vital principles of CSR, it 
has been argued that EM is expected to occur less in social responsible companies 
because such companies do not hide unfavourable earnings realization and, hence, 
conduct no EM (Chih et al. 2008). On the other hand, managers may use CSR as 
entrenchment mechanism to protect them-selves against stakeholder activism and 
vigilance (Prior et al. 2008). 
Although very few studies have addressed the link between EM and CSR, these 
studies, in general, have documented two contradictory perspectives. Since EM is 
perceived as an irresponsible act and inconsistent with CSR principles, the first 
perspective argues firms with strong commitment to CSR are more prone to act in a 
responsible way when reporting their financial statements (Choi et al. 2013). 
Likewise, Kim et al. (2012) argue that socially responsible  companies  that  expend  
effort  and  resources  in choosing and implementing CSR practices to meet ethical 
expectations by stakeholders are more likely to prevent EM behaviour, thereby 
providing more transparent and reliable financial information. On the other hand, 
the second perspective argues that CSR can be used as an effective tool to deal with 
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stakeholder activism and vigilance when manages manipulate earnings (Prior et al. 
2008). With this regard, Prior et al. (2008) argue that managers who manage 
earnings engage in board activities such as CSR to bolster their own job security and 
gain support from stakeholder groups. In line with this view, Choi et al. (2013) argue 
that CSR can be used as an entrenchment mechanism to protect  managers who act 
in pursuit of private benefits by distorting earnings information.  
Empirically, the review of the literature reveals that the findings of the prior studies 
on the relation between EM and CSR are also contradictory. While several studies 
find that EM and CSR are negatively linked, others find a positive relationship 
between the two variables. For example, Kim et al. (2012) investigate the association 
between EM and CSR in US companies and find that social responsible companies 
are less likely to manage earnings via discretionary accruals or real EM. In line with  
the findings of  Kim et al.’s (2012) study, Choi et al. (2013) find that South Korean 
firms with high level of CSR engage in low level of EM.  Likewise, Chih et al. (2008) 
investigate the link between EM and CSR using multinational firm data for 46 
countries and find that firms with great commitment to CSR engage in low level of 
earnings smoothing and avoidance, while the extent of earnings aggressiveness is 
increased. 
On the other hand, other studies have found that EM and CSR are positively related. 
For instance, Prior et al. (2008) using multinational firm data for 26 countries and 
find that managers who manipulate earnings resort to CSR activities to deal with 
stakeholders’ activism and vigilance. Hence, CSR is used as an effective tool to hide 
managers’ opportunistic behaviour. The similar results are found by Gargouri et al. 
45 
 
(2010) find a positive relationship between EM and CSR in Canadian companies. 
Likewise, Patten and Trompeter (2003) investigate the link between environmental 
disclosure and EM during 1984 chemical leak at Union Carbide's Bhopal, India plant 
and find that companies with higher levels of pre-event environmental disclosures 
tend to engage in income-increasing EM.    
Based on above discussion, it can be concluded that although agency theory argues 
that disclosure as a monitoring tool may reduce information asymmetry between 
managers and stakeholders, thereby constraining EM practices, the previous studies 
have found mixed and contradictory results. While several studies find that EM and 
CSR are negative related, others find that EM and CSR are positively related.  Thus, 
this study is motivated to investigate whether or not EM and CSR are linked in the 
context of the UK.      
3.5 Theories related to EM and CSR  
Researchers have introduced various theories to explain the motivations behind CSR 
activities (e.g. Deegan et al. 2002; Hooghiemstra 2000; Gray et al. 1995a). These 
theories are, for example, Agency Theory, Stakeholder Theory, Political Economy 
Theory, Legitimacy Theory, Signalling Theory, Cost-benefit Theory, and Political Cost 
Theory. However, for the purpose of the present study, only Stakeholder, Legitimacy, 
Political Economy, Agency, and Signalling theories are reviewed because these 
theories are sufficient to assist with the development of the study’s hypotheses.      
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3.5.1 Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholder theory is examined in the literature from three perspectives: the 
instrumental, the descriptive, and the normative perspectives (Donaldson and 
Preston 1995). While the first two perspectives suggest that a business should 
strategically manage powerful stakeholders by identifying them with the self-interest 
of the business, the normative perspective suggests that managers should address 
all stakeholder groups from an accountability perspective (Gray et al. 1997; 1996; 
1995a; Donaldson and Preston 1995; Gray et al. 1988; Freeman 1984).   
Under the instrumental and descriptive perspectives, CSD is seen as a means to 
manage only the perception of powerful stakeholder groups (Ullmann 1985). 
Therefore, CSD is provided for the strategic purpose of gaining approval and support 
for the firm’s continuing operation, rather than for accountability purposes (Deegan 
2002). In line with this suggestion, CSD is made to manage the perception of 
stakeholder groups who are seen as important to the firm.  
On the other hand, the normative stakeholder perspective explains that firms have a 
duty and obligation to a wider range of stakeholder groups and that CSD is obligatory 
for the firm in order to discharge wider accountability by providing information to 
relevant stakeholders (Buhr 2001; Guay et al. 1996). However, this perspective 
provides a prescription for how managers can undertake strategies to manage and 
treat their various stakeholders; it does not have a direct role in predicting 
managerial behaviour in practice (Deegan 2002).  
Based on the notion that a firm is perceived not as a bilateral relationship between 
shareholders and managers, but as a multilateral set of relationships amongst 
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stakeholders, Prior et al. (2008) argue that EM not only affects a firm’s shareholders 
but also has an impact on stakeholders. Hence, when stakeholders suspect EM, the 
firm is expected to immediately lose value on the stock market.  
Although stakeholder theory is useful because it “defines the influencing /influenced 
groups for us and explicitly defines what accountability the organisation itself is 
willing to recognise and discharge” (Gray et al. 1997, p.333)”, it has been criticised 
because it is based on the relative power and influence of stakeholders, which could 
marginalise the rights of other stakeholders who may be seen as less important 
(Deegan 2002; Gray et al. 1997).  
3.5.2 Legitimacy Theory 
Legitimacy theory argues that a firm’s activities must be legitimate in the eyes of 
society if it is to be allowed to continue its operations. According to Suchman (1995), 
legitimacy theory is ‘’a generalised perception or assumption that the actions of any 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system 
of norms, values, beliefs and definitions’’ (p. 574). Hence, if the company loses its 
legitimacy, society may revoke its contract and prevent it from continuing its 
operations (Deegan and Rankin 1996; Guthrie and Parker 1989). In accordance with 
this perspective, it is accepted that companies disclose social information to show 
that they are conforming to the expectations and values of the society within which 
they operate, as well as to legitimise their behaviour (Deegan and Rankin 1996; 
Guthrie and Parker 1989).   
Maali et al. (2006) argue that firms need to provide voluntary social disclosure in 
order to meet broad expectations of society relating to employee welfare, 
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community and the treatment of the natural environment. Furthermore, O’Donovan 
(2002); and Brown and Deegan (1998) state that social expectation is not a static 
concept; in fact, it may change over time, which means that firms need to improve 
their social activities in order to continuously maintain their legitimacy. According to 
Dowling and Pfeffer (1975), there are various strategies that firms can adopt in order 
to maintain their legitimacy within the society in which they operate, and all these 
strategies can be involved to make social disclosure as a means of showing that firms 
are conforming to society’s expectations. In this regard, Lindblom (1994) argues that, 
when a disparity between an entity’s value system and the value system of the larger 
social system is present, there is a threat to the entity’s legitimacy. In addition, the 
study suggests that firms can narrow this legitimacy gap by adopting one of four 
strategies.  
First, the firm might seek to inform its stakeholders about actual changes in its 
performance and activities. Second, the firm may seek to change the perceptions of 
the relevant publics without changing its actual behaviour. Third, the firm may seek 
to manipulate perception by deflecting attention from the issue of concern to other 
related issues via an appeal to, for example, emotive symbols. Fourth, the firm might 
seek to change external expectations of performance. According to Lindblom (1994), 
these four legitimating strategies may  be used by the firm to alter the perception or 
expectations of society with or without changing the real activities; the study 
suggests that, while the disclosed social information might be the same, the purpose 
behind the disclosure may have four different purposes. Along the same lines,  Gray 
et al. (1995a) indicate that the first strategy can be used “in response to a 
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recognition that the legitimacy gap arose from an actual failure of performance of 
the firm. The second legitimacy strategy can be applied when the firm thinks that the 
legitimacy gap arose via misperceptions on the part of the relevant public. The third 
strategy can be chosen whenever the firm with a legitimacy gap regarding its 
pollution performance chooses. The fourth strategy can be adopted when the firm 
considers that the relevant public have unrealistic or incorrect expectations of its 
responsibilities” (p.54).  
Patten (1992, 1991) states that firms may choose to present social disclosure in 
annual reports to maintain or increase perceptions of legitimacy and respond to 
public policy changes. Besides annual reports, firms may use advertising, press 
releases, and information in their own publications or brochures in order to 
influence the perceptions of the public policy process (Zeghal and Ahmed 1990). 
Parker (1986) argues that ‘’social disclosure can act as an early response to 
impending legislative pressure for increased disclosure and as a counter to possible 
government intervention or pressure from other outside interest groups. Thus, from 
this viewpoint, CSD might be used to anticipate or avoid social pressure. At the same 
time it may be used to boost the corporation’s public standing” (p. 76). Therefore, as 
argued by Gray et al. (1988), CSD in the company reports may be used as a means of 
anticipating or avoiding social pressure as well as enhancing the firm’s image or 
reputational status. Maali et al. (2006) argue that firms need to disclose enough 
social information to legitimise their activities and behaviours as well as to assess 
whether they are behaving like good corporate citizens.  
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In terms of EM, Sun et al. (2010) indicate that managers who engage in EM tend to 
realise that CSD can be used to maintain the firm’s legitimacy, specifically with social 
and political stakeholders. Therefore, CSD is seen as a means of informing 
stakeholders of the firm’s wider interests and of its accountability that prompts it to 
behave in a socially responsibility manner.    
However, several studies have employed legitimacy theory as a driver for social 
disclosure (e.g. Branco and Rodrigues 2008; De Villiers and van Staden 2006; Ahmed 
and Sulaiman 2004; Campbell et al. 2003; Deegan and Rankin 1996). Gray et al. 
(1995a) argue that legitimacy theory overlaps with political economy theory. For 
example, Gray et al. (1995a) point out that CSD as an organisational practice can be 
more clearly understood through political economy theory rather than solely by 
economic or moral explanations. In addition, Parker (2005) states that legitimacy 
theory is lacking specificity, and its ability to predict and explain managerial 
behaviour remains uncertain.    
3.5.3 Political Economy Theory 
Political economy theory is based on the premise that the political, economic and 
social contexts are inseparable; thus, all these aspects should be considered in CSD 
studies (Guthrie and Parker 1989). The study by Gray et al. (1995a) agrees with the 
perspective of Guthrie and Parker by indicating that ‘’the essential point, it seems, is 
that the economic domain cannot be studied in isolation from the political, social 
and institutional framework within which the economy operates’’ (p. 52). According 
to Gray et al. (1995b), political economy theory focuses on the exchanges that occur 
in any framework such as the market and the relationships among social institutions 
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participating in such exchanges. Therefore, CSD is considered a means of 
constructing and affecting the political and economic environment surrounding the 
firm, which means that firms appear to respond to government or public pressure in 
order to provide information on their social impact (Guthrie and Parker 1989). 
However, a number of studies have attempted to interpret CSR using political 
economy theory in order to explain and understand the motivations that induce 
firms to provide CSD through their reports (Adams and Harte 1998; Adams et al. 
1995b; Gray et al. 1995a; Guthrie and Parker 1989). Gray et al. (1996) categorise this 
theory into two approaches: bourgeois political economy theory and classical 
political economy theory approaches. The first approach tends to focus on the 
interaction of competing groups within society and perceives the world as essentially 
pluralistic; however, it generally ignores sectional interests, structural inequity, 
conflict and the role of the State (Cowen et al. 1987). Williams and Ho Wern Pei 
(1999) state that ‘’bourgeois political economy concentrates on the interaction of 
actors within a pluralistic world” (p.211). This may indicate that different individuals, 
institutions and organisations, seeking to preserve their own self-interests, attempt 
to operate within the system through various relationships with others (Dahl 1982). 
The theory emphasises that actors, be they individuals or organisations, have the 
right to pursue their own goals and self-interests (Clark 1991). These rights, however, 
are moderated by the social context in which they exist (Gray et al. 1996).  
The classical political economy theory, on the other hand, argues that the conflict 
between the different groups is inherent within society (Gray et al. 1996; Cooper and 
Sherer 1984). Deegan (2006) describes the classical political economy theory as that 
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which perceives ‘’accounting report and disclosures as a means of marinating the 
favoured position of those who control scarce resources, and as a means of 
undermining the position of those with scarce capital. It focuses on the structural 
conflicts within society" (p.274). 
In respect of EM, Patten and Trompeter (2003) argue that firms that do have 
incentives to reduce reported earnings are expected to exhibit a lower magnitude of 
EM in response to regulatory threats. In addition, they state that if a firm’s managers 
believe that CSD is an effective tool for reducing the likelihood of regulatory actions, 
it would appear that firms with higher levels of CSD would have less incentive to 
engage in income-decreasing EM. In addition, Yip et al. (2011)  argue that, while an 
ethical perspective suggests that ethical firms will minimise EM, the political cost 
offers another reason for lower EM. Therefore, they assume that firms with high CSD 
are expected to exhibit a lower magnitude of EM when political costs are high. 
Although political economy theory explains the motivations for conducting CSD 
(Guthrie and Parker 1989), it fails to consider the internal factors present in 
companies, such as the corporate characteristics that may have an important effect 
on social disclosure (O’Donovan 2002; Patten 1991). 
3.5.4 Agency Theory 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) define an agency relationship as “a contract under which 
one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform 
some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making 
authority to the agent” (p. 308). In the context of business, the agent represents the 
managers of a corporation, while the principal(s) refers to the corporation’s 
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shareholders. Ideally, based on the business contract between management and 
owner, it is assumed that management is responsible for making decisions on behalf 
of the owners and they must practise their duties in such a way as to increase the 
owners’ wealth and to fulfil their expectations. However, when managers and 
owners have different objectives, the conflict of interests problem occurs, and 
managers will act and make economic decisions that fulfil their own self-interests at 
the expense of the shareholders (e.g. Prior et al. 2008; Watts and Zimmerman 1986). 
In addition, information asymmetry exists when the managers of a firm have 
superior access to information as compared to the investors (e.g Fraser et al. 2009; 
Marshall and Weetman 2007; Arnold and de Lange 2004). In this regard, Prior et al. 
(2008) argue that the separation of ownership and control of modern corporations, 
together with the existence of information asymmetries within companies, spawns 
the possibility of opportunistic behaviours by the managers, who may have different 
objectives from those of the shareholders and may thus pursue self-serving goals 
(the agency problem (p.161).  
Given that managers of a company are concerned about their job positions, security 
and rewards, and with maximising their wealth, it is possible that they will engage in 
undesirable activities such as EM, which in turn may  harm the company’s value and 
reputation as well as causing investors to make non-optimal investment decisions 
(agency problem) (Prior et al. 2008). Therefore, transparency and accountability 
systems should be put in place in order to avoid agency problems (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986). In this regard, Morris (1987) states that, without appropriate 
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monitoring, the separation of ownership and control of a company might create 
serious problems. 
 In order to solve the agency problem, Healy and Palepu (2001, p.409-410) suggest 
several solutions. The first is to develop optimal contractual incentives to reduce the 
conflict of interests between managers and investors. The second is to ensure that 
the role of the mentoring function by the board of directors is sufficiently effective 
to observe and control for managerial behaviour on the behalf of investors. Finally, 
financial analysts and rating agencies should make use of private information 
provided by managers to uncover any managerial misuse of the firm’s resources. 
These solutions imply that contractual agreements and internal and external 
corporate governance mechanisms play an essential role in reducing the agency 
problem. 
With respect to corporate disclosure, Eng and Mak (2003) indicate that disclosure is 
recognised as one of the possible solutions to reduce the agency problem since well-
informed investors are expected to scrutinise firms based on the information 
provided to them, and this subsequently reduces the agency costs. Likewise, Huang 
and Zhang (2011) suggest that disclosure is viewed as one of the monitoring 
mechanisms used to reduce information asymmetry between managers and 
investors; hence, it may be an effective tool to decrease the agency problem. In 
addition, Sun et al. (2010) state that companies may use different methods such as 
voluntary disclosure to reduce the conflict of interests between managers and 
investors.  
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Given that the financial transparency and accountability are vital principles of CSR 
(Chih et al. 2008), EM is expected to occur less in companies that disclose more 
information on their social activities, because when the information transparency is 
increased, it is expected that the information asymmetry between managers and 
investors will be decreased, which will enable investors to detect EM (Jo and Kim 
2007). On the other hand, EM is considered more likely to occur in those companies 
with limited or low levels of CSD, as a result of which information asymmetry is 
expected to be high (Jo and Kim 2007). In addition, Eisenhardt (1989) states that 
“….since information systems inform the principal about what the agent is actually 
doing, they are likely to curb agent opportunism because the agent will realize that 
he or she cannot deceive the principal”(p.60). 
3.5.5 Signalling Theory 
The problem of information asymmetry, or the signalling problem, exists when one 
party has greater access to information compared to the other (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986). In other words, when managers have greater access to the 
company’s information and transactions compared to the investors, who rely on the 
information provided by those managers who may conceal the company’s true 
economic value, the problem of information asymmetry exists. According to 
signalling theory, a company discloses information to reduce information asymmetry 
and to signal to investors that it is performing better than its competitors (Álvarez et 
al. 2008; Miller 2002). However, Hughes (1986) states that the credibility of 
information provided by a firm is an essential element in ensuring lower information 
asymmetry. In this regard, Bhattacharya and Dittmar (2001) argue that “A good firm 
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can distinguish itself from a bad firm by sending a credible signal about its quality to 
capital markets. The signal will be credible only if the bad firm chooses not to mimic 
the good firm by sending the same signal” (p.1).  
Although there are a number of overlaps between signalling theory and agency 
theory as a consequence of significant similarities (Sun et al. 2010), signalling theory 
is more concerned with the quality than the quantity of information (e.g. Morris 
1987; Watts and Zimmerman 1986). In this respect, Gray (2007) states that high-
quality firms tend to use CSD as an alternative to the classical financial reporting, 
while low-quality companies choose non-disclosure, consistent with constrained 
accounting information. In addition, the study argues that the quality of company 
reports is a signal to investors and financial markets that managers are able to 
control social risks within the company. Likewise, Sun et al. (2010) indicate that 
corporate environment disclosure as a part of CSR is a signal to investors and other 
powerful and economic stakeholders that the company is actively taking part in CSR 
and that its market value is in good condition. However, there is no guarantee that 
companies will provide accurate information because managers’ disclosure decisions 
are determined by the marginal benefits to be gained from reducing information 
asymmetry in the market (Abhayawansa and Abeysekera 2009). 
Given that disclosure is used by investors as a monitoring tool to control managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour (Bushman and Smith 2001), it is predicted to reduce the 
information symmetry (agency problem) between companies and their investors. In 
this regard, Healy and Palepu (2001) state that investors need information in order 
to monitor a firm’s activities and make connections between managerial  decisions 
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and the firm’s performance. In consistency with this view, agency theory has been 
widely used in CSR and EM studies (Choi et al. 2013; Jiang et al. 2013; Pyo and Lee 
2013; Yongtae et al. 2012; Chih et al. 2008; Prior et al. 2008; Jo and Kim 2007) to 
explain and understand the information asymmetry problem. Based on the notion 
that corporate disclosure is a useful tool for reducing information asymmetry, prior 
studies predicted a negative association between disclosure and information 
asymmetry (Heflin et al. 2005; Brown et al. 2004; Coller and Yohn 1997; Welker 
1995).  
Based on the above, it can be noticed that the agency and signalling theories are 
partially overlapping in the since of that both theories related to information 
asymmetry between firms and their investors. They both perceived disclosure as a 
means to reduce information asymmetry (Morris 1987). In this regard, (Morris 1987, 
p.53) points out that “Rational behaviour is common to both theories; information 
asymmetry is  implied by positive monitoring costs in agency theory; quality can be 
defined in terms of agency theory variables; and signalling costs are implicit in some 
bonding devices of agency theory. Therefore, agency theory and signalling theory are 
consistent. However, the previous studies have implied agency theory to explain EM 
behaviour (Kent et al. 2010; Jiraporn et al. 2008; Wallace et al. 2004). According to 
agency theory, EM is perceived as a form of agency cost that arises from both 
information asymmetry and the conflicts between managers and investors (Prior et 
al. 2008; Christie and Zimmerman 1994). In line with this argument, the study by 
Richardson (2000) finds that information asymmetry is positively related to EM, 
which implies that the greater the level of information asymmetry the higher the 
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possibility of EM. In contrast, when the level is relatively low, EM is less likely to be 
practiced. 
On the other hand, Kim and Verrecchia (1994) suggest that information asymmetry 
between firms and investors decreases with voluntary disclosure. Likewise,  (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976) indicate the corporate disclosure is perceived as one of tools 
mitigating agency cost. Furthermore, Eng and Mak (2003) argue that CSD is a 
possible solutions for reducing the conflict between mangers and investors, which 
may and then may decrease the level of EM. Given that increasing the level of 
disclosure is a possible solution to constrain EM through decreasing information 
asymmetry and conflicts between managers and shareholders, the present study 
employs agency theory to explain the potential relationship between CSR and EM.      
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3.6 Summary 
This chapter provides a review of CSR: its definitions, motivations and the link with 
its disclosure. Then CSD is reviewed by addressing its definitions and the theories. It 
concentrates, in particular, on the theories used in the literature to explain and 
understand the relationship between CSD and external stakeholder groups. CSD will 
be used as a proxy for CSR in the study. Since EM is perceived as an agency problem, 
CSR is perceived as a monitoring tool available to stakeholders to monitor managers’ 
behaviour and actions. The review of the literature reveals that the agency theory is 
a more appropriate framework with which to explain the association between EM 
and CSD. However, it is found that signalling theory is related to the quality of 
information provided by companies and the information asymmetry problem. Given 
that the present study is concerned with the association between the quantity of 
CSD and EM, the agency theory is applied as a primary theory to explain and 
interpret the study results.  
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4 Chapter Four                                                                          
Research Methodology 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapters provide a general review of the literature on EM and CSR and 
its disclosure. This chapter on methodology is structured as follows. Sections 4.2 
present the study aim and research questions. Section 4.3 focuses on the sample 
selection and data collection. Section 4.4 discusses the measurements variables. 
Sections 4.5 and 4.6 present the empirical models and analytical procedures 
respectively. Section 4.7 provides a summary of the chapter.     
4.2 Main Research Question and Objectives 
The primary aim of the present study is to investigate whether or not CSR and EM 
are related in UK companies. In particular, it aims to investigate whether the level of 
CSD (proxy for CSR) impacts the magnitude of discretionary accruals (proxy for EM). 
To achieve this aim, the main question of the present study is: Is there a relationship 
between the magnitude of EM and the level of CSR in the UK?  
Three empirical objectives are formulated to address the research main question.  
The first objective is to identify which of the existing EM models is most suitable for 
measuring EM practices in the UK. This is achieved by reviewing the use of different 
models in assessing EM. This study reviews and critically evaluates three different 
models, namely the Jones (1991), modified Jones (Dechow et al. 1995), and the 
performance - matched (Kothari et al. 2005). These models are applied in the 
previous studies. In addition and under the first objective, the level and the direction 
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of reported earnings is also exploring. The second objective is to investigate the total 
and sub-themes levels of CSR. This objective is tested using alternative 
measurements. The third objective is to investigate whether or not discretionary 
accruals (as proxy for EM) and Corporate Social Responsibility disclosure (CSD) (as 
proxy for CSR) are linked in the context of the UK. 
4.3 Hypotheses Development 
The main purpose of this study is to investigate whether or not EM and CSR are 
linked. Thus, the primary question of the study is developed as follows:   
Is there a relationship between EM and CSR in UK companies? 
Agency theory provides explanation of that agency problems occur and conflicts 
arise between managers and owners when the managers act for their own benefits 
rather than optimizing the firms’ value from the stakeholders’ viewpoint (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986). Information asymmetry occurs when managers have superior 
access to the information as compared to the owners (Fields et al. 2001). While 
managers work in the firm every day and are knowledge about all business 
transactions and affairs, stakeholders, on the other hand, depend on periodic 
sources of information, such as annual and interim reports to enable them to valuate 
firm’s value. Thus, information asymmetry will be higher if the quality of information 
is low.  
The separation of ownership and control of a company, together with existence 
conflicts problem and information asymmetry, could create serious problems 
because mangers are more concerned about their job security, rewards, ability to 
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remain in power, and to maximize their own wealth (Morris 1987). Therefore, it is 
possible that managers would become involved in undesirable activities that could 
indirectly harm the company as well as the other stakeholders but which would 
benefit managers. Managers could undertake opportunistic EM to achieve their 
objectives, which in turn, increasing firm’s agency cost.  
Since agency relationships suffer from the problems of conflict of interest and 
information asymmetry, an optimal solution should be discovered to control such 
problems. Several solutions have introduced in the literature to solve firm’s agency 
problems. For example, Watts and Zimmerman (1986) argue that the transparency 
and accountability system is one of the solutions that should be put in place in order 
to avoid agency problems. Given that financial transparency and accountability are 
vital to CSR, a closure investigation of EM (agency cost) and CSR is required (Chih et 
al. 2008).  
Agency theory has been previously employed in the literature to describe the link 
between EM and CSR. For instance, Jo and Kim (2007) argue that EM is expected to 
occur less in companies that disclose more information on their social activities, 
because when the information transparency is increased, it is expected that the 
information asymmetry between managers and investors will be decreased, which 
enables investors to detect EM. Likewise, Eisenhardt (1989) states that “….since 
information systems inform the principal about what the agent is actually doing, 
they are likely to curb agent opportunism because the agent will realize that he or 
she cannot deceive the principal” (p. 60). Similarly, Shleifer (2004) argue that 
manipulate earnings, which unethical behaviour, occurs less often in corporations 
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with a strong commitment to CSR. In addition, Chih et al. (2008) state that a strong 
commitment to CSR principles prevents managers from using their opportunistic 
discretion over earnings.  
Based on the above discussion, the following hypotheses have been developed: 
H1: “There is a negative relationship between the level of EM and CSR”.   
The previous hypothesis is developed to determine the association between the 
total level of CSR and EM. Therefore, in order to test the association between the 
CSR sub-themes (i.e. community (COM), employee (EMP), environment (ENV), 
products and services (PRO), customers (CUS), and others (OTH)) and EM, a further 
six hypotheses are developed as follows:  
H2: “There is a negative relationship between the level of EM and COM sub-score”. 
H3: “There is a negative relationship between the level of EM and EMP sub-score”. 
H4: “There is a negative relationship between the level of EM and ENV sub-score” 
H5: “There is a negative relationship between the level of EM and PRO sub-score”. 
H6: “There is a negative relationship between the level of EM and CUS sub-score” 
H7: “There is a negative relationship between the level of EM and OTH sub-score” 
4.4 Sample Selection and Data Collection  
4.4.1 Sample Selection  
The study covers the period from 2008 to 2010. There are several reasons for this 
selection. First, the review of EM literature reveals that during the financial crisis 
period,  managers may have an incentive to manage earnings to mitigate the impact 
of the financial crisis on firm’s economic financial performance in order to increase 
the shareholders’ confidence in the firm’s economic performance (Rolland and dirigé 
2013; Berndt and Dipl-Kfm. 2011). Since 2008 is considered as the year when the 
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global financial crisis started, one might expect that EM is more prevalent in a period 
of uncertainty during and after the global financial crisis in 2008. On the other hand, 
given that CSR is viewed as one form of monitoring mechanism used by investors 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976), it is expected that CSR to be more effective when 
managers have an incentive to manage earnings during the financial crisis (Huang 
and Zhang 2011). In light of the above statement, the time period covered in this 
study (2008-2010) allows this study to examine whether CSR influence EM activities 
during the global financial crisis. Second, the introduction of the Climate Change Act 
in 2008, demanded firms to include disclosures of greenhouse gas emissions in their 
annual and accounting reports (Climate Change Act 2008). In addition, the amended 
Companies Act 2006 required firms to include disclosures regarding essential CSR 
issues such as greenhouse gas emissions, water, and energy within the business 
review or operational and financial review in their annual and accounting reports 
(The Companies Act 2006).  
The initial sample for this study is the FTSE 350 Index, which is includes the top 350 
UK companies classified by total market capitalisation in the London Stock Exchange 
(LSE). Furthermore, the FTSE 350 Index was chosen because it includes a broad range 
of industries and commercial activities and accounts for a significant portion of the 
UK’s economic output, which in turn ensures that the sample is large enough for the 
statistical procedures to be conducted.  
Utilities, mining, and financial industries are removed from the initial sample due to 
their unique characteristics and the specific regulations that may affect the results. 
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This approach is consistent with the previous EM literature (Klein 2002; DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1994). The justifications for excluding these industries are as follows: 
 Firms in utilities industry are excluded because they are motivated to adopt 
conservative accounting policies to defer income recognition since these 
industries are set on fixed accounting rates of return. Thereby, the task of 
detecting managers’ opportunistic manipulation behaviour would be difficult.  
 Mining firms are excluded because the market values of these companies 
differ from other companies in that they include other factors such as the 
value of any real operational options (Kelly 2004; Brennan and Schwartz 
1985). 
 Financial companies are excluded because they have special accounting 
policies that differ from other companies, thus making the estimation of 
discretionary accruals difficult (Chtourou et al. 2001; Peasnell et al. 2000b). 
The initial sample was reduced by a further 30 firms within industries with fewer 
than six firm-year observations for each sector3. Another 16 firm-year observations 
were excluded since their data are not available. After the eliminations, the final 
sample is 515 firm-year observations, as presented in Table 4.1. 
In line with the industrial classification supplied by FAME and Thomson One Banker, 
The Industrial Classification Benchmark (ICB) is used to perform EM estimation 
related to coefficient parameters. The ICB is used by most stock exchanges 
worldwide including, for example, the London Stock Exchange and the New York 
                                                          
3
. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression is applied to estimate discretionary accruals. The OLS regression requires at least six 
observations to be applied. DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) and Subramanyam (1996), for example, indicated that it is necessary 
to include industries with sufficient observations to ensure unbiased estimation. Therefore, industries with fewer than six 
observations were removed from the initial sample. 
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Stock Exchange. Table 4.2 presents the distribution of the final sample in accordance 
with ICB classification. 
Figure 4-1: Sample Selection Procedure for the Study Period 
Description 2008 2009 2010 Pooled 
Initial sample (FTSE 350 Companies) 350 350 350 1050 
Excluded:     
Financial industries (i.e. financial, insurance, and investment companies) 133 133 133 399 
Regulated industries (Utilities) 9 9 9 27 
Mining industry  21 21 21 63 
    489 
Industries with fewer than six firms     
Automobiles & Parts 1 1 1 3 
Construction & Materials 3 3 3 9 
Chemicals 5 5 5 15 
Forestry & Paper 1 1 1 3 
    30 
Firms with unavailable data  5 11 - 16 
Final sample 172 166 177 515 
 
 
Figure 4-2: Final Sample for the Study Period Classified by Industry 
ICB Code Industries 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % Pooled % 
0500 Oil & Gas 14 0.081 13 0.078 16 0.090 43 0.083 
2700 Industrial Goods & Services 53 0.308 53 0.319 55 0.311 161 0.313 
3500 Food & Beverages 11 0.064 11 0.066 11 0.062 33 0.064 
3700 
Personal & Household 
Goods 
12 0.070 12 0.072 13 0.073 37 0.072 
4500 Health Care 8 0.047 8 0.048 9 0.051 25 0.049 
5300 Retail 25 0.145 25 0.151 25 0.141 75 0.146 
5500 Media 9 0.052 9 0.054 8 0.045 26 0.050 
5700 Travel & Leisure 20 0.116 20 0.120 20 0.113 60 0.117 
6500 Telecommunications 6 0.035 0 0.000 6 0.034 12 0.023 
9500 Technology 14 0.081 15 0.090 14 0.079 43 0.083 
Total 172 100 166 100 177 100 515 100 
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4.4.2 Data Collection  
Since this study seeks to investigate whether or not CSR impacts EM, four main 
resources are used to collect the data, namely FAME, Thomson One Banker, firms’ 
annual reports, and CSR reports4, if any. Most of the variables related to EM are 
collected from FAME and Thomson One Banker. The other variables related to CSR 
and corporate governance are gathered from individual firms’ annual reports and 
CSR reports, if any.  
4.5 The Measurements of the Study Variables 
4.5.1 Measurement of EM (Dependent Variable)  
The review of EM literature reveals that three alternative approaches are currently 
used in the literature to measure EM. These approaches are total-accruals, specific-
accruals, and frequency distribution approaches (see Section 2.5 of Chapter 2). In 
spite of the advantages of using the specific-accruals approach to estimate EM, it is 
insufficiently flexible to investigate additional variables such as corporate 
governance and CSR (McNichols 2000). In addition, the frequency distribution 
approach has also been criticised because it does not enable researchers to assess 
the extent of EM or to differentiate between discretionary accruals and non-
discretionary accruals (McNichols 2000). On the other hand, the total-accruals 
approach allows researchers to control for additional variables and distinguish 
between non-discretionary and discretionary accruals. Therefore, the aggregate-
accruals approach is preferred to the other two approaches in recent EM studies 
(Choi et al. 2013; Pyo and Lee 2013; Kim et al. 2012; Hong and Andersen 2011; Yip et 
                                                          
4 Whatever the name of the corporate social responsibility report, be it the corporate responsibility report, the environmental 
report, social and environmental citizenship report, the corporate sustainability report, etc. 
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al. 2011; Mohamad et al. 2010; Sun et al. 2010). Following the previous studies, the 
present study applies total-accruals to measure discretionary accruals. According to 
this approach, there are three steps to measure discretionary accruals. The first step 
is to calculate total accruals, the second is to estimate non-discretionary accruals, 
and the third is to predict discretionary accruals. Each of these three steps is 
discussed as follows.   
4.5.1.1 Estimating Total Accruals  
To calculate total accruals, there are two approaches have been used in the 
literature. These approaches are traditional balance sheet approach (Dechow et al. 
1995; Jones 1991; Healy 1985) and cash flow approach (Kim et al. 2012; Hong and 
Andersen 2011; Sun et al. 2010; Kothari et al. 2005; Klein 2002; Becker et al. 1998; 
Subramanyam 1996; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994). Under the traditional balance 
sheet approach, total accruals are calculated as follows:  
Equation 4-1: Total accruals (balance sheet approach) 
                                                 
Where:   
    : Total accruals in year t 
     : Change in current assets in year t 
       : Change in cash and cash equivalents in year t 
     : Change in current liabilities in year t 
      : Change in debt included in current liabilities in year t 
     : Depreciation and amortization expense in year t 
In accordance with the cash flow approach, total accruals are measured as follows: 
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Equation 4-2: Total accruals (cash flow approach) 
                                                                                   
Where:   
    : Total accruals in year t 
      : Earnings before extraordinary and abnormal items in year t 
    : Operating cash flow in year t 
Although the balance sheet and cash flow approaches have been used in the 
literature, Hribar and Collins (2002) indicate that the cash flow approach produces 
fewer measurement errors compared to the balance sheet approach to estimating 
accruals. In line with this argument, a significant number of recent studies have 
preferred to apply cash flow to estimate accruals (Pyo and Lee 2013; Kim et al. 2012; 
Hong and Andersen 2011; Sun et al. 2010; Chih et al. 2008; Gong et al. 2008; 
Gunawan 2007; Kothari et al. 2005).  The present study follows the previous studies 
and calculates total accruals in accordance with the cash flow approach. Therefore, 
total accruals are defined as the difference between earnings before extraordinary 
and abnormal items and operating cash flow. 
4.5.1.2 Estimating Discretionary Accruals 
Although EM literature has suggested a number of discretionary models (see Section 
2.5.1 of Chapter 2), the discretionary accruals models most commonly used in 
empirical EM research are the Jones, modified Jones, and performance-matched 
models (Choi et al. 2013; Jiang et al. 2013; Pyo and Lee 2013; Sun and Rath 2010; 
Kothari et al. 2005; Bartov et al. 2001; Kothari 2001; Thomas and Zhang 2000; 
Beneish 1997; Subramanyam 1996; Dechow et al. 1995; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; 
Jones 1991).   
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4.5.1.2.1 Jones (1991) Model 
Jones (1991) argues that a firm’s economic circumstances have an influence on 
accounting accruals and attempts to control for such effects. The study uses the 
change in revenues as a proxy to control for firm’s economic circumstances and the 
level of property, plant, and equipment as a proxy to control for the effect of the 
depreciation. 
According to the cross-sectional Jones (1991) model, discretionary accruals are 
estimated in two steps. The first step is to predict non-discretionary accruals for each 
year and industry, and all the variables are scaled by total assets at the beginning of 
the year (Jones 1991).  The Jones model is presented in equation 4.3 as follows: 
Equation 4-3: Non-discretionary accruals  Jones (1991) model 
                       ⁄                   ⁄                  ⁄⁄       
where   
TA : Total accruals 
∆REV    : Change in revenues 
PPT : Gross property, plant and equipment 
A : Total assets  
j : Firm j; 1 …………N 
i : Industry i; 1 ………N 
t : Year; 1 ………..N 
e : Error term    
 
At the second stage, discretionary accruals for each firm j were calculated by 
deducting non-dictionary accruals from total accruals (TA) as illustrated in equation 
4.1. 
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Equation 4-4: Discretionary accruals  Jones (1991) model 
                       ́         ⁄    ́               ⁄    ́              ⁄⁄        
where   
DA : Discretionary accruals  
j : Firm j; 1 …………N 
  ́,   ́, and   ́ are the predicted coefficients from equation 4.3.  
4.5.1.2.2 Modified Jones (Dechow et al. 1995) Model 
Dechow et al. (1995) developed the original Jones model by adjusting the change in 
receivables (debtors) from the change in revenues (see Section 2.5.1.5 of Chapter 2).     
As in the process of measuring discretionary accruals in accordance with the Jones 
model, two steps are conducted to estimate discretionary accruals, as suggested by 
Dechow et al. (1995). Firstly, non-discretionary accruals are estimated for each year 
and each industry group as presented in equation 4.5 as follows:  
Equation 4-5: Non-discretionary accruals  modified Jones (Dechow et al. 1995) model 
                       ⁄                                ⁄                  ⁄⁄       
where   
TA : Total accruals 
∆REV    : Change in revenues 
∆RCE    : Change in receivables (debtors) 
PPT : Gross property, plant and equipment 
A : Total assets  
j : Firm j; 1 …………N 
i : Industry i; 1 ………N 
t : Year; 1 ………..N 
e : Error term    
Step two was performed to capture discretionary accruals as in equation 4.6.  
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Equation 4-6: Discretionary accruals  modified Jones (Dechow et al. 1995) model 
                       ́         ⁄    ́                            ⁄    ́              ⁄⁄
       
where   
DA : Discretionary accruals  
j : f rm j;   …………  
  ́,   ́, and   ́ are the predicted coefficients from equation 4.5.  
Consistent with the previous studies of Pyo and Lee (2013); Kim et al. (2012); 
Gargouri et al. (2010); Sun et al. (2010); Chih et al. (2008); and Prior et al. (2008), the 
present study uses the residuals from equations 4.3 and 4.5 of the Jones and the 
modified Jones models as discretionary accruals.  
Although, the original Jones and modified Jones models are applied in a 
discretionary-accruals time-series approach, a significant number of recent academic 
studies (Cohen and Zarowin 2010; Sun and Rath 2010; Iqbala et al. 2009; Chen et al. 
2008; Abdul Rashidah  and Ali 2006; Bergstresser and Philippon 2006; Xie et al. 2003; 
Kothari 2001; Teoh et al. 1998a; Teoh et al. 1998b) prefer the cross-sectional 
discretionary-accruals approach to the time-series approach (see Section 2.5 of 
Chapter 2). Following the previous studies, the present study uses the cross-sectional 
Jones and modified Jones models to predict discretionary accruals. 
4.5.1.2.3 Performance-Matched (Kothari et al. 2005)  Model 
Kothari et al. (2005) argue that firms’ financial performance has an impact on 
accounting accruals and that both the Jones and modified Jones models may result 
in measurement errors because of the misspecification issue in estimating 
discretionary accruals. Therefore, they add the firms’ financial performance to the 
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modified Jones model to control for the impact of financial performance on 
accounting accruals. Their study uses a lagged value of return on assets (ROA) as a 
proxy for firm financial performance to reduce the problem of heteroscedasticity 
and to avoid the problem of misspecification measurement.  
Two steps were performed to measure dictionary accruals according to the 
performance-matched (Kothari et al. 2005) model. The first was to predict non-
discretionary accruals as follows:  
Equation 4-7: Non-discretionary accruals  Performance-Matched (Kothari et al. 2005)  
model 
                       ⁄                                ⁄                  ⁄⁄     
      
where   
TA = Total accruals 
 REV    = Change in revenues 
 RCE    = Change in receivables (debtors) 
PPT = Gross property, plant and equipment 
ROA = Return on assets 
A = Total assets  
j = F rm j;   …………  
i = I  us ry  ;   ………  
t = Y  r;   ………..  
e = Error term    
The second was to calculate discretionary accruals as presented in equation 4.7 
below.   
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Equation 4-8: Discretionary accruals  Performance-Matched (Kothari et al. 2005)  model 
                       ́         ⁄    ́                            ⁄    ́              ⁄⁄
           
where   
DA = Discretionary accruals  
j = f rm j;   …………  
  ́,   ́, and   ́  are the predicted coefficients from equation 4.7.  
 The residuals of equation 4.7 were used as discretionary accruals.  
4.5.2 Measurement of CSD (Independent variable)  
Following the previous studies by Hassan and Harahap (2010); and Haniffa and 
Cooke (2005), content analysis and the disclosure index approaches are both used in 
the present study to capture the level of CSD in UK companies. Haniffa and Cooke 
(2005) indicate that using content analysis alone cannot capture the picture and 
graphs, which perceived as powerful and effective methods of communicating CSR 
information. Therefore, the use of disclosure index and content analysis methods is a 
reasonable approach to capture the whole picture of CSD.  
4.5.2.1 Content Analysis  
For the purpose of investigating the level of CSD in annual reports and CSR reports, if 
any, content analysis, which is defined as “a method of codifying the text (or 
content) of a piece of writing into various groups (or categories) depending on 
selected criteria” (Weber, 1990 cited in Haniffa and Cooke 2005, p. 404), is applied in 
the present study to capture the amount of disclosure. Several essential steps are 
required if content analysis is to be used in any kind of CSD, beginning with the 
determination of document(s) that will be used as a source of the text, and ending 
75 
 
with an assessment of their reliability and validity (Wolfe 1991). In this regard, 
Krippendorff (1980) indicates that content analysis involves at least four steps. These 
steps are as follows: (1) determining the document(s) to analyse; (2) determining the 
recoding unit; (3) determining the disclosure categories; and (4) testing the reliability 
and viability of the data. 
4.5.2.1.1 Determining the Document(s)    
At this point in the use of content analysis, a decision regarding the source(s) of the 
data needs to be taken (Unerman 2000). There are a variety of data resources that 
can be used as a sampling unit(s) for CSR; however, annual reports have employed 
by a significant number of CSD studies (Aribi and Gao 2012; Aribi and Gao 2010; 
Maali et al. 2006; Haniffa and Cooke 2005; Holland and Boon Foo 2003; Raar 2002; 
Zeghal and Ahmed 1990). In this regard, Gray et al. (1995b) state that “The annual 
report is used as a principal focus of reporting. There is some justification for this. 
The annual report is not only a statutory document, produced regularly, but it also 
represents what is probably the most important document in terms of an 
organisation’s construction of its own social image” (p.83). Likewise, Stanton and 
Stanton (2002, p.478) state that annual reports are formal public documents 
produced by companies as a response to the mandatory corporate requirements 
existing in most Western economies. Simiarly, Hines (1988) indicates that the annual 
report is seen as the most important document in terms of the firm’s construction of 
its own social image. Additionally, Marston and Shrives (1991) documented that the 
annual report is the most comprehensive document available to the public and is 
thereby considered the main disclosure medium.     
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Although the majority of CSD literature focuses on annual reports as a main source 
of social information, this exclusive focus may provide an incomplete picture of all 
CSR practices (Roberts 1991). In this regard, Zeghal and Ahmed (1990) indicate that 
the annual reports are not the only channel companies can use to provide 
information about their social responsibility activities. Similarly, Campbell et al. 
(2003) state that “disclosure of social information in the annual reports represented 
a small proportion of a company’s total social reports” (p.566). Several studies have 
used documents other than annual reports. For example, Zeghal and Ahmed (1990) 
used corporate advertisements and brochures besides annual reports. Guthrie and 
Parker (1989) used half-yearly reports of the PHB company alongside annual reports, 
whereas Jennifer and Taylor (2007) investigated triple bottom-line reporting in 
annual reports, CSR reports, and website reportes.   
Although CSD can be made via a variety of means, using all available means would be 
an illogical decision. In this regard, Unerman (2000) states that any study must limit 
the range of documents it uses since large firms may publish a large number of 
documents each year; this places the researcher at risk of being overwhelmed by the 
number of documents,  many of which may be unavailable in the corporate archive, 
thus making it difficult to ensure the completeness of the data. 
In light of the above, it appears that the use of annual reports alone may not give a 
full picture of CSD; on the other hand, using all available documents would an 
illogical method of investigating the level of disclosure. Therefore, the present study 
used both annual reports and CSR reports to investigate the level of CSD in UK 
companies.  
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4.5.2.1.2 Determining the Unit of Analysis   
One of the most important decisions in the process of using content analysis is to 
determine how to measure the data. A number of methods have been used in the 
literature, such as recording units in terms of words, sentences, pages, lines, 
proportion of pages or a mixture of these units (Aribi and Gao 2012; Aribi and Gao 
2010; Parsa and Kouhy 2008; Haniffa and Hudaib 2007; Maali et al. 2006; Gao et al. 
2005; Xiao et al. 2005; Holland and Boon Foo 2003; Raar 2002; Tsang 1998; Deegan 
and Rankin 1996; Hackston and Milne 1996; Gray et al. 1995a). However, each of 
these methods has both advantage(s) and disadvantage(s), which means there is no 
single accepted method of measuring the level of disclosure (Unerman 2000). For 
example, while the use of the page as a recording unit takes into account any non-
narrative disclosure (e.g. photographs and charts, which are considered powerful 
and effective methods of communication) (Unerman 2000), the print size, column 
size and page size may differ from one annual report to another (Ng 1985). In the 
present study, word count is chosen to capture the quantity of CSD.   
Although the measurement of the quantity of CSD in terms of the number of words 
cannot capture charts and graphics, words have the advantage of leading themselves 
to more exclusive analysis (Xiao et al. 2005). Moreover, Zeghal and Ahmed (1990) 
point out that word is the smallest unit of measurement and can be expected to 
provide the maximum robustness for the study in assessing the amount of 
disclosure. Supporting this, Campbell (2004) indicate that “it [the word] was felt that 
to be a robust measure in which counting errors were likely to account for a lower 
overall proportion of the total compared to those in sentence counting”(p.109).In 
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addition, Deegan and Gordon (1996) state that using words can enable the 
researcher to record the volume of disclosure in greater detail. In the same vein, 
Krippendorff (1980) indicates that words are the preferred measure when it is 
intended to measure the total amount of  space devoted to a topic and to ascertain 
the importance of that topic. Furthermore, Weber (1990) suggests that a small 
recording unit such as a word increases the measurement reliability, while a large 
unit such as a page decreases the required reliability (Milne and Adler 1999). 
For the purposes of the present study and similar to the previous studies by Aribi 
and Gao (2012); Aribi and Gao (2010); Haniffa and Cooke (2005); Xiao et al. (2005); 
and Campbell (2004), the number of words is used to measure the level of CSD.  
4.5.2.1.2.1 Selection of CSD Key Words 
Word count was used in the present study to measure the quantity of CSD. Hence, 
the specific CSD key words were created to be detected in companies’ annual and, if 
any, CSR reports.  The list of CSD key words was established through three steps 
(Hussainey et al. 2003). First, I read a sample of 50 companies’ annual reports (pilot 
study) during a given period to identify the key words related to the main categories 
of CSD. This step generates a preliminary list of CSD key words. Second, synonyms 
for each key word were added to the preliminary list created in the first step. Finally, 
an additional criterion was introduced that any keyword must satisfy in order to be 
included in the final list (See appendix 3).  
The amount for each keyword for each CSD item and company was collected and 
counted. The total quantity for each CSD category represents the number of key 
words in company’s annual and, if any, CSR reports. Here, for example, is report for 
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the key word “Employees”, form Tesco PLC’s annual report for the financial year 
2008: 
Example (1): Employees Keyword 
“The average monthly number of EMPLOYEES (including executive directors) was: 
Total 25210”. (Tesco PLC, annual report 2008) 
 
 
Example (2): Employees Keyword 
“Disabled persons in EMPLOYEES receive equal treatment to that afforded to other 
EMPLOYEES, in line with the Group’s philosophy of equal opportunities for all 
employees, irrespective of race, nationality, gender, disability or age”. (Tesco PLC, 
annual report 2008) 
 At the end of the report for each company, the total number of words which 
included the “Employees” key words is provided. For Tesco’s 2008 annual report, the 
number of words with “Employees” key word is 12 and 33 respectively. The total 
number of words for all keywords under each category represents the total level of 
CSD for the company.         
4.5.2.1.3 Determining the Categories  
Conducting content analysis research requires a clear and accurate identification of 
the main categories of CSR along with further relevant subcategories that will be 
equally applicable to all samples of annual and CSR reports. In this regard, Tilt (2001) 
states that an accurate classification of CSD categories is an essential element of 
research design in content analysis. Although the literature does not provide a clear 
reference to the categories of CSD, Gray et al. (1995b, p.81) indicate four major 
categories to formulate the main themes of CSD. These categories, which are 
consistent in a significant number of CSD studies, are as follows: community, 
employees, natural environment, and customers. 
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Based on previous studies (Othman et al. 2011; Rizk et al. 2008; Hall 2002; Jennifer 
and Taylor 2007; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Newson and Deegan 2002; Deegan et al. 
2002; Williams and Ho Wern Pei 1999; Hackston and Milne 1996; Gray et al. 1995a), 
“energy”, “products and services”, “value-added statement”, and “others” are added 
to the main categories to encompass most of the theme and items of CSD in annual 
reports and CSR reports. The “others” category is added to capture any elements 
that represent social responsibility but fall outside the main and added categories 
(Gray et al. 1995b). The CSD categories were further subdivided into subcategories 
to capture CSD in the sample of annual and CSR reports. Before conducting a pilot 
study, decision rules were also established based on the previous studies by 
Hackston and Milne (1996); and Gray et al. (1995b) to classify which CSR items are to 
be disclosed under which category and subcategory.  
In order to ensure that disclosure categories and subcategories are able to represent 
the different aspects of CSD in a sample of annual and CSR reports and to test the 
reliability of the disclosure measurement, a pilot study was conducted prior to the 
main study. The pilot study process commenced with the downloading of 50 annual 
reports for the period 2008-2010 (around 17 annual reports per year and 5 per 
industry). In the second stage of the pilot study, the annual reports were distributed 
to the researcher and another qualified independent researcher, who is familiar with 
the use of content analysis, to decide whether the categories, subcategories and 
decision rules fitted the sample firms.  
The results of the pilot study indicated that “energy” and “added-value statements” 
can be included in subcategories instead of main categories. Therefore, “energy” is 
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added to the environmental category and “added-value statements” is added to the 
“others” category. The final checklist comprises 59 subcategories included within six 
main categories of CSD: environment (ENV), employees (EMP), community 
development (COM), customers (CUS), products and services (PRO), and others 
(OTH). 
4.5.2.1.4 Reliability and Validity of Disclosure Measurement  
The basic characteristic of content analysis is that data should be tested to prove 
that it is objective, systematic and reliable (Krippendorff 1980). According to Hayes 
and Krippendorff (2007), “Conclusions from such data can be trusted only after 
demonstrating their reliability” (p.77). Neuendorf (2002) states that content analysis’ 
reliability and validity has been defined as the extent to which a measuring 
procedure provides the same results on repeated trials. According to Aribi and Gao 
(2012), reliability and validity are determined to ensure that different researchers 
will code the text in the same way and therefore diminish the chance for inaccuracy 
and  biases. Krippendorff (1980) identifies three types of content analysis’ reliability; 
 Stability, sometimes called intra-coder reliability, refers to the ability of a judge 
to code data in the same way over time. For example. If the annual reports 
analysed by a coder and then analysed again after three or four weeks, and the 
coding was the same each time then the stability of content analysis would be 
achieved.  
 Reproducibility, sometimes called inter-coder reliability, refers to that the same 
coding achieved when various coder are involved. The inter-coder reflects on the 
measurement of the extent to which coding is the same when using various 
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coders. High reproducibility is considered a minimum standard for content 
analysis.  
 Accuracy refers to assessing coding performance against predetermined 
standards set by a panel of experts or known from previous experiments and 
studies. 
 According to Guthrie and Mathews (1985), there are no identified standards for CSD 
and therefore no correct performance or measure. Thus, for the purpose of this 
study, the reliability of content analysis will be evaluated through the reproducibility 
and stability. Like Aribi and Gao (2012, 2010), a number of steps were taken to 
ensure the reliability. In particular, it involves:  
 Krippendorff (1980) points out that, in order to ensure the study’s reliability and 
to gain a better understanding of the subject, the training of coders is important 
and is a common elementary task in content analysis. Therefore, the pilot study 
was used as a training stage beside its main objective.   
 During this period of training, some practical steps were undertaken, including 
refining categories and subcategories, altering processes, and carefully revising 
sheets to ensure the reliability of the classification process in the study and to 
ensure that the content analysis process was being used effectively.    
 It is worth mentioning that, during this period of training, any difficulties or 
questions in understanding and applying decision rules were written down and 
discussed with the researcher’s colleagues, who are familiar with the use of 
content analysis, to ensure the existence of “shared meaning” (Gray et al. 1995b) 
and to enhance the reliability of  the instrument used. 
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 To ensure the reproducibility of the study, the annual reports downloaded in the 
pilot study were distributed and assessed by the researcher and another 
independent researcher; the results were then compared. During this process, 
any difficulties or ambiguities were discussed and explained to ensure that the 
coders used the same decision rules, and any points made were used to develop 
the procedures of analysis.  
 During the training period, some practical steps were undertaken, including 
refining categories and subcategories, altering processes, and carefully revising 
sheets to ensure the reliability of the classification process in the study and to 
ensure that the content analysis process was being used effectively.    
In addition to the reliability of  the disclosure measurement, the process of data 
measurement must be valid (Krippendorff 1980). In this regard, clear definitions of 
categories and subcategories and explicitly formulated decision rules and procedures 
of CSD were established and developed, as mentioned earlier. In addition, the 
agreement between the researcher and the other coder regarding the themes, 
items, and rules of analysis can be taken as a sign that the measurement procedures 
are valid.  
4.5.2.2 Disclosure Index Approach      
The CSR items were extracted from firms’ annual reports and, if available, CSR 
reports. Like the studies of Othman et al. (2011); Rizk et al. (2008); and Haniffa and 
Cooke (2005), an equally-weighted dichotomous approach based on categorical 
coding is applied in this study to score CSD items and develop the disclosure index. 
According to this approach, all items included in index checklist are equally valued 
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regardless of their importance or relevance to any particular user group (Chau and 
Gray 2002; Cooke 1989a). A dichotomous procedure was conducted whereby an 
item of disclosure was awarded a “1” point if the item of the relevant disclosure 
included in the checklist was disclosed, and a “0” point if it was not disclosed. The 
disclosure index (CSRI) for each company is estimated as follows: 
Equation 4-9: Disclosure social index 
   I    
∑   
  
   
 
 
Where: 
CSRI = Total level of social responsibility disclosure score. 
X = 1 if an item is disclosed, and 0 otherwise. 
N = Number of items. 
j = Category j. 
i = Firm i. 
 
The disclosure index includes six categories: community (COM), employees (EMP), 
environment (ENV), customers (CUS), products/services (PRO), and others (OTH). 
Each category includes a number of items. Therefore, the score for each item within 
a particular category was added to other items in the same category and the total 
score for the category was then divided by the maximum number of items within the 
category. Afterwards, the firm’s total score was measured by adding up the scores 
for the six categories and then dividing by the total number of categories (i.e. 6 
categories) to obtain the total score of disclosure for the firm.   
4.5.3 Measurement of Control Variables 
In addition to dependent and independent variables, a number of control variables 
are included in the present study based on the previous studies. The control 
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variables are included to control for the potential effect of corporate governance 
and firm-specific factors that may influence the extent of EM. Although a significant 
number of factors that impact the magnitude of EM have been suggested in the 
literature, it is difficult to control for certain factors such as management style and 
corporate culture because of measurement problems (Archambeault 2002). As the 
purpose of this study is to investigate whether CRS constrains EM in UK companies, a 
review of the literature revealed several factors that might influence the extent of 
EM. To control for the impact of corporate governance mechanisms and firm-specific 
effects, the control variables are divided into two groups. The first group includes 
the corporate governance variables while the second includes the firm-specific 
variables.        
4.5.3.1 Corporate Governance 
4.5.3.1.1 The Effectiveness of the Board 
A monitoring function over managers is one of the major responsibilities of the 
board in order to reduce the agency cost and to ensure that managers fulfil their 
duties in a manner that serves the best interests of shareholders (Brennan and 
McDermott 2004; Fama and Jensen 1983; Fama 1980). In this regard, Fama (1980) 
states that boards with a majority of insider directors have weak monitoring of 
managers and are subject to self-monitoring. On the other hand,  Lawler et al. (2002) 
indicate that the presence of independent directors on the board enhances the 
monitoring function of the board. The UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) 
suggests that half of the board be composed of independent directors (excluding the 
chairman). Thus, a higher proportion of independent directors on the board is 
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expected to enhance the effectiveness of the monitoring function. Furthermore, 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002) state that the presence of independent directors not only 
affects the firm’s performance but also impacts the firm’s disclosures by forcing the 
management to improve the quality of these disclosures. Beasley (1996) found that a 
higher proportion of independent directors on the board is negatively associated 
with financial statement fraud. In addition, a significant number of EM studies 
indicate that a higher proportion of independent directors on the board is negatively 
and significantly related to EM (Dimitropoulos and Asteriou 2010; Jaggi et al. 2009; 
Bradbury et al. 2006; Peasnell et al. 2005; Xie et al. 2003; Klein 2002; Peasnell et al. 
2000a; Beasley 1996). In other words, firms with higher numbers of independent 
directors on the board report a lower magnitude of earnings management.  
In respect of the financial expertise of directors on the board, Carcello et al. (2002); 
(Chtourou et al. 2001) indicate that a higher level of directorial experience on the 
board leads to a higher monitoring function. They argue that when the directors on 
the board are financial experts they can understand and address issues related to 
financial statements. In this regard, (Xie et al. 2003) find that firms with directors 
who have a corporate and financial background are less likely to engage in EM.  
Based on the above and consistent with the previous studies byZaman et al. (2011); 
and Ho-Young (2008), the present study measures the board of directors’ 
effectiveness as a dummy. It takes the value “1” if more than 50 per cent  of a 
board’s members who are not on the audit committee are independent and at least 
the sample median of the board’s directors are financial experts; otherwise, board 
effectiveness is equal to “0”.  
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4.5.3.1.2 The Effectiveness of the Audit Committee  
Agency theory suggests that directorial independence is an essential element in a 
committee’s effective monitoring function (Fama and Jensen 1983). The UK 
Corporate Governance Code (2010: 16) indicates that all members of the audit 
committee should be independent. In terms of EM, several UK studies have found a 
negative and significant association between the independence of the audit 
committee and EM (Bradbury et al. 2006; Beasley 1996). Similar results were found 
by Davidson et al. (2005); Bédard et al. (2004); (Xie et al. 2003); and Klein (2002). 
In respect of audit committee financial expertise, the UK Corporate Governance 
Code (2003: 16) recommended that at least one member of the audit committee 
have recent and relevant financial experience. The evidence of empirical studies 
indicates that the financial expertise of the audit committee members improves the 
monitoring function and the quality of the firm’s financial reports (Krishnain and 
Visvanathan 2008; Abbott et al. 2003a; Carcello et al. 2002). In addition, Bédard et al. 
(2004); and Xie et al. (2003) find that firms whose audit committee members have 
higher financial expertise report lower EM. Therefore, following the previous studies 
by Zaman et al. (2011); Ho-Young (2008); and Raghunandan and Rama (2003), the 
current study measured audit committee effectiveness as a dummy variable, where 
“1” is awarded if all the members of the audit committee are independent and  the 
number of those directors who are financial experts is at least equal to the sample 
median; otherwise audit committee effectiveness is awarded “0”.  
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4.5.3.2 Firm-Specific Variables  
4.5.3.2.1 Firm Size  
Mixed results regarding the relation between EM and firm size have been reported 
in previous studies (Lobo and Zhou 2006; Watts and Zimmerman 1990). Therefore, 
firm size can be negatively or positively associated with EM. According to Watts and 
Zimmerman (1990), the political cost and government scrutiny are high for larger 
firms; hence, these firms are more likely to engage in income-decreasing EM. 
Conversely, Richardson (2000) states that market pressure is greater for larger 
companies because they are subject to close scrutiny by investors; thus, they are 
more likely to adopt aggressive accounting policies which in turn causes them to 
engage in income-increasing EM. Recently, several empirical studies have supported 
the negative relationship perspective between firm size and EM (Pyo and Lee 2013; 
Kim et al. 2012; Hong and Andersen 2011; Yip et al. 2011; Gargouri et al. 2010; Chih 
et al. 2008). This perspective argues that larger firms are often required to disclose 
their financial information and are thus less likely to manipulate earnings. Consistent 
with the previous studies by Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010); and Jaggi et al. 
(2009), firm size is measured as the natural logarithm of total assets at the year-end.  
4.5.3.2.2  Cash Flow from Operations 
Net cash flow from operational activities is used to capture the differences in 
performance across firms within different industries and economic activities, and 
how they impact on EM. The studies by Gul et al. (2009); Lobo and Zhou (2006); and 
Dechow et al. (1995) find that firms with a high operational cash flow are less likely 
to manage earnings upwards because they are already performing well. On the other 
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hand, firms with a low operational cash flow are more likely to increase EM. 
Following the previous studies by Peasnell et al. (2005); and Becker et al. (1998), the 
cash flow from operations is measured as net cash flow from operations divided by 
the total assets.  
4.5.3.2.3 Financial Leverage  
Leverage represents the debt structure of a firm, and it has been used in previous 
literature as a proxy for debt covenant violation (Elayan et al. 2008). There are two 
contrasting strands of empirical evidence on the impact of financial leverage on EM. 
One strand of evidence indicates that firms with high financial leverage are more 
likely to engage in income-increasing EM (Richardson 2000; DeFond and Jiambalvo 
1994; Watts and Zimmerman 1990). The justification of the positive relationship 
between financial leverage and EM is that firms facing financial distress or financial 
difficulties have an incentive to manipulate reported earnings upwards in order to 
avoid debt covenant valuation and increased financing costs (Watts and Zimmerman 
1990). Therefore, the debt covenant valuation argument assumes a positive 
association between financial leverage and EM. On the other hand, Choi et al. 
(2013); Chih et al. (2008); Dechow and Skinner (2000); and DeFond and Jiambalvo 
(1994) find that firms with high financial leverage tend to manage discretionary 
accruals downwards. They argue that leaders may intensify the monitoring of EM, 
which causes the association between EM and financial leverage to be negative. 
Consistent with the previous studies by Jo and Kim (2007); Richardson et al. (2002); 
and Becker et al. (1998), financial leverage is measured in the present study by 
dividing long-term debt by total assets.  
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4.5.3.2.4 Firm Performance 
Return on assets (ROA) is used in the literature as a proxy to control for a firm’s 
financial performance (Abbott and Parker 2000). Financial performance can be 
negatively or positively related to EM. According to the political cost hypothesis, 
firms with high financial performance tend to choose accounting policies that result 
in a reduction in discretionary accruals to mitigate political pressure (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1990). In line with this argument, Skinner (2003) finds that high 
profitability is negatively and significantly related to EM. In contrast, Skinner finds 
that firms with low financial performance tend to inflate reported earnings. On the 
other hand, Jo and Kim (2007) find that high profitability is positively and 
significantly related to discretionary accruals. Following the previous studies, ROA is 
used in the present study to control for the impact of the firm’s financial 
performance on EM.  
4.5.3.2.5 Market-to-Book Ratio 
Previous studies have used market-to-book ratio as a proxy to control for a firm’s 
growth (Srinidhi et al. 2011; Thiruvadi and Huang 2011; Peni and Vähämaa 2010). In 
this regard, Chih et al. (2008) argue that firms with higher market-to-book ratios 
tend to manage discretionary accruals upwards because they are under the greatest 
pressure to adopt aggressive accounting policies to report increased earnings. In 
addition, Peni and Vähämaa (2010) state that firms with high growth have more 
opportunities to manipulate reported earnings. However, the findings on the 
optional impact of firm growth on EM are mixed. For example, Thiruvadi and Huang 
(2011); and Peni and Vähämaa (2010) find a positive relationship between market-
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to-book ratio and EM, while Chih et al. (2008) find no association between them. 
Following the previous studies, the market-to-book ratio is used in this study to 
control for firm growth.  
4.5.3.2.6 Loss 
Loss is used in the literature as a proxy for a firm’s financial condition (Peni and 
Vähämaa 2010). It is argued that firms facing financial problems have a strong 
incentive to engage in income-decreasing discretionary accruals (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1994). In this regard, Moreira and Pope (2007) indicate that firms with 
losses tend to engage in income-decreasing EM. This strategy is known as the “big 
bath” technique, which assumes that managers prefer to engage in income-
decreasing earnings management when they realise that the current earnings will 
not achieve the earnings targets because they are so low; hence, they defer current 
earnings in order to use them to meet future earnings targets  (Healy 1985). In line 
with this view, Peni and Vähämaa (2010) find a positive relationship between 
earnings management and loss. Consistent with the previous studies by Peni and 
Vähämaa (2010); and Skinner (2003), this study used loss to control for a firm’s 
financial condition and measured it as a dummy;  it is assigned a “1” if the firm’s net 
income is negative, and “0” otherwise.   
4.6 Empirical Research Models 
The previous studies on the association between EM and CSR provide contradictory 
results.  While some studies have found that EM and CRS are positively related (Jiang 
et al. 2013; Yip et al. 2011; Heltzer 2011; Gargouri et al. 2010; Prior et al. 2008; 
Patten and Trompeter 2003), others have found a negative relationship between the 
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two variables (Pyo and Lee 2013; Choi et al. 2013; Kim et al. 2012; Hong and 
Andersen 2011; Chih et al. 2008); still others have found EM and CSR to be unrelated  
(Sun et al. 2010).  
Since the existing literature has not investigated this area of accounting research in 
the context of the UK, apart from the study by Sun et al. (2010), who addressed the 
link between environmental disclosure and EM for the year 2007. The primary aim of 
the present study is to investigate whether or not EM and CSR are linked.  
In order to support or reject the study main hypothesis (H1), the study uses the 
disclosure index (CSRI) in the main analyses, consistent with previous studies (Choi et 
al. 2013; Jiang et al. 2013; Pyo and Lee 2013; Kim et al. 2012; Yip et al. 2011; Chih et 
al. 2008), while the level of CSR is examined using the content analysis approach as 
an alternative analysis to check whether the main results are consistent and robust.  
The association between CSR and EM is investigated using the following regression-
specific model. 
Model:  
           I        F        F     I       F        
                     
Where:  
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Figure 4-3: variable definitions and measurements 
Label Variable  Description 
Dependent Variable 
EM Earnings 
management  
The obsolete value of discretionary accruals estimated using 
I. Cross-sectional Jones model (JM) 
II. Cross-sectional modified Jones model (MJM) 
III. Cross-sectional performance-adjusted model (PM) 
Independent Variable 
CSRI Corporate social 
responsibility   
Total level of CSR score  
Control Variables 
BRDEF Board effectiveness Dummy. 1 = if all the members on the board of directors are 
independent and at least a sample median of them are financial 
experts, 0 = if otherwise. 
AUDEF Audit committee 
effectiveness 
Dummy. 1 = if all the members on the audit committee are 
independent and at least a sample median of them are financial 
experts, 0 = if otherwise. 
SIZE Firm size The natural logarithm of total assets at the year-end 
OCF Cash flow from 
operation 
Net cash flow from operation divided by the total assets. 
LEVG Financial leverage Long-term debt divided by total assets 
ROA Return on assets  Net income divided by total assets 
MB Market to book  Market to book ratio 
LOSS Loss Dummy. 1 = if the firm net income is negative, 0 = otherwise. 
 
The previous model tests the association between the total level of CSR and EM. In 
order to provide more information on the association between the CSR and EM, a 
further regression-specific models to test  the association between CSR sub-themes 
(i.e. community (COM), employee (EMP), environment (ENV), products and services 
(PRO, customers (CUS), and others (OTH)) and EM are developed as follows: 
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           Is        F        F     I       F
                            
Where: 
Figure 4-4: CSD Themes definitions and measurements 
Label Variable  Description 
Dependent Variable 
CSRIs CSR sub-themes  
 
Total level of CSR sub-themes scores using 
i .  COM: Total level of community sub-score 
i i .  EMP: Total level of employee sub-score  
i i i .   ENV: Total level of environment sub-score   
i v .  PRO: Total level of products and services  sub-score  
v .  CUS: Total level of customer sub-score  
v i .  OTH: Total level of others sub-score  
 
4.7 Empirical Procedures of Data Analysis  
This section discusses the process of data analysis. This process includes preliminary 
analysis, multivariate analysis and robustness checks. Each of these phases is 
outlined below. 
4.7.1 Preliminary Analysis 
Preliminary analysis of the data includes descriptive statistics, univariate analysis and 
correlation matrix. Descriptive statistics describe the data in terms of central 
tendency and shape of distribution on a single variable in an organised form. Central 
tendency tests include the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum, while the shape of distribution includes the skewness and kurtosis tests. 
In particular, while skewness measures the symmetry of distribution, kurtosis tests 
the peakedness (flatness) of distribution. Both measures are used to test for the 
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normality of data distribution. According to Abdul Rashidah  and Ali (2006); and 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), a normal distribution of the data requires that the 
standard of skewness and kurtosis are ± 1.96 and ± 2 respectively. In addition to 
descriptive statistics, univariate analysis is performed to test whether the mean 
value is significantly different from zero for firms that engage in high EM compared 
with those that engage in low EM.  
The correlation between sample variables is made by pairwise correlation matrix to 
explain the degree of linear relationship between two variables. The correlation 
coefficient is in a range between -1 to +1, where ±1 correlation refers to a perfect 
linear relationship between variables. According to Gujarati (2003), a higher degree 
of correlation coefficient between independent variables may affect the results of 
regression analysis because of the multicollinearity problem, and the study 
recommends ±80% or above as the beginning of the  multicollinearity, which affects 
the regression results.  
4.7.2 Multivariate Analysis  
4.7.2.1 Regression Analysis 
Statistical multivariate data analysis methods can be classified, in general, under two 
broad categories: the parametric and non-parametric methods. However, the nature 
and characteristics of the data determine which method should be applied. 
Therefore, Gujarati (2003) suggests five fundamental assumptions to be tested 
before choosing the multivariate analysis model. These assumptions include the 
following: 
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1. Normality: This assumption requires that the data be normally distributed.  
2. Linearity:  This assumption suggests that the relationship between dependent 
and independent variables should be linear. 
3. Independence: Under this assumption, the error term of one observation should 
not be correlated with the error terms of other observations. 
4. Heteroscedasticity: This assumption requires that the variance of the dependent 
variable be constant. 
5. Multicollinearity: This assumption suggests that the collinearity among 
independent variables should be not exist.    
The above assumptions are checked using several tests to determine which 
approach (i.e. the parametric and non-parametric methods) is more appropriate for 
the study data. First, Skewness and Kurtosis tests are applied to check for the 
normality. Second, the Quantile–Quantile (Q-Q plot) test is used to test for linearity. 
Third, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test is used to test for independency and 
multicollinearity. Fourth, the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg and White’s general 
tests are used to check for heteroscedasticity.  
The results of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) will generate inconsistent and biased, 
when these assumptions are violated (Gujarati 2003). However, several regression 
estimators, such as OLS with robust standard error, weighted least square regression 
(Generalised Least Squares (GLS)), and robust regression provide an alternative to 
OLS regression when the assumptions have been violated (Judge et al. 1985). In the 
presence of heteroscedasticity, and autocorrelation, either the least square 
estimator with robust standard error (Huber-White standard errors) or GLS 
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regressions are able to reweight the error variance and thus to correct 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Gujarati 2003). 
In general, the present study finds that most of the OLS assumptions are not 
adequately fulfilled, even though several steps (e.g. data transformation) have been 
taken to conform to these assumptions. In this regard, Glass et al. (1972) indicate 
that mild violations of the OLS assumptions are robust and unaffected in many 
situations. Thus, pooled OLS regression is performed in the main analyses while 
additional tests using least square estimator with robust standard is used in the 
sensitivity analysis as an alternative estimator.  
4.7.3 Further Analyses and Robustness Checks 
The purpose of further and sensitive analyses is to ensure that the main results are 
robust to various measurements and estimators. While the aim of further analyses is 
to control for the potential effect of the direction of discretionary accruals and the 
type of industry in which a firm operates on the main findings, the robustness checks 
aim to ensure that the main results are robust to various measurements and 
estimators as well as to control for endogeneity.  
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4.8 Summary 
This chapter provides the justifications for the study methods in accordance with the 
study objectives and research questions. In an attempt to provide evidence on the 
impact of CSR on EM in UK companies, the process of data analysis is performed 
using the pooled OLS regression models to examine the study hypotheses. The 515 
(FTSE 350 Index) company-year observations are drawn for the period 2008-2010.  
The next two chapters, chapter five and chapter six, will highlight and analyse EM 
and CSR practices in UK companies respectively. Chapter seven will then analyse and 
discuss the findings on the association between CSR and EM in UK companies. 
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5 Chapter Five                                                                                
EM Practices in the UK: A General Description 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to examine EM practices in UK companies. It starts by explaining 
the descriptive statistics for all variables used to estimate discretionary accruals. 
Section 5.3 discusses the findings of EM models, and section 5.4 discusses the results 
of univariate analysis regarding the level and direction of EM. Section 5.5 discusses 
the chapter summary.  
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
As explained in the previous chapter, three different models (i.e. Jones (JM), 
modified Jones (MJM), and performance-matched (PM) models) are applied in the 
present study to estimate discretionary accruals. While total accruals (TA) is used as 
the dependent variable, change in revenues (∆REV), change in receivables (∆REC), 
property, plant and equipment (PPT), and return on assets (ROA) are the 
independent variables. A cross-sectional approach is adopted to estimate 
discretionary accruals in the three models. This approach is based on year and type 
of industry classification to predict discretionary accruals. Therefore, the descriptive 
statistics for each variable included in the three models presented in the following 
tables are based on year and type of industry, scaled for the period from 2008 to 
2010. Given that the variables are scaled by total assets at the beginning of the year, 
the values of these variables can be interpreted as percentages of total assets. 
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5.2.1 Total Accruals (TA) 
TA is used in the three aforementioned models as a dependent variable. Table 5.1 
shows that the mean value of TA for the full sample during a given period is (-0.059), 
while the minimum and maximum values are (-0.814) and (0.494) respectively. Since 
TA is calculated as the difference between earnings before extraordinary and 
abnormal items (EBXA) and operating cash flow (OCF) divided by total assets (see 
Section 4.5.1.1 of Chapter 4), the results suggest that the mean value of EBXA is less 
than OCF by (-0.059). It can also be seen that the mean value of TA across years and 
industries is negative, suggesting that, on average, the EBXA are lower than OCF. 
Based on the year scaled, the highest average of TA is (-0.051) in 2010, while the 
lowest value is (-0.072) in 2009. These results indicate either that OCF in 2010 is less 
than OCF in 2009 or that the EBXA in 2010 is higher than its counterpart in 2009. 
Comparing the average of TA based on type of industry, Table 5.1 shows that the 
Technology industry has the highest average with (-0.040) compared with other 
industries, while the Media sector has the lowest average with (-0.115). In addition, 
Table 5.1 shows that the minimum value is (-0.814) in 2008 and the maximum is 
(0.494) in 2010, while the minimum and maximum values of TA are (-0.814) and 
(0.494) for the Media and Personal & Household Goods industries respectively. 
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Table 5-1: Descriptive Statistics by Year and Industry Scaled for Total Accruals (TA) 
Total Accruals (TA) Mean Min P50 Max Sd. 
Full sample -0.059 -0.814 -0.052 0.494 0.081 
Year      
2008 -0.055 -0.814 -0.044 0.298 0.094 
2009 -0.072 -0.394 -0.062 0.131 0.072 
2010 -0.051 -0.278 -0.051 0.494 0.073 
Industry      
Oil & Gas -0.048 -0.272 -0.054 0.298 0.095 
Industrial Goods & Services -0.059 -0.394 -0.048 0.093 0.063 
Food & Beverage -0.045 -0.183 -0.041 0.042 0.051 
Personal & Household Goods -0.056 -0.342 -0.040 0.494 0.138 
Health Care -0.047 -0.134 -0.046 0.016 0.038 
Retail -0.057 -0.278 -0.055 0.131 0.070 
Media -0.115 -0.814 -0.076 0.074 0.159 
Travel & Leisure -0.062 -0.213 -0.061 0.060 0.048 
Telecommunications -0.102 -0.270 -0.108 0.167 0.093 
Technology -0.040 -0.175 -0.043 0.103 0.060 
Total accruals =[ Earnings before extraordinary and abnormal items (EBXA) - Operating cash flow (OCF)]/Total 
assets 
5.2.2 Change in Revenue (∆REV) 
∆REV is an independent variable used in the three models. Table 5.2 shows that the 
average value of ∆REV for the full sample and a given period is (0.077), indicating 
that the average value of ∆REV is increased by (0.077). The minimum and maximum 
values are (-1.763) and (0.877) respectively. Based on the year scaled, Table 5.2 
reports that the highest value of ∆REV is (0.122) in the year 2008 and the lowest is 
(0.048) in 2009, suggesting that the average ∆REV is increased by (0.122) in 2008 and 
by (0.048) in 2009. Table 5.2 also shows that, on average, revenues increase by 
(0.061) in 2010.  Comparing ∆REV across industries, the highest average is (0.112) in 
the Telecommunications sector and the lowest is (0.031) for Personal & Household 
Goods. Across years and industries, the minimum value is (-1.763) in the year 2008 
for the Oil & Gas industry, while the maximum is (0.877) in the year 2009 for the 
Personal & Household Goods sector.  
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Table 5-2: Descriptive Statistics by Year and Industry Scaled for Change in Revenue (∆REV) 
Total Accruals (TA) Mean Min P50 Max Sd. 
Full sample 0.077 -1.763 0.068 0.877 0.188 
Year      
2008 0.122 -1.763 0.105 0.733 0.225 
2009 0.048 -0.757 0.056 0.877 0.195 
2010 0.061 -0.351 0.044 0.692 0.125 
Industry      
Oil & Gas 0.052 -1.763 0.042 0.733 0.333 
Industrial Goods & Services 0.072 -0.757 0.088 0.651 0.179 
Food & Beverage 0.088 -0.117 0.070 0.368 0.103 
Personal & Household Goods 0.031 -0.555 0.025 0.877 0.271 
Health Care 0.091 0.001 0.095 0.340 0.072 
Retail 0.096 -0.523 0.080 0.600 0.159 
Media 0.041 -0.187 0.043 0.387 0.130 
Travel & Leisure 0.098 -0.242 0.041 0.764 0.177 
Telecommunications 0.112 -0.036 0.032 0.613 0.171 
Technology 0.086 -0.351 0.099 0.309 0.126 
Change in revenue (∆REV)=[                     ]/Total assets 
 
5.2.3 Change in Receivables (∆RCE) 
∆RCE is deducted from ∆REV, (∆REV-∆RCE), when applying MJM and PM models to 
predict non-discretionary accruals. As can be noted from Table 5.3, the average 
value of ∆RCE for a given period and industry is almost positive, except for the year 
2009. The average for the full sample is (0.012), indicating that, on average, ∆RCE is 
increased by (0.012) during the period. The minimum and maximum values are (-
0.263) and (0.846) respectively. Table 5.3 also shows that the highest average of 
∆RCE is (0.027) in the year 2008 and the lowest is (-0.004) in 2009. These findings 
indicate that the average ∆RCE in 2008 is higher than its counterpart value in 2007 
and has increased by (0.027), while in 2009 it is lower than its counterpart in 2008 
and has decreased by approximately (-0.004). By comparing the lowest and the 
highest values of ∆RCE based on industry, it can be seen that the lowest average 
value is (0.002) for the Telecommunications sector, while the highest is (0.026) for 
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the Retail industry. This indicates that the average ∆RCE in Telecommunications is 
lower than the average ∆RCE in the Retail industry. 
Table 5-3: Descriptive Statistics by Year and Industry Scaled for Change in Receivables 
(∆REC) 
Total Accruals (TA) Mean Min P50 Max Sd. 
Full sample 0.012 -0.263 0.005 0.846 0.058 
Year      
2008 0.027 -0.136 0.019 0.312 0.047 
2009 -0.004 -0.263 -0.005 0.846 0.081 
2010 0.012 -0.092 0.005 0.142 0.031 
Industry      
Oil & Gas 0.017 -0.136 0.012 0.134 0.048 
Industrial Goods & Services 0.007 -0.224 0.011 0.120 0.049 
Food & Beverage 0.007 -0.092 0.009 0.060 0.027 
Personal & Household Goods 0.007 -0.063 0.001 0.183 0.038 
Health Care 0.018 -0.025 0.019 0.068 0.024 
Retail 0.026 -0.263 0.005 0.846 0.114 
Media 0.005 -0.094 0.003 0.142 0.047 
Travel & Leisure 0.005 -0.049 0.001 0.274 0.039 
Telecommunications 0.002 -0.028 0.003 0.039 0.018 
Technology 0.021 -0.063 0.021 0.113 0.039 
Change in revenue (∆REC)=[                           ]/Total assets 
5.2.4 Gross Property, Plant and Equipment (PPT) 
PPT is an independent variable included in the three models to control for the effect 
of depreciation, depletion and amortisation (Jones 1991). In general, the average 
value of PPT for the full sample is (0.467) during the period from 2008 to 2010. The 
minimum value is (0.004), while the maximum is (0.737), indicating that the range of 
PPT is between (0.004) and (0.737) of total assets at the beginning of the year. Based 
on the year scaled, Table 5.4 shows that the highest average of PPT is (0.494) and 
the lowest is (0.451) in the years 2009 and 2008 respectively. It ranges between 
(0.004) and (0.737) during the period 2008-2010. Based on the industry scaled, the 
highest value is (0.949) in the Telecommunications sector, while the lowest is (0.057) 
for Personal & Household Goods.  
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Table 5-4: Descriptive Statistics by Year and Industry Scaled for Gross Property, Plant and 
Equipment (PPT) 
Total Accruals (TA) Mean Min P50 Max Sd. 
Full sample 0.467 0.004 0.346 0.737 0.403 
Year      
2008 0.451 0.004 0.315 0.469 0.390 
2009 0.494 0.004 0.366 0.737 0.449 
2010 0.455 0.004 0.355 0.456 0.367 
Industry      
Oil & Gas 0.592 0.060 0.675 0.307 0.339 
Industrial Goods & Services 0.455 0.086 0.299 0.403 0.338 
Food & Beverage 0.567 0.183 0.481 0.568 0.342 
Personal & Household Goods 0.057 0.004 0.028 0.240 0.067 
Health Care 0.258 0.048 0.263 0.518 0.171 
Retail 0.641 0.138 0.587 0.456 0.327 
Media 0.134 0.025 0.093 0.422 0.127 
Travel & Leisure 0.673 0.088 0.700 0.433 0.360 
Telecommunications 0.949 0.047 0.527 0.737 0.945 
Technology 0.202 0.020 0.103 0.134 0.258 
 
5.2.5 Return on Assets (ROA)  
ROA is used as an independent variable in the PM model to control for the impact of 
the firm’s financial performance. Table 5.5 shows that the average ROA for the full 
sample is (0.083) and ranges from (-0.544) to (0.751). It also shows that the highest 
average of ROA is (0.089) during 2008 and the lowest is (0.077) in 2009, suggesting 
that the firms’ highest financial performance is in 2008 compared with the other 
years. The minimum and maximum values range from (-0.544) to (0.751) during a 
given period. Based on the industry scaled, the lowest value is (0.044) in Personal & 
Household Goods and the highest is (0.109) in the Technology sector. The minimum 
value of ROA is (-0.554) in the Media industry and the maximum value is (0.751) in 
Industrial Goods & Services.  
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Table 5-5: Descriptive Statistics by Year and Industry Scaled for Return on Assets (ROA) 
Total Accruals (TA) Mean Min P50 Max Sd. 
Full sample 0.083 -0.544 0.074 0.751 0.098 
Year      
2008 0.089 -0.544 0.083 0.658 0.117 
2009 0.077 -0.105 0.065 0.751 0.105 
2010 0.083 -0.165 0.071 0.374 0.067 
Industry      
Oil & Gas 0.076 -0.165 0.072 0.462 0.109 
Industrial Goods & Services 0.084 -0.131 0.077 0.751 0.085 
Food & Beverage 0.073 -0.067 0.075 0.197 0.050 
Personal & Household Goods 0.044 -0.248 0.051 0.248 0.101 
Health Care 0.087 -0.063 0.087 0.158 0.053 
Retail 0.086 -0.172 0.084 0.556 0.090 
Media 0.088 -0.544 0.047 0.658 0.216 
Travel & Leisure 0.092 -0.015 0.067 0.473 0.097 
Telecommunications 0.076 -0.156 0.070 0.184 0.085 
Technology 0.109 -0.012 0.092 0.310 0.081 
Return on assets (ROA)= Net income / total assets 
 
5.3 Analysis of EM 
Following the previous studies by Dechow et al. (2012); Kothari et al. (2005); Dechow 
et al. (1995); and Jones (1991), this section evaluates EM models in two different 
ways: i) exploring each independent variable and identifying which variable makes a 
significant contribution to the model; and ii) comparing the explanatory power by 
looking for adjusted R2. These tests are performed to determine which model is 
more appropriate for detecting EM in terms of the study data. In doing so, EM 
models are applied on the full sample during a given period. 
In respect of independent variables, a variable makes a strong contribution to the 
dependent variable when it has the largest coefficient value. In addition, a variable 
makes a significant contribution when it has a significance value of less than 0.05 or 
0.01 (Pallant 2007, p.159). Table 5.6 shows that the highest coefficient is for the 
variable ∆REV-∆REC/A in both MJM and PM; however, the coefficient of the same 
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variable is highest in PM compared with MJM. These findings are consistent with the 
previous study by (Peasnell et al. 2000b). In contrast, PPT is the weakest variable 
across the three models. Table 5.6 reveals that almost all independent variables are 
significantly related to TA at less than the 0.01 level, except for 1/A and ∆REV/A in 
the JM model. Overall, Table 6.5 reports that the PM model predicts the highest 
coefficients of independent variables compared with the JM and MJM models. 
With regard to the explanatory power, Table 5.6 shows that the Adjusted R2 has 
explanatory power of approximately (29, 31 and 35 per cent) for JM, MJM and PM 
respectively. These results indicate that PM has the highest explanatory power 
compared to the other models. 
Based on the above, it can be concluded that the PM has the highest predictors and 
explanatory power compared with the other models. Hence, the PM model will be 
used as the primary model to estimate discretionary accruals in the present study.  
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Table 5-6: Regression Estimations of Jones, Modified Jones, and Performance-Mached 
Models for the Full Sample  
TA Jones model (JM) Modified Jones model 
(MJM) 
Performance-matched 
model (PM) 
1/A 
-1.280 
-1.213 
-4.597 
-3.139*** 
-8.565 
-5.522*** 
∆REV/A 
0.014 
0.718 
  
∆REV-∆REC/A  
11.964 
3.294*** 
14.891 
4.211*** 
PPT 
-0.087 
-13.799*** 
-0.081 
-12.945*** 
-0.096 
-14.589*** 
ROA   
0.223 
6.319*** 
R2 0.30 0.31 0.35 
Adj-R2 0.29 0.31 0.35 
F-Stat. 75.03*** 79.92*** 72.20*** 
       h  g     r v  u s         h  g     r c  v bl s        ross prop r y  pl         qu pm     
ROA= Return on assets, and A= total assets at the beginning of the year.  
JM=                         ⁄                   ⁄                  ⁄⁄       
MJM=                         ⁄                                ⁄                  ⁄⁄       
PM=                        ⁄                                ⁄                  ⁄⁄               
* **and *** donate significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 
5.4 Univariate Analysis of EM 
5.4.1 Univariate Analyses of the Level of EM 
The section investigates whether the level of discretionary accruals differs 
significantly through the years from 2008 to 2010 using the three EM models (I.e. 
JM, MJM, and MP models). In doing so, the pooled sample is divided into two 
subsets of data according to the absolute discretionary accruals yearly cross-
sectional median. The first group comprises firms that have discretionary accruals 
above the median, and the data set is identified as “High EM”. Meanwhile, the 
second data set comprises firms with discretionary accruals below the median and is 
identified as “Low EM”. The t-test is performed to examine whether or not the mean 
values of High EM and Low EM firms are significantly different from zero in a given 
period.   
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The results of univariate analysis comparing the discretionary accruals of High EM 
and Low EM companies are presented in Table 5.7. While column two presents the 
means of High and Low EM firms in 2008using the three EM models, columns three 
and four illustrate the means of the two groups in 2009 and 2010 respectively. In 
general, the means of the two subsets are insignificantly different from zero across 
the three years and the models.  
Although the differences between the means across the years and models are 
statically insignificant,   Table 5.7 reveals that the high value of EM, in average, for 
the two subsets is in 2008 compared with 2009 and 2010. As can be seen in Table 
5.7, the highest level of EM for the high EM subset, for example, is in 2008 across the 
models. Similar results are noticed for the low EM group. Since the year 2008 has 
been considered by the economists as the year of global financial crisis due to the 
collapse of large financial intuitions, these results may reflect the impact of the 
global financial crisis on the level of EM. It has argued that during the economic 
crisis, firms engage either in a high levels of EM (Rolland and dirigé 2013; Berndt and 
Dipl-Kfm. 2011). These results are consistent with the previous study of Berndt and 
Dipl-Kfm. (2011) who examine EM practice during the period of 2007-2008 using 
multinational data and find that firms manage earnings more aggressively during 
financial crises in order to achieve earnings targets.  
In light of the above, the results of univariate tests indicate that managers have an 
incentive to engage in a high level of discretionary accruals to manipulate reported 
earnings, although these levels are insignificantly different from zero across years 
and models.  
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             Table 5-7: Univariate Test of EM Level (High and Low)  
Models 2008 2009 2010 2008-2009 2008-2010 2009-2010 
    Difference 
in mean 
T-test Difference 
in mean 
T-test Difference 
in mean 
T-test 
JM 
         
High (Mean) 0.078 0.068 0.061 0.010 1.988 0.017 1.988 0.007 1.988 
Low (Mean) 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.001 1.988 0.002 1.988 0.001 1.988 
MJM          
High (Mean) 0.078 0.068 0.061 0.010 1.989 0.017 1.989 0.007 1.989 
Low (Mean) 0.011 0.010 0.009 0.001 1.988 0.002 1.988 0.001 1.988 
PM          
High (Mean) 0.078 0.072 0.067 0.006 1.989 0.011 1.989 0.005 1.989 
Low (Mean) 0.058 0.050 0.046 0.008 1.988 0.012 1.988 0.004 1.988 
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5.4.2 Univariate Analysis of the Direction of EM 
Although the previous section provides a summary of whether High and Low EM 
subsets differ significantly across years using JM, MJM and PM models, it does not 
explain whether the direction of EM is income-increasing (positive) or income-
decreasing (negative). Hence, this section examines whether the direction of 
discretionary accruals differs significantly between positive and negative 
discretionary accruals. In doing so, the full sample is divided into two subsets 
according to the direction of discretionary accruals (i.e. positive and negative). A 
company is deemed an positive EM firm if the discretionary accruals of this firm has 
a positive sign, while it is deemed an negative EM firm if the sign of its discretionary 
accruals is negative. A univariate test is performed using a t-test to determine 
whether the means of positive and negative discretionary accruals firms differ 
significantly across years.   
In general, Table 5.8 reveals that the means of positive are insignificant deferent 
across years and models.  As can be seen from table 5.8, the results reveal that firms 
engage in high level of either income-increasing or income-decreasing in 2008 
comparing with 2009 and 2010. These results suggest that firms which engage in 
income-increasing EM during 2008 have a lower level of discretionary accruals in 
subsequent years, while firms that tend to engage in income-decreasing EM during 
2008 have a higher level of discretionary accruals in following years. Taking the 2008 
financial crisis into account, it can be interpreted that firms that manage their 
accruals upwards during the financial crisis tend to decrease the level of 
discretionary accruals in the years following the crisis period. On the other hand, 
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firms that practise income-decreasing EM during periods of financial crisis tend to 
increase their discretionary accruals in subsequent years. These results support the 
findings of the previous studies (see Section 5.4.1 of this Chapter). On the other 
hand, firms that realise they cannot achieve earnings targets tend to manage 
earnings downwards. In this regard, Habib et al. (2013) find that, during the period of 
the global financial crisis, managers of distressed firms engage more in income-
decreasing EM practices compared to their counterparts in healthy firms.  
112 
 
    Table 5-8: Univariate Test of EM Direction (Incme-Increasing And Income-Decreasing) by Year Scaled 
Models 2008 2009 2010 2008-2009 2008-2010 2009-2010 
    Difference 
in mean 
T-test Difference 
in mean 
T-test Difference 
in mean 
T-test 
JM 
         
Income-increasing (Mean) 0.039 0.033 0.030 0.006 1.989 0.009 1.989 0.003 1.989 
Income-decreasing (Mean) -0.049 -0.046 -0.037 -0.003 1.987 -0.012 1.987 -0.009 1.987 
MJM          
Income-increasing (Mean) 0.037 0.033 0.030 0.004 1.988 0.007 1.988 0.003 1.988 
Income-decreasing (Mean) -0.049 -0.044 -0.042 -0.005 1.988 -0.007 1.988 -0.002 1.988 
PM          
Income-increasing (Mean) 0.058 0.050 0.046 0.008 1.988 0.012 1.988 0.004 1.988 
Income-decreasing (Mean) -0.044 -0.039 -0.037 -0.005 1.974 -0.007 1.974 -0.002 1.974 
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5.5 Summary  
This chapter describes a set of EM variables based on year and industry scaled for 
515 UK firms during the period 2008-2010. In order to identify the most suitable 
model for detecting EM in terms of the study data, three EM models frequently 
described in the literature are evaluated. These models are the JM, MJM and PM 
models.  
Based on OLS regression, the PM model has the highest predictors and explanatory 
power compared to the other two models. Hence, it is used as the primary model to 
detect EM in the present study. Furthermore, the results indicate that the MJM 
model has a higher explanatory power than the JM. Thus, it is applied as an 
alternative measurement of EM in the sensitive and additional analyses of the 
association between corporate social responsibility and earnings management. 
The univariate analysis reveals that the mean difference between high and low EM is 
insignificant across years. It also shows an insignificant difference beween the means 
in income-increasing and income-decreasing groups across years. These findings 
suggest that managers in UK companies have incentives to manage earnings at both 
high and low levels as well as in both upwards and downwards directions. 
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6 Chapter Six                                                                                                  
CSD Practices in the UK: A General Description 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates CSD practices in UK companies over a three-year period 
from 2008 to 2010 using content analysis and disclosure index approaches. It is 
structured as follows. Section 6.2 discusses and analyses CSD in terms of number of 
firms. Section 6.3 presents the findings of CSD in terms of number of words, while 
section 6.4 addresses the results of CSD scores. Section 6.5 discusses the extent of 
CSD in different industries, and section 6.6 presents the summary.  
6.2 CSD - Number of Companies 
Table 6.1 presents information on the number and percentage of firms making at 
least one disclosure in their annual reports during the period 2008-2010, based on 
six categories: community (COM), employees (EMP), environment (ENV), products 
and services (PRO), customers (CUS), and others (OTH).  
Table 6.1 shows that more firms are interested in EMP-related information than with 
other categories. In addition, it reveals that firms are more concerned about COM, 
ENV and PRO but are less concerned about CUS and OTH. These results are 
consistent with the study by Momin (2006), who found that 100 per cent of UK firms 
make disclosures on human resources.  In addition, Momin (2006) found that 97 per 
cent of UK firms make disclosures on community information and that 89 per cent of 
companies provide information related to environmental issues. In respect of other 
countries, Hackston and Milne (1996) find that a higher number of New Zealand 
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firms make disclosures on human resources, while their second most important 
concern is the community. Likewise, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) find that a higher 
number of Malaysian firms make disclosures on employees. 
Table 6-1: CSD by Number of Companies 
Category/ Year 2008 2009 2010 2008-2010 
 No. % No. % No. % No. % 
No. Companies 172 33% 166 32% 177 34% 515 100% 
COM 165 96% 164 99% 167 91% 496 96% 
EMP 169 98% 163 98% 169 92% 501 97% 
ENV 148 86% 145 87% 157 86% 450 87% 
PRO 136 79% 129 78% 139 76% 404 78% 
CUS 100 58% 86 52% 91 50% 277 54% 
OTH 101 59% 129 78% 142 78% 372 72% 
Note: COM= Community, EMP= Employees; ENV= Environment; PRO= Products &Services; CUS= Customer; and OTH= Others  
In respect of the number of firms producing CSR reports, Table 6.2 shows that a 
majority of firms did not produce CSD reports. As can be seen from Table 6.2, 137 
(80 per cent), 129 (78 per cent), and 138 (78 per cent) firms did not produce CSR 
reports during the years 2008, 2009 and 2010 respectively. For the whole sample, 
404 (78 per cent) firms did not produce such reports. Conversely, Table 6.2 reveals 
that 35 firms (20 per cent) in 2008, 37 (22 per cent) in 2009, and 39 (22 per cent) in 
2010 produced CSR reports. In general, 111 (22 per cent) firms in the sample 
provided such reports. These figures are lower than those obtained by Holland and 
Boon Foo (2003), who found that 53 per cent of UK companies produced such 
reports. 
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A possible explanation for these results is the fact that all the companies belonging 
to regulated, mining and financial industries have been removed from the study 
sample. This elimination may reduce the number of firms likely to produce CSR 
reports.  
 Table 6-2: CSD by Number of CSR Reports 
Year 2008 2009 2010 2008-2010 
Full sample 172 166 177 515 
CSR reports No. % No. % No. % No. % 
1 35 20% 37 22% 39 22% 111 22% 
0 137 80% 129 78% 138 78% 404 78% 
Note: 1 a firm produces CSR report; 0 otherwise. 
Regarding the number of companies in terms of CSD themes, the results in Figure 6.1 
reveal that a higher number of companies that produce CSR reports are more 
interested in EMP and COM information (110 and 109 firms respectively). Figure 6.1 
also shows that firms are more concerned about OTH, EVN and PRO than about CUS 
information. 
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Figure 6-1: CSR Reports by Number of Companies 
 
In light of the above, it can be concluded that a higher number of UK companies are 
more concerned about providing information regarding EMP. The companies are 
also concerned about COM, ENV and PRO information. However, information related 
to CUS and OTH was of less concern in terms of the number of companies.     
6.3 CSD - Number of Words 
Content analysis is used to measure the level of CSD in annual and CSR reports in 
terms of the number of words over the three years from 2008 to 2010. As seen in 
Table 6.3, the EMP-related information is the most important CSD information, with 
332,986 (33 per cent) words during the given period. It had 102,369 (32 per cent) 
words in 2008, increasing slightly to 113,008 (33 per cent) in 2009, and to 118,609 
(33 per cent) in 2010.  These results are consistent with the previous studies by 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2004); Hackston and Milne (1996); and Andrew et al. (1989), 
who find that the most popular area of CSD is related to human resources. According 
to Andrew et al. (1989), the drive to disclose EMP information is attributed to 
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government concern about improving working conditions and standard of living. 
Table 6.3 also shows that the second most important theme of CSD is COM, with 
277,993 (27 per cent) words. The third and fourth categories are ENV and OTH, with 
160,932 (16 per cent) and 128,477 (13 per cent) words respectively. In addition, 
there are clearly fewer words related to PRO and CUS.    
Overall, the findings on the level of CSD are consistent with the previous study by 
Guthrie and Parker (1990), who find that EMP and COM involvements are the most 
popular areas of CSD in the UK, US and Australia, with 40  and 31 per cent of 
disclosures respectively. They also find that ENV is the third most important area of 
CSD with 13 per cent. Energy and others have the lowest priorities with 7 and 2 per 
cent respectively. Likewise, Hackston and Milne (1996) find that EMP-related 
information is the most popular area of CSD in New Zealand companies. Similarly, 
Rizk et al. (2008) find that EMP involvement is the most popular area in Egyptian 
companies. Similar results were found by Sobhani et al. (2009), who investigate 
social reporting in Bangladeshi companies and find that EMP is the most important 
area of CSD. Likewise, Haron et al. (2004) examine the level of CSD in Malaysian 
companies for the years 1996, 1998 and 2000, and find that the EMP theme receives 
the highest level of disclosure. 
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Table 6-3: Total Number of Words in Annual and CSR Reports  
Category/Year 2008 2009 2010 2008-2010 
N0. 
words 
% 
N0. 
words 
% 
N0. 
words 
% N0. words 
% 
COM 86,357 27% 94,355 28% 97,281 27% 277,993 27% 
EMP 102,369 32% 112,008 33% 118,609 33% 332,986 33% 
ENV 55,052 17% 57,251 17% 59,186 16% 160,932 16% 
PRO 23,584 7% 25,639 7% 28,446 8% 77,669 8% 
CUS 14,356 5% 15,262 4% 15,507 4% 45,125 4% 
OTH 34,859 11% 38,243 11% 44,818 12% 128,477 13% 
TOTAL  316,577 100% 342,758 100% 36,3847 100% 1,023,182 100% 
COM= Community, EMP= Employees; ENV= Environment; PRO= Products &Services; CUS= Customer; and OTH= Others 
 
6.4 CSD Score 
In addition to the content analysis approach, the disclosure index approach is also 
used in this study to examine the level of CSD in UK companies. This section 
discusses the extent of CSD in terms of scores. Table 6.4 provides descriptive 
statistics on CSD scores in annual and CSR reports over the period 2008-2010. As can 
be seen from Table 6.4, CSD scores range from a minimum of 0.101 for the CUS 
theme in 2010 to a maximum of 1 across themes and years. These results suggest 
that at least 10 per cent of CUS items are disclosed in 2010, while the highest CSD 
score is when 100 per cent of disclosure items are disclosed. In line with the findings 
of content analysis, Table 6.4 shows that the highest average CSD score is 0.667, for 
EMP, while the lowest average CSD score is 0.323, for CUS. The second highest 
average score is awarded for COM, with 0.536. The third and fourth highest average 
scores are related to ENV and OTH information, with 0.517 and 0.415 respectively. 
PRO information has the fifth highest average score with 0.383. These findings are 
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consistent with those of Rizk et al. (2008); Haniffa and Cooke (2005); and Haron et al. 
(2004), who find that EMP information has the highest score compared with the 
other categories.  
Table 6-4: Average CSD Score  
Category COM EMP ENV PRO CUS OTH TOTAL 
NO. Items 7 12 28 4 4 4 59 
2008 Mean 0.532 0.661 0.512 0.381 0.320 0.441 0.334 
Min 0.222 0.208 0.250 0.215 0.143 0.209 0.101 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
2009 Mean 0.543 0.684 0.524 0.377 0.319 0.420 0.340 
Min 0.250 0.250 0.211 0.236 0.108 0.197 0.098 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
2010 Mean 0.537 0.688 0.508 0.381 0.302 0.423 0.347 
Min 0.375 0.334 0.270 0.232 0.101 0.197 0.140 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
2008-2010 Mean 0.536 0.677 0.517 0.383 0.323 0.415 0.340 
Min 0.250 0.208 0.211 0.208 0.108 0.197 0.096 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
 
6.5 CSD in Different Industries 
In order to provide more information on CSD, this section discusses the level of CSD 
in different industries. Table 6.5 provides information on the level of CSD in terms of 
words according to different industries. As can be seen from Table 6.5, EMP 
information has the highest number of words and the Industrial Goods & Services 
sector provides a higher quantity of EMP information with 25 per cent. Oil & Gas, 
Personal & Household Goods, and Travel & Leisure industries provide the second 
highest level of CSD regarding EMP disclosure, with 12 per cent. The third sector is 
Retail with 10 per cent, while Health Care and Food & Beverages are the fourth and 
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fifth industries providing EMP information with, 9 per cent and 8 per cent 
respectively. Telecommunications is the sector providing the least information, with 
2 per cent. In respect of COM information, Table 6.5 shows that Industrial Goods & 
Services provides the highest number of words with 29 per cent, while the lowest 
level is provided by the Telecommunications industry with 2 per cent. Similar results 
are found with regard to the other CSD themes.  
Overall, Table 6.5 shows that the highest level of CSD in terms of number of words is 
provided by the Industrial Goods & Services sector with 26 per cent, followed by 
Travel & Leisure with 13 per cent. The third-ranked sectors in terms of producing 
CSD are the Oil & Gas, Personal & Household Goods, and Retail sectors with 11 per 
cent. In fourth and fifth place are Health Care and Food & Beverage, with 9 per cent 
and 8 per cent respectively. The industries providing the least information related to 
CSD are Technology, Media, and Telecommunications with 6 per cent, 3 per cent, 
and 2 per cent respectively.  
Although the results are consistent with the argument that industrial firms are able 
to provide a higher quantity of CSD  (Hassan 2010), the results in Table 6.6 reveal 
that the level of CSD may depend on the number of firms within the industry. For 
example, the Industrial Goods & Services industry has the highest number of 
companies (161 firms), while the Telecommunications sector has the lowest number 
of companies (12 firms). 
122 
 
Table 6-5: Total Number of Words in Annual and Corporate Social Responsibility Reports by Industry 
Industry/Category Companies COM EMP ENV PRO CUS OTH TOTAL 
No.  % NO. 
Words 
% NO. 
Words 
% NO. 
Words 
% NO. 
Words 
% NO. 
Words 
% NO. 
Words 
% NO. 
Words 
% 
Oil & Gas  43 8% 27907 10% 40893 12% 18882 12% 5033 6% 4783 11% 17129 13% 114627 11% 
Industrial Goods & Services 161 31% 81740 29% 81696 25% 41667 26% 21553 28% 9851 22% 27422 21% 263929 26% 
Food & Beverage 33 6% 20867 8% 27355 8% 12415 8% 8540 11% 2940 7% 8411 7% 80528 8% 
Personal & Household Goods 37 7% 29763 11% 40631 12% 15517 10% 8474 11% 5559 12% 13478 10% 113422 11% 
Health Care 24 5% 24422 9% 30207 9% 11705 7% 5060 7% 4670 10% 12009 9% 88073 9% 
Retail 75 15% 31310 11% 33593 10% 19520 12% 10726 14% 4771 11% 15246 12% 115166 11% 
Media 26 5% 6487 2% 9551 3% 5905 4% 3179 4% 2483 6% 5074 4% 32679 3% 
Travel & Leisure 60 12% 35883 13% 38772 12% 22388 14% 9876 13% 6047 13% 16717 13% 129683 13% 
Telecommunications* 12 2% 6316 2% 7065 2% 2709 2% 1764 2% 1661 4% 3484 3% 22999 2% 
Technology 44 9% 13298 5% 23223 7% 10221 6% 3464 4% 2360 5% 9510 7% 62076 6% 
TOTAL 515 100% 277993 100% 332986 100% 160932 100% 77669 100% 45125 100% 128477 100% 1023182 100% 
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With regard to CSD scores in different industries, Table 6.6 shows that the highest 
average CSD score is awarded to EMP across industries. It also shows that 
Telecommunications has the highest score with 0.750, while the lowest score related to 
EMP information is 0.609 for the Oil & Gas industry. COM has the second highest score 
across industries compared with other themes, and the Telecommunications sector has 
the highest score with 0.637. The lowest score related to COM information is awarded to 
the Travel & Leisure sector with 0.507. As can be seen from Table 6.7, the third score is 
related to ENV and the highest score for this theme is awarded to the Travel & Leisure 
sector with 0.465. With regard to OTH, Table 6.6 shows that Health Care has the highest 
score of 0.497, while the lowest is 0.379 for Oil & Gas. While the Retail sector produces 
the highest score of 0.414 related to PRO information, Telecommunications has the 
lowest score at 0.325. Finally, the highest score for CUS disclosure is awarded to Industrial 
Goods & Services with 0.358; the lowest is given to Telecommunications with 0.188.  
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    Table 6-6: CSR Reports Scores by Industry 
Category COM EMP ENV PRO CUS OTH TOTAL 
NO. Items 7 12 28 4 4 4 59 
Panel A: Annual reports 
Oil & Gas Mean 0.552 0.609 0.507 0.355 0.306 0.378 0.308 
Min 0.375 0.292 0.217 0.263 0.143 0.215 0.132 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Industrial Goods & 
Services 
Mean 0.546 0.680 0.516 0.370 0.358 0.445 0.352 
Min 0.222 0.208 0.250 0.208 0.125 0.197 0.147 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Food & Beverage Mean 0.609 0.702 0.523 0.398 0.356 0.413 0.391 
Min 0.417 0.417 0.217 0.179 0.236 0.286 0.262 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Personal & 
Household Goods 
Mean 0.549 0.685 0.478 0.338 0.296 0.402 0.336 
Min 0.375 0.417 0.318 0.155 0.143 0.250 0.211 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Health Care Mean 0.577 0.676 0.509 0.390 0.351 0.497 0.357 
Min 0.280 0.384 0.250 0.125 0.236 0.250 0.219 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Retail Mean 0.582 0.744 0.526 0.414 0.230 0.419 0.359 
Min 0.322 0.459 0.211 0.236 0.143 0.232 0.223 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Media Mean 0.538 0.706 0.486 0.396 0.288 0.428 0.336 
Min 0.318 0.583 0.375 0.209 0.125 0.250 0.206 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Travel & Leisure Mean 0.507 0.640 0.465 0.392 0.298 0.414 0.308 
Min 0.298 0.292 0.375 0.197 0.108 0.208 0.160 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Telecommunications Mean 0.637 0.750 0.492 0.325 0.188 0.454 0.354 
Min 0.375 0.375 0.270 0.197 0.101 0.340 0.280 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Technology Mean 0.595 0.667 0.517 0.365 0.211 0.402 0.318 
Min 0.298 0.459 0.280 0.236 0.143 0.232 0.193 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
TOTAL Mean 0.536 0.677 0.517 0.390 0.323 0.408 0.340 
Min 0.250 0.208 0.211 0.250 0.108 0.155 0.096 
Max 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
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6.6 Summary 
This chapter describes the extent of CSD in UK companies during the period 2008-2010. 
Six CSD themes are examined using both content analysis and disclosure index 
approaches. These themes are: COM, EMP, ENV, PRO, CUS, and OTH. The findings based 
on content analysis reveal that companies are more concerned about EMP, COM, ENV 
and OTH information but are less interested in providing information related to PRO and 
CUS disclosures. 
The results of using disclosure index are in line with the results of using content analysis. 
In particular, they show that the highest score of CSD is related to EMP information, while 
the lowest is for CUS information. In line with previous studies, the disclosure index is 
used as a primary measurement for CSD to examine the association between EM and 
CSD. In addition, the findings of content analysis are used as an alternative measurement 
for CSD. 
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7 Chapter Seven                                                                                                 
Data Analysis and Discussion 
 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to examine the association between EM and a set of explanatory 
variables of CSR, corporate governance, and other control variables. The remainder of this 
chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 presents the descriptive statistics and 
univariate analysis. Section 7.3 provides the correlation matrix analysis. Section 7.4 
summarises the results of multivariate analysis. Section 7.5 presents the results of 
additional and sensitive analysis.  Section 7.6 provides the summary of this chapter.    
7.2 Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analyses 
7.2.1 Descriptive Statistics  
Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Table 7.1. The dependent variable 
PM is the absolute discretionary accruals value measured through the yearly cross-
sectional performance-matched (Kothari et al. 2005) model. The mean value of 
discretionary accruals is 0.044 and ranges from 0.000 to 0.300. This result implies that the 
average value of discretionary accruals in UK companies is 4.4 per cent of total assets, 
which is relatively comparable with the previous findings of Yu (2008); and Rajgopal et al. 
(1999), who document that the average value of discretionary accruals in US companies is 
around 4.6 and 4.9 per cent respectively. Othman and Zeghal (2006) report that Canadian 
companies have an average absolute value of discretionary accruals of 6 per cent, while 
their counterparts in France have an average of 3 per cent. The aforementioned results 
imply that the magnitude of EM in UK companies may be less than that of their 
127 
 
counterparts in US and Canadian companies, while it may higher than that of French 
companies.   
The independent CSRI variable is the total score of CSD obtained by using the disclosure 
index. Following the previous studies (Lanis and Richardson 2012; Wibowo 2012), it is 
used as a proxy for CSR. As can be seen from Table 7.1, the mean value of CSRI is 0.367 
and it ranges from 0.029 to 1.000. This finding implies that the average CSR score in UK 
companies is 37.3 per cent. This figure is relatively higher than those of Jiang et al. (2013); 
Mohamad et al. (2010); and Haniffa and Cooke (2005), who find that the average value of 
CSR scores in Chinese and  Malaysian companies is 32, 18, and 11 per cent respectively. 
This comparison implies that firms in the UK have a higher level of CSR activities 
compared with Chinese and Malaysian firms.  In other words, it indicates that UK 
companies are more interested in engaging in a higher level of social responsibility 
activities compared with Asian companies.   
In respect to corporate governance effectiveness variables, a dummy variable of board of 
directors’ effectiveness (BRDEF) as a control variable has a mean of 0.256, while the audit 
committee effectiveness (AUDEF) has an average of 0.609. These results indicate that 
25.6 per cent of UK firms have efficient boards, whereas 60.9 per cent have efficient audit 
committees. Ho-Young (2008) indicates that the proportion of board effectiveness in US 
companies is 32.65 per cent, whereas the percentage of audit committee effectiveness is 
34.54 per cent. These results suggest that the proportion of board effectiveness in UK 
companies is lower than that in US companies, while the proportion of audit committee 
effectiveness in UK companies is higher than that of their counterparts in the US. Since 
the audit committee effectiveness is measured as a dummy variable, which gives a value 
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of “1” if all the members of audit committee are independent and at least a sample 
median of them are financial experts and “0” otherwise, the aforementioned finding on 
audit committee effectiveness may imply that UK companies are complying with the 
guidelines of the UK Corporate Governance Code (2010) and Smith Report (2003), which 
recommend that all directors on audit committees be independent.  
In terms of other control variables, the mean (median) of operating cash flow (OCF) is 
0.135 (0.117), indicating that the average cash flow from operations in UK companies is 
around 13.5 per cent. Table 7.1 reports that the mean value of company size (SIZE) is 
7.292 and the market-to-book ratio (MB) is 2.944. The result on company size is relatively 
comparable with the study by  Kim et al. (2012), who find that the mean values of SIZE 
and MB are around 7.  
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Table 7-1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Min P50 Max Sd. Kurtosis Skewness 
PM 0.044 0.000 0.034 0.300 0.042 10.751 2.332 
CSRI 0.367 0.029 0.373 1.000 0.115 2.997 -0.253 
BRDEF 0.256 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.437 2.246 1.116 
AUDEF 0.609 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.488 1.201 -0.448 
OCF 0.135 -0.135 0.117 0.850 0.104 11.109 1.916 
LEVG 0.599 -0.100 0.596 1.319 0.217 3.523 0.188 
ROA 0.084 -0.544 0.073 1.341 0.117 43.192 4.069 
SIZE 7.292 3.691 7.202 12.223 1.486 3.499 0.570 
LOSS 0.136 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.343 5.514 2.125 
MB 2.944 -0.387 2.269 22.070 3.050 18.755 3.430 
PM = Discretionary accruals using Performance-adjusted model; CSRI = Corporate social responsibility score; BRDEF = Board of 
directors effectiveness coded as 1 if more than 50% of directors on the board who are not on audit committee are independent, and 
at least a sample median of directors on the board are financial experts; and 0 otherwise; AUDEF = Audit committee effectiveness 
coded as 1 if all the members are independent, and at least a sample median are financial experts; and 0 otherwise;  OCF = Operating 
cash flow; LEVG = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  ROA = Firm performance as measured by net 
revenue to total assets ratio;  SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural logarithm of total assets;  LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has loss; and 0 
otherwise;  MB = Market-to-book ratio. 
 
7.2.2 Univariate Analysis 
This section tests whether the mean of several characteristics differs according to the 
level of discretionary accruals. The aim of this analysis is to consider whether companies 
are affected differently depending on the level of discretionary accruals. In doing so, the 
pooled study sample is divided into two subsets of data according to the discretionary 
accruals yearly cross-sectional median. The first data set comprises firms that have 
discretionary accruals above the median and is identified as “High EM”. Meanwhile, the 
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second data set comprises firms with discretionary accruals below the median and is 
identified as “Low EM”. The results of univariate tests using t-test and Mann-Whitney U 
test are presented in Table 7.2. Descriptive statistics show the mean and standard 
deviation of each variable, and t-test and Mann-Whitney U test are performed to provide 
the mean difference between High EM and Low EM firms. 
PM shows a significant difference between the means of High EM and Low EM groups at 
the 1% level. Mean discretionary accruals are 7.2 per cent for High EM firms and 1.5 per 
cent for Low EM firms, suggesting that discretionary accruals in the High EM group are 
higher than those in the Low EM group by 5.7 per cent on average. The mean CSRI of the 
High EM subset is 35 per cent, which is lower than that of the Low EM group (38 per cent) 
and is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. This result suggests that firms with 
higher discretionary accruals may be more likely to provide less information related to 
CSR than those firms with lower levels of discretionary accruals. In other words, firms 
with a high level of CSR have a lower magnitude of discretionary accruals compared with 
firms with a lower level of CSR.  These results are in line with the findings of the previous 
studies by Choi et al. (2013); and Kim et al. (2012), who find a negative relationship 
between the level of CSR and the magnitude of EM.  
Table 7.2 shows that the average efficiency of BRDEF and AUDEF in High EM firms is 
insignificantly different from those in the Low EM group, suggesting that corporate 
governance effectiveness does not differ between High and Low EM firms. A possible 
explanation for these results is that the study sample consists of the FTSE 350 firms, 
which may have similar corporate governance requirements and recommendations. In 
spite of that, univariate tests do not reveal any significant differences between the means 
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regarding BRDEF and AUDEF for the two groups; they show that the percentages of 
BRDEF and AUDEF are higher in the Low EM group compared to those companies in the 
High EM group.  
With regard to the other control variables, Table 7.2 reveals that OCF, LVEG, ROA, and MB 
ratio are insignificantly different from zero in the two groups. The difference between 
mean values of firm SIZE in High EM and Low EM groups is significant at the 5% level, with 
values of 7.127 and 7.456 respectively. This result is consistent with the notion that larger 
companies engage in lower levels of EM compared to smaller companies, which might 
manage earnings aggressively. In this regard, Chih et al. (2008) argue that larger 
companies are required to disclose their information more often; hence, they are less 
inclined to manage reported earnings compared with smaller companies. Empirically, this 
result is in line with the previous findings of Chih et al. (2008), who found that larger 
companies are less likely to engage in a higher level of EM. A comparison of losses (LOSS) 
reveals that firms making losses may engage in higher discretionary accruals. The mean 
values are 19.8 per cent for High EM firms and 7.4 per cent for those of low EM firms, 
which differs significantly from zero at the 1% level.  
In light of the above, discretionary accruals in higher CSR firms appear to be lower than 
those in firms with lower levels of CSR. In other words, firms that provide lower CSR 
information are more likely to engage in a higher level of discretionary accruals than their 
counterparts with higher levels of CSR. Furthermore, larger firms appear to engage in 
lower levels of discretionary accruals compared with smaller firms, and larger firms may 
provide higher levels of CSR information. It appears that firms with losses tend to provide 
132 
 
lower levels of CSR and are therefore more likely to manage earnings than companies 
that have reported profits.  
Table 7-2: Univariate Test 
 High EM Low EM T-test Mann Whitney Tests 
Variable Mean Sd. Mean Sd. T-Value P-Value Z-Value P-Value 
PM 0.072 0.044 0.015 0.009 -20.411 *** -19.634 *** 
CSRI 0.350 0.118 0.384 0.109 3.389 *** 3.66 *** 
BRDEF 0.226 0.419 0.287 0.453 1.590  1.587  
AUDEF 0.587 0.493 0.632 0.483 1.032  1.032  
OCF 0.587 0.493 0.632 0.483 1.032  1.032  
LEVG 0.598 0.241 0.599 0.192 0.057  0.126  
ROA 0.086 0.129 0.082 0.103 -0.411  0.727  
SIZE 7.127 1.455 7.456 1.501 2.520 ** 2.754 *** 
LOSS 0.198 0.400 0.074 0.262 -4.194 *** -4.128 *** 
MB 3.021 3.137 2.867 2.965 -0.572  -0.231  
PM = Discretionary accruals using Performance-adjusted model; CSRI = Corporate social responsibility score; BRDEF = Board of 
directors effectiveness coded as 1 if more than 50% of directors on the board who are not on audit committee are independent, and 
at least a sample median of directors on the board are financial experts; and 0 otherwise; AUDEF = Audit committee effectiveness 
coded as 1 if all the members are independent, and at least a sample median are financial experts; and 0 otherwise;  OCF = 
Operating cash flow; LEVG = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  ROA = Firm performance as 
measured by net revenue to total assets ratio;  SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural logarithm of total assets;  LOSS = Coded 1 if 
firm has loss; and 0 otherwise;  MB = Market-to-book ratio. 
 
7.3 Correlation Matrix 
Table 7.3 presents the correlation coefficients between dependent, independent and 
control variables in the full sample used in the regression analysis. Pearson correlation 
coefficients are reported in the first line, while the t-statistics are shown in the second 
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line. PM is negatively and significantly correlated with CSRI at the 1% level, suggesting 
that firms with higher levels of CSR  report lower magnitudes of discretionary accruals, 
consistent with the previous studies by  Choi et al. (2013); and Yongtae et al. (2012). Table 
7.3 also reveals that discretionary accruals are negatively and significantly correlated with 
BRDEF at the 10% level, indicating that firms with higher board efficiency are more likely 
to report lower levels of discretionary accruals. In addition, discretionary accruals are 
negatively and significantly correlated with financial LEVG, suggesting that firms with 
higher LEVG reported lower discretionary accruals, consistent with the findings of Kim et 
al. (2003). Conversely, discretionary accruals are found to be positively and significantly 
correlated to LOSS at the 1% level. This result indicates that firms reporting losses are 
more likely to report higher levels of discretionary accruals, consistent with the study by 
Kent et al. (2010).  
CSRI is positively and significantly correlated to SIZE at the 1% level, suggesting that larger 
companies provide more information on CSR, consistent with the results of Chih et al. 
(2008). Furthermore, CSRI is positively and significantly correlated to financial LEVG at the 
5% level, suggesting that firms with higher LEVG reported more information on CSRI. This 
result is consistent with the findings of Gargouri et al. (2010).  
Interestingly, BRDEF is negatively and significantly correlated to SIZE, suggesting that 
larger firms’ boards of directors are less efficient. A possible explanation for this result is 
that larger companies may have larger boards, and larger boards are considered to be  
less effective than smaller boards because of, for example, coordination problems (Coles 
et al. 2008, p. 330). 
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AUDEF is found to be positively and significantly correlated with BRDEF at the 5% level, 
indicating that firms with higher BRDEF have higher AUDEF. The results also reveal that 
AUDEF is positively and significantly correlated to SIZE at the 1% level. This indicates that 
larger firms have more AUDEF, consistent with the results of  Zaman et al. (2011). A 
significant and positive correlation is found between AUDEF and LOSS at the 5% level, 
suggesting that firms with higher levels of AUDEF are likely to be more conservative than 
those with lower levels of AUDEF, contrary to the results of Zaman et al. (2011). A 
possible explanation for this is that firms with higher AUDEF may be more likely to apply 
conservative accounting polices than their counterparts with lower AUDEF.  
A positive and significant correlation is also found between OCF, ROA and MB at the 1% 
level, suggesting that firms with higher OCF have higher ROA and higher MB, consistent 
withYongtae et al. (2012). Conversely, OCF is found to be negatively and significantly 
correlated to SIZE at the 1% level, implying that larger firms have lower OCF. It is also 
shown that OCF is negatively and significantly correlated to LOSS at the 1% level, 
suggesting that firms reporting losses have lower OCF, consistent with the findings of 
Yongtae et al. (2012). 
LEVG is found to be positively and significantly correlated to SIZE and MB at the 1% level, 
suggesting that smaller firms may need more capital and outside loans. This finding also 
suggests that firms with higher MB may depend more on outside loans. These results are 
consistent with the study byYongtae et al. (2012). However, a negative and significant 
correlation is found between LEVG and ROA at the 5% level, indicating that firms with 
higher LEVG have lower ROA, consistent with the findings of Yongtae et al. (2012). 
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 A negative and significant correlation is found between ROA and both SIZE and LOSS at 
the 1% level, suggesting that larger companies have lower ROA; this finding also indicates 
that firms with losses have lower ROA compared with those companies whose net 
operations yield profits. In addition, ROA is positively and significantly correlated with MB 
at the 1% level, suggesting that firms with higher ROA also have higher MB, consistent 
with Yongtae et al. (2012).  
SIZE is found to be negatively and significantly correlated to MB at the 10% level, implying 
that larger firms have lower MB. Table 7.3 also shows a negative and significant 
correlation between LOSS and MB ratio, suggesting that firms with losses have lower MB.  
Based on the above, it can be concluded that the largest correlation coefficient is around 
50 per cent, which is between ROA and OCF as shown in Table 7.3. This result indicates 
that multicollinearity between independent variables does not exist in the present study. 
In this regard, previous studies have suggested ± 80 per cent as the point at which 
multicollinearity problems may affect the regression analysis results (Abdul Rashidah  and 
Ali 2006; Gujarati 2003). Furthermore, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) test is also 
performed in the study to examine the collinearity between the independent variables. 
As can be seen in Table 7.3, there is no variance higher than 10, which implies that the 
collinearity between the independent variables is not likely to be a problem in the 
regression models. In this regard, the previous studies by Abdul Rashidah  and Ali (2006); 
and Gujarati (2003) argue that a variance inflation factor of less than 10 is not a cause for 
concern. 
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Table 7-3: Pairwise correlation matrix 
Variable PM CRSI BRDQ AUDQ OCF LEVG ROA SIZE LOSS MB VIF 
PM 1.000           
CSRI -0.200*** 1.000         1.030 
 (0.000)           
BRDEF -0.104* 0.042 1.000        1.030 
 (0.019) (0.341)          
AUDEF -0.040 0.055 0.116** 1.000       1.040 
 (0.365) (0.215) (0.008)         
OCF -0.066 -0.035 -0.018 -0.072 1.000      1.400 
 (0.133) (0.432) (0.691) (0.101)        
LEVG -0.123** 0.106** 0.010 0.176*** -0.002 1.000     1.130 
 (0.005) (0.017) (0.814) (0.000) (0.961)       
ROA 0.011 0.073 0.037 -0.067 0.495*** -0.082** 1.000    1.360 
 (0.808) (0.098) (0.406) (0.128) (0.000) (0.064)      
SIZE -0.080 0.244*** -0.139*** 0.296*** -0.284*** 0.215*** -0.224*** 1.000   1.190 
 (0.071) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)     
LOSS 0.199*** -0.052 0.053 0.114** -0.260*** 0.085 -0.316*** 0.0211 1.000  1.030 
 (0.000) (0.240) (0.233) (0.010) (0.000) (0.055) (0.000) (0.632)    
MB -0.009 0.060 -0.030 -0.070 0.170*** 0.210*** 0.150*** -0.110* -0.100* 1.000 1.120 
 (0.845) (0.160) (0.530) (0.120) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.020)   
Mean VIF           1.150 
*** **and * Denote significance (2-tailed) at 0.001, 0.05, and 0.10 levels respectively.   
PM = Discretionary accruals using Performance-adjusted model; CSRI = Corporate social responsibility score; BRDEF = Board of directors effectiveness coded as 1 if more than 50% of directors on the board who are not 
on audit committee are independent, and at least a sample median of directors on the board are financial experts; and 0 otherwise; AUDEF = Audit committee effectiveness coded as 1 if all the members are 
independent, and at least a sample median are financial experts; and 0 otherwise;  OCF = Operating cash flow; LEVG = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  ROA = Firm performance as 
measured by net revenue to total assets ratio;  SIZE = Firms size as measured by natural logarithm of total assets;  LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has loss; and 0 otherwise;  MB = Market-to-book ratio. 
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7.4 Multivariate Analysis  
In this section, multiple regression analysis of discretionary accruals by a set of 
predictor variables is performed to explain and predict EM for the whole study.  
The results of pooled OLS regression analysis are presented in Table 7.4. The 
dependent variable is discretionary accruals (PM) and the main independent variable 
is CSR score (CSRI). Other independent variables such as board effectiveness (BRDEF) 
and audit committee effectiveness (AUDEF) are included in the regression. 
Furthermore and consistent with the previous studies, control variables for firms’ 
characteristics, such as OCF, LEVG, ROA, SIZE, LOSS, and MB are included in the 
regression. The overall R2 as shown in Table 7.4 is around 12 per cent, showing that 
the predictor variables are able to explain and predict the dependent variable by 
approximately 12 per cent. The power of the regression model is relatively 
comparable with previous studies (Jiang et al. 2013; Pyo and Lee 2013; Lassaad and 
Khamoussi 2012; Yongtae et al. 2012).  
Table 7.4 shows that the coefficient of CSRI is negatively and significantly related to 
EM (coef. = -0.062, t = -3.513, p < 0.01). This result indicates that firms with a higher 
level of CSR report lower levels of discretionary accruals compared with those firms 
with a lower level of CSR. This finding is in line with the first hypothesis H1.  
The aforementioned result is inconsistent with the previous results of Gargouri et al. 
(2010); and Prior et al. (2008), who document a positive and significant relationship 
between EM and CSR and argue that CSR is used as an effective tool to deal with 
stakeholder activism and vigilance when firms engage in EM.  It is also inconsistent 
with the study by Sun et al. (2010), who find no relation between EM and 
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environmental disclosure in the UK. However, the result is in line with the studies of 
Choi et al. (2013); Jiang et al. (2013); Kim et al. (2012); Lassaad and Khamoussi 
(2012); Yongtae et al. (2012); and Chih et al. (2008), who find that firms with greater 
levels of CSR have lower levels of EM. The negative association between EM and CSR 
is predicted by Chih et al. (2008), who argue that financial transparency and 
accountability are vital to CSR; thus, they expect the principles of CSR to prevent 
managers from using their opportunistic discretion over reported earnings, which 
will in turn improve the quality of financial reports. They named their negative 
relationship hypothesis as “myopia avoidance hypothesis” (Chih et al. 2008, pp.181-
182). 
The coefficient of BRDEF is negatively and significantly related to the magnitude of 
EM (coef. = -0.010, t =-2.606, p < 0.01). This result implies that firms with high BRDEF 
report lower discretionary accruals. As BRDEF in the present study is measured by 
combining the number of independent and financially expert directors on the board, 
as suggested by Ho-Young (2008), the result is consistent with Dimitropoulos and 
Asteriou (2010); Lo et al. (2010); Davidson et al. (2005); (Xie et al. 2003); and Klein 
(2002), who find that a board with a higher proportion of independent directors is 
negatively associated with the magnitude of discretionary accruals. Moreover, the 
result is in line with the assumption that the financial expertise of the board of 
directors is an important factor for enhancing the quality of financial reports.  
However, several studies in the Asian context, such as those in Hong Kong (Jaggi et 
al. 2009), Indonesia (Siregar and Utama 2008), Malaysia (Abdul Rashidah  and Ali 
2006), and China (Tian and Chung-Ming 2001), find that the proportion of 
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independent board members has no effect on the magnitude of EM, and they 
conclude that there is no association between the independence of directors on the 
board and EM. A possible interpretation of the aforementioned results in the Asian 
context is that the system of having independent directors in such countries is still in 
development and/or that family-controlled companies still predominate, with family 
members dominating the boards of directors in these countries. 
Nevertheless, the UK study by Peasnell et al. (2005) found that the proportion of 
independent directors on the board is negatively and significantly related to income-
increasing EM to avoid reported losses and earnings reductions.  
The coefficient of AUDEF is insignificantly related to discretionary accruals (coef. = -
0.004, t =-0.788, p > 0.10).  Although there is no relationship between discretionary 
accruals and the AUDEF, the direction of the coefficient is consistent with the 
findings of Kent et al. (2010); Abdul Rashidah  and Ali (2006); and Peasnell et al. 
(2005), indicating that discretionary accruals decrease when the AUDEF is high. As 
the AUDEF is measured as the proportion of independent directors on the audit 
committee and the median of financial experts among the directors, following Ho-
Young (2008), the result of AUDEF is consistent with the previous studies that found 
a negative and insignificant relationship between EM and the proportion of 
independent directors on the audit committee. It is also in line with Kent et al. 
(2010); Abdul Rashidah  and Ali (2006); and Yang and Krishnan (2005), who found a 
negative and insignificant relationship between EM and the presence of financially 
expert directors on the audit committee.    
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With regard to other control variables, the coefficient of OCF is negatively and 
significantly related to discretionary accruals (coef. = -0.047, t =-2.122, p < 0.05), 
suggesting that firms with higher OCF report a lower magnitude of EM compared 
with those firms with lower OCF. This finding corroborates the findings of Jiang et al. 
(2008); Lobo and Zhou (2006); Becker et al. (1998); and Dechow et al. (1995), who 
found that discretionary accruals are negatively and significantly related to EM.  
The coefficient of LEVG is significantly and negatively associated with EM (coef. = -
0.018, t =-2.081, p < 0.05), suggesting that firms with higher LEVG report lower EM 
compared to those firms with lower LEVG. This result is in line with the studies by 
Choi et al. (2013); Chih et al. (2008); and DeAngelo et al. (1994), who find that LEVG 
is negatively and significantly related to discretionary accruals.  
The SIZE is negatively and significantly related to EM at (coef. = -0.003, t =-2.121, p < 
0.05), consistent with previous studies (Kim et al. 2012; Hong and Andersen 2011; 
Yip et al. 2011; Chih et al. 2008; Xie et al. 2003; Becker et al. 1998). This finding 
reveals that larger companies tend to report lower magnitudes of EM than smaller 
companies do. In this regard, Xie et al. (2003), for example, argue that smaller 
companies are more likely to show higher discretionary accruals because they may 
be operating in a business environment that is subject to less scrutiny, thus providing 
them with greater opportunities to engage in higher levels of EM compared with 
larger firms.    
The coefficient of LOSS is found to be significantly and positively related to 
discretionary accruals (coef. = 0.045, t = 4.686, p < 0.01), consistent with (Kent et al. 
2010). This result implies that firms with losses report higher discretionary accruals, 
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indicating that firms that reported a loss in the period tend to engage in higher EM 
than those firms that have reported a profit. This type of EM is known as the ’big 
bath’ technique. This technique may be preferred when managers realise that the 
current earnings are so low that they will be unable to meet earnings targets; thus, 
managers have an incentive to further reduce current earnings to meet future 
earnings targets (Healy 1985). According to Healy (1985), firms tend to use the “big 
bath” strategy when they realise that they will be unable to manage earnings to 
meet managerial targets.   
None of the coefficients of ROA and MB ratios are significantly related to EM, 
suggesting that these two ratios do not affect the magnitude of EM. Although these 
results are in line with the previous studies by Sun et al. (2010); and Chih et al. 
(2008), who find that neither ROA nor MB ratios are significantly related to EM, they 
reflect the conflicting views in the previous literature regarding the potential impact 
of ROA and MB on EM. While several studies have found ROA and MB are negatively 
significant related to EM (e.g. Skinner 2003). others have found ROA and MB are 
positively related to EM (e.g. Thiruvadi and Huang 2011; Peni and Vähämaa 2010; Jo 
and Kim 2007); still others have found ROA and MB to be unrelated to EM (e.g. Chih 
et al. 2008).  
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Table 7-4: Results of pooled OLS regression of CSR on EM 
PM Exp. Sign Coef. t P>t 
CSRI - -0.062 -3.513 *** 
BRDEF - -0.010 -2.606 *** 
AUDEF - -0.004 -0.788  
OCF ? -0.047 -2.122 ** 
LEVG ? -0.018 -2.081 ** 
ROA ? 0.012 0.457  
SIZE ? -0.003 -2.121 ** 
LOSS + 0.025 4.323 *** 
MB ? 0.000 1.200  
Constant ? 0.103 6.882 *** 
 
    
Adj. R2  0.120   
PM = Discretionary accruals using Performance-adjusted model; CSRI= Corporate social responsibility score; BRDEF = Board 
of directors effectiveness coded as 1 if more than 50% of directors on the board who are not on audit committee are 
independent, and at least a sample median of directors on the board are financial experts; and 0 otherwise; AUDEF = Audit 
committee effectiveness coded as 1 if all the members are independent, and at least a sample median are financial experts; 
and 0 otherwise;  OCF = Operating cash flow; LEVG = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  
ROA = Firm performance as measured by net revenue to total assets ratio;  SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural 
logarithm of total assets;  LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has loss; and 0 otherwise;  MB = Market-to-book ratio. 
Since the coefficient of the total CSRI score as a proxy for CSR performance reveals a 
significant and negative relationship with EM, further investigations of the 
association between sub-scores of CSR and EM are required. Therefore, following 
the previous studies by  Yongtae et al. (2012); and Gargouri et al. (2010), the present 
study examines whether there is association between EM and CSR sub-scores by 
testing the association between each CSR sub-score and EM. Multiple pooled OLS 
regression is performed to examine each of the six CSR sub-themes: community 
(COM), employees (EMP), environment (ENV), products (PRO), customers (CUS), and 
others (OTH). The results of the six regression models are presented in Table 7.5. As 
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can be seen from Table 7.5, overall R2 for the six models are relatively lower than 
those of the main analysis presented in Table 7.4. The constants are positively 
significant at (p < 0.01). 
The results of model 1 in Table 7.5 reveal that the coefficient of COM is significantly 
and negatively related with the extent of discretionary accruals (coef. = -0.019, t = -
2.242, p < 0.05), consistent with hypothesis H2. 
The result of the association between EM and COM suggests that firms with higher 
levels of COM information report lower discretionary accruals compared to those 
firms with lower levels of such information. This result is in line with the finding of 
Kim et al. (2012), who find a negative and significant association between COM and 
EM.  
In respect to EMP information, Model 2 shows that the coefficient of EMP is 
negatively and significantly related to the magnitude of EM (coef. = -0.028, t = -2.55, 
p < 0.05), indicating that firms with higher levels of EMP tend to report lower 
discretionary accruals. This result is in line with hypothesis H3. 
The above finding is consistent with Kim et al. (2012), who find a negative and 
significant relationship between EMP and EM, but it is inconsistent with the results 
provided by Gargouri et al. (2010), who find a positive and significant association 
between EM and EMP. Gargouri et al. (2010) justify their findings by suggesting that 
Canadian companies are relatively smaller compared to other firms such as US 
companies; therefore, by engaging in CSR activities these firms will incur high costs 
which in turn may reduce their financial performance, at least in the short term. 
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Therefore, this incentive may encourage managers to engage less in CSR activities 
and resort to a higher level of EM. In this regard, Prior et al. (2008) argue that when 
managers engage in EM they resort to CSR as an effective tool to deal with 
stakeholder activism and vigilance. However, an opposite view posited by several 
researchers argues that providing a higher level of earnings reporting quality is 
closely connected to CSR activities; therefore, a negative relationship between EM 
and CSR is expected to be confirmed (e.g Choi et al. 2013; Kim et al. 2012; Chih et al. 
2008). Choi et al. (2013), for instance, identify this type of negative relationship 
between EM and CSR as the “long-term perspective hypothesis”. They find that CSR 
is negatively and significantly related to EM practices.   
 Model 3 and model 4 reveal that ENV and PRO sub-scores are negatively and 
significantly related to the extent of discretionary accruals (coef. = -0.024, z = -3.119, 
p < 0.01), and (coef. = -0.029, t = -2.069, p < 0.05) respectively, supporting the 
following hypotheses H4 and H5. 
These findings suggest that firms with higher levels of ENV and PRO information 
report a lower magnitude of discretionary accruals. Although, the result regarding 
the association between EM and ENV is inconsistent with the study by Sun et al. 
(2010) who find no relationship between the two variables, it is consistent with 
those of Kim et al. (2012), who find that both ENV and PRO are negatively related to 
EM. 
The coefficients of CUS and OTH in models 5 and 6 are insignificantly related to EM, 
rejecting the two following hypotheses H6 and H7.  
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Although there are no relationships between the levels of CUS and OTH and the 
magnitude of EM, the direction of the coefficients are in line with the main findings 
in Table 7.4, revealing that discretionary accruals decreased when the levels of CUS 
and OTH information increased. 
In brief, with regarding to corporate governance and other control variables, the 
coefficients of BRDEF, AUDEF, OCF, LEVG, ROA, SIZE, LOSS and MB show relatively 
similar results to the results and directions of the main findings in Table 7.4. 
According to the results in Tables 7.4 and 7.5, it can be concluded that the level of 
CSR information appears to play an essential role in constraining EM practices. In 
addition, the BRDEF seems to be an important tool for providing high-quality 
earnings reporting.       
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Table 7-5: Results of OLS regression of CSR individual themes on EM 
 Exp.  Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
PM Sing Coef. t P>t Coef. t P>z Coef. t P>t Coef. t P>t Coef. t P>t Coef. t P>t 
COM - -0.019 -2.242 **                
EMP -    -0.028 -2.355 **             
ENV -       -0.024 -3.119 ***          
PRO -          -0.029 -2.069 **       
CUS -             -0.005 -0.446     
OTH -                -0.002 -0.125  
BRDEF - -0.01 -2.639 *** -0.011 -2.723 *** -0.009 -2.488 ** -0.011 -2.818 *** -0.011 -2.717 *** -0.01 -2.681 *** 
AUDEF - -0.004 -0.89  -0.004 -0.855  -0.004 -0.871  -0.004 -0.88  -0.004 -0.866  -0.004 -0.888  
OCF ? -0.048 -2.121 ** -0.051 -2.242 ** -0.044 -1.945 * -0.047 -2.052 ** -0.048 -2.133 ** -0.048 -2.099 ** 
LEVG ? -0.019 -1.997 ** -0.018 -1.984 ** -0.018 -2.023 ** -0.018 -1.98 ** -0.019 -2.019 ** -0.019 -2.066 ** 
ROA ? 0.013 0.492  0.014 0.534  0.011 0.419  0.01 0.386  0.012 0.459  0.012 0.463  
SIZE ? -0.003 -2.135 ** -0.003 -2.209 ** -0.003 -2.132 ** -0.003 -2.104 ** -0.003 -2.138 ** -0.003 -2.12 ** 
LOSS + 0.025 4.126 *** 0.026 4.375 *** 0.027 4.322 *** 0.026 4.298 *** 0.026 4.341 *** 0.026 4.338 *** 
MB ? 0.000 0.898  0.000 0.805  0.000 0.697  0.000 0.587  0.000 0.6  0.000 0.615  
Constant ? 0.091 6.537 *** 0.102 5.935 *** 0.09 6.697 *** 0.089 6.324 *** 0.085 6.135 *** 0.084 6.454 *** 
                    
Adj. R2  0.095   0.100   0.104   0.096   0.086   0.086   
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7.5 Additional and sensitivity analyses   
7.5.1  Additional analyses   
In order to better explain and predict the behaviour of discretionary accruals, further 
analyses classified by discretionary accruals’ direction5 (i.e. positive and negative 
accruals) and by industrial classification are performed.  
7.5.1.1 Discretionary accruals direction analysis   
Following the studies by Kim et al. (2012); Gul et al. (2006); and Ashbaugh et al. 
(2003), the present study breaks the full sample down into two groups: firms with 
income-increasing (positive) discretionary accruals and firms with income-decreasing 
(negative) discretionary accruals. The objective of this partition is to investigate 
whether or not the direction of discretionary accruals has a different impact on the 
association between EM and CSR and other independent variables. It will also 
provide a better understanding of discretionary accruals behaviour. The results on 
firms with income-decreasing (negative) and income-increasing (positive) 
discretionary accruals are presented in Tables 7.6 and 7.7 respectively.  
The results of multiple pooled OLS regression for observations with income-
decreasing discretionary accruals are presented in Table 7.6. The overall R2 is 23 per 
cent for firms with income-decreasing discretionary accruals, indicating that the 
explanatory power of the regression model is relatively higher than the model of full 
observations in Table 6.5. The coefficient of the contrast is negative and significant 
at 10%, suggesting that firms with income-decreasing accruals reported discretionary 
                                                          
5
 Discretionary accruals direction is divided into Income-increasing (positive) and income-decreasing 
(negative) directions.  
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accruals by 4 per cent of total assets at the beginning of the year regardless of other 
independent variables.  
The coefficient of CSRI is negatively significant (coef. = -0.059, t = -2.293, p < 0.05), 
suggesting that firms with higher levels of CSR report lower level of income-
decreasing discretionary accruals than those firms with lower levels of CSR. This 
finding is in line with the main finding presented in Table 7.4 and supports the 
results documented by Kim et al. (2012), who find that companies with higher level 
of CSR are more likely to engage in income-decreasing EM. Since transparency and 
accountability are vital to CSR, it is expected that a firm with strong commitments to 
CSR principles will not tend to hide unfavourable earnings realisation and, therefore, 
will not practise EM in order to either increase or decrease reported earnings. 
Therefore, the opposite association between EM and CSR is in line with the 
argument that EM occurs less often in a firm with strong commitments to CSR, since 
opportunistic EM practice is perceived as unethical behaviour (Shleifer 2004). In 
addition, Chih et al. (2008) argue that a strong commitment to CSR principles 
prevents managers from using their opportunistic discretion over earnings. 
The coefficient of the BRDEF is also negatively significant (coef. = -0.011, t = -2.137, p 
< 0.05), indicating that firms with higher board effectiveness report lower negative 
discretionary accruals. However, as presented in the main results in Table 7.4, the 
AUDEF is found to be negatively and insignificantly associated with income-
decreasing discretionary accruals, which implies that AUDEF does not impact the 
negative direction of discretionary accruals. Although the UK Corporate Governance 
Code (2010) is widely regarded as an international benchmark for good corporate 
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governance practice, it provides firms with the flexibility to choose between 
complying with its principles or explaining why they are not doing so (Arcot et al. 
2010). In this regard, Arcot et al. (2010) find that less than 10 per cent of UK 
companies were not compliant with the corporate governance code and argue that 
the flexibility in corporate governance regulations and recommendations play a 
crucial role in the monitoring function of corporate governance. Therefore, the 
findings in the present study regarding AUDEF may reflect the fact that not all firms 
comply with the recommendations of the code of corporate governance 
The coefficient of OCF is negatively and significantly related to income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals at the 1%. The results suggest that firms with higher OCF are 
more likely to report a lower level of income-decreasing discretionary accruals. 
These results support the previous studies results (Kim et al. 2012; Kim et al. 2003; 
Becker et al. 1998). However, the coefficient of LOSS shows a positive and significant 
relationship with income-decreasing discretionary accruals. This finding indicates 
that firms reporting losses are more likely to report lower levels of income-
decreasing discretionary accruals. The result is consistent with the “big bath” 
strategy, which argues that managers prefer to engage in income-decreasing 
discretionary accruals when they realise that current earnings are so low that they 
will be unable to meet earnings targets. Therefore, as a strategy they further reduce 
current earnings through income-decreasing discretionary accruals in order to be 
able to meet future earnings targets (Healy 1985). 
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The coefficients of LEVG, ROA, Size and MB are insignificantly associated with 
income-decreasing discretionary accruals, suggesting that LEVG, ROA, Size and MB 
do not affect the direction of income-decreasing discretionary accruals. 
On the other hand, Table 7.7 presents the results of multiple pooled OLS regression 
for firms with income-increasing discretionary accruals. As can be seen from Table 
7.7, the overall R2 is around 11%, suggesting that the explanatory power of the 
model is relatively lower than the explanatory power of the full sample in Table 7.4 
and income-decreasing discretionary accruals in Table 7.6. The intercept is positive 
and significant at the 1% level, indicating that firms with income-increasing accruals 
reported discretionary accruals of around 9 per cent of total assets at the beginning 
of the year regardless of other independent variables.  
The coefficient of CSRI is significantly negative (coef. = -0.047, t = -1.998, p < 0.05), 
suggesting that firms with higher levels of CSR report lower levels of income-
increasing discretionary accruals.  This finding corroborates that of Kim et al. (2012), 
who find that CSR is negatively associated with income-increasing EM.  
A negative and significant relationship is also found between income-increasing 
discretionary accruals and BRDEF (coef. = -0.010, t = -1.900, p < 0.10), suggesting that 
firms with higher BRDEF report lower income-increasing accruals. However, the 
coefficient of AUDEF is negative and insignificantly related to income-increasing EM. 
These results are in line with the main results in Table 7.4 and suggest that AUDEF 
does not affect income-increasing discretionary accruals. 
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With respect to the control variables, the coefficients of OCF and SIZE are negative 
and significantly related to income-increasing discretionary accruals, implying that 
firms with higher OCF and/or larger companies report lower income-increasing 
discretionary accruals.  
Interestingly, the coefficient of LOSS reveals no significant relationship with income-
increasing discretionary accruals, suggesting that firms that reported losses during 
the period do not engage in income-increasing EM. In contrast, they are more likely 
to engage in income-decreasing discretionary accruals. These results are in line with 
the "big bath" strategy that supposes that managers prefer to manage current 
earnings downwards when they realise that the current earnings will be unable to 
meet earnings targets. Therefore, they defer current earnings to be used to meet 
earnings targets in the future. 
None of the coefficients for LEVG, ROA and MB are significantly related to income-
increasing discretionary accruals, suggesting that LEVG, ROA and MB do not have an 
impact on income-increasing EM.  
In light of the above, the results in Table 7.6 and 7.7 reveal that CSRI, BODEF, OCF 
and SIZE run in opposite directions with bout income-decreasing and income-
increasing EM, suggesting that firms with higher CSRI, BODEF and OCF and larger 
companies report lower income-decreasing and lower income-increasing 
discretionary accruals. In addition, the results show that firms with losses tend to 
engage in income-decreasing rather than income-increasing EM.  
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Table 7-6: Multiple OLS regression for firms with negative earnings management (income-
decreasing) 
PM (-) Exp. Sing Coef. t P>t 
CSRI - -0.059 -2.293 ** 
BRDEF - -0.011 -2.137 ** 
AUDEF - -0.001 -0.133  
OCF ? 0.241 3.637 *** 
LEVG ? -0.001 -0.049  
ROA ? -0.029 -0.954  
SIZE ? 0.001 -0.216  
LOSS + 0.041 5.313 *** 
MB ? 0.001 -1.168  
Constant ? 0.038 1.725 * 
Adj. R2  0.232   
PM = Discretionary accruals using Performance-adjusted model; CSRI= Corporate social responsibility score; BRDEF = Board of 
directors effectiveness coded as 1 if more than 50% of directors on the board who are not on audit committee are 
independent, and at least a sample median of directors on the board are financial experts; and 0 otherwise; AUDEF = Audit 
committee effectiveness coded as 1 if all the members are independent, and at least a sample median are financial experts; 
and 0 otherwise;  OCF = Operating cash flow; LEVG = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  
ROA = Firm performance as measured by net revenue to total assets ratio;  SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural logarithm 
of total assets;  LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has a loss; and 0 otherwise;  MB = Market-to-book ratio. 
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Table 7-7: Multiple OLS regression for firms with positive earnings management (income-
increasing) 
PM(+) Exp. Sing Coef. t P>t 
CSRI + -0.047 -1.998 ** 
BRDEF + -0.010 -1.900 * 
AUDEF + -0.004 -0.673  
OCF ? -0.092 -2.486 ** 
LEVG ? -0.013 -0.951  
ROA ? 0.032 1.416  
SIZE ? -0.004 -2.180 ** 
LOSS - 0.001 0.116  
MB ? 0.002 2.722  
Constant ? 0.091 5.291 *** 
Adj. R2 
 
0.114   
PM = Discretionary accruals using Performance-adjusted model; CSRI= Corporate social responsibility score; BRDEF = Board of 
directors effectiveness coded as 1 if more than 50% of directors on the board who are not on audit committee are 
independent, and at least a sample median of directors on the board are financial experts; and 0 otherwise; AUDEF = Audit 
committee effectiveness coded as 1 if all the members are independent, and at least a sample median are financial experts; 
and 0 otherwise;  OCF = Operating cash flow; LEVG = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  
ROA = Firm performance as measured by net revenue to total assets ratio;  SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural logarithm 
of total assets;  LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has a loss; and 0 otherwise;  MB = Market-to-book ratio. 
 
7.5.1.2 Industry Analysis  
The type of industry in which a company operates can play an important role in 
motivating managers to manage reported earnings (Sun et al. 2010; Toniato et al. 
2006). Thus, the relation between discretionary accruals and CSR can be driven by 
the type of industry. In order to take this potential impact into account, the study re-
performed OLS regression analysis for each industry, following the previous studies 
of Gargouri et al. (2010); Sun et al. (2010); and Prior et al. (2008). Industry 
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Classification Benchmark (ICB) is used to classify the full sample into ten industries. 
The object of these analyses is to investigate whether or not the type of industry 
affects the relationship between discretionary accruals and CSR. Therefore, the aim 
of this analysis is to examine whether or not the results of the primary analysis in 
Table 7.4 are affected by the type of industry. To do so, an industry dummy variable 
for each industry is included in the regression, taking a value of 1 if the firm belongs 
to a particular industry and 0 otherwise.   
The results of the industry analysis are presented in Table 7.8. Consistent with the 
primary findings in Table 7.4, the coefficients of CSRI for all industrial models are 
negatively significant at the 1% level, suggesting that firms with higher levels of CSR 
across industries report lower levels of discretionary accruals.  
The coefficients of BRDEF reveal a negative and significant relationship with 
discretionary accruals at the 1% level for the ten models, indicating that firms with 
higher BRDEF report lower discretionary accruals. These results confirm and 
consistent with the main results in Table 7.4.        
The coefficients of AUDEF for the ten models show an insignificant relationship 
between the AUDEF and discretionary accruals, implying that AUDEF does not 
impact the magnitude of EM.    
In terms of control variables, the coefficients of OCF, LEVG, and SIZE are negatively 
and significantly related to EM across sectors at the 5% level, consistent with the 
primary results in Table 7.4. The coefficient of LOSS is positively and significantly 
related to discretionary accruals for all the industrial models, consistent with the 
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main result in Table 7.4. The coefficients of MB and ROA are insignificantly related to 
EM, thus corroborating the primary results.   
Although most industries are insignificantly related to discretionary accruals, the 
results in Table 7.8 reveal that Oil & Gas, Food & Beverages, and 
Telecommunications are significantly related to discretionary accruals. While the 
coefficient of the Oil & Gas industry shows a positive and significant association with 
discretionary accruals at the 5% level, the coefficients of Food & Beverages and 
Telecommunications are negatively and significantly related to discretionary accruals 
at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. These results suggest that the Oil & Gas sector 
tends to report higher rather than lower levels of discretionary accruals, while Food 
& Beverages and Telecommunications are more likely to report lower levels of 
discretionary accruals. A possible explanation for these differing results is that these 
industries may have more complex transactions, such as revenue recognition, than 
the other industries, which indicates that they may have more incentives than others 
to manage earnings. In this regard, Beasley et al. (2000, p.421) argue that revenue 
frauds are common in technology firms, whereas assets frauds and 
misappropriations are most common in financial services firms. They find that 
certain industries have more particular types of fraud than other industries. Thereby, 
the results on the industrial variables are in line with those of  Beasley et al. (2000), 
who find that the nature of frauds differs by type of industry.  
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Table 7-8: Multiple OLS regression for type of industry 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
PM Coef. t P>t Coef. t P>t Coef. t P>t Coef. t P>t Coef. t P>t 
CSRI -0.058 -3.352 *** -0.063 -3.559 *** -0.059 -3.343 *** -0.065 -3.585 *** -0.062 -3.515 *** 
BRDEF -0.009 -2.242 ** -0.009 -2.457 ** -0.010 -2.648 *** -0.008 -2.261 ** -0.010 -2.659 *** 
AUDEF -0.005 -1.036  -0.003 -0.738  -0.004 -0.824  -0.004 -0.971  -0.004 -0.818  
OCF -0.049 -2.253 ** -0.048 -2.147 ** -0.048 -2.130 ** -0.047 -2.177 ** -0.047 -2.131 ** 
LEVG -0.015 -1.778 * -0.017 -1.957 * -0.018 -2.080 ** -0.015 -1.712 * -0.018 -2.091 ** 
ROA 0.007 0.269  0.011 0.435  0.011 0.452  0.012 0.508  0.012 0.459  
SIZE -0.003 -2.450 ** -0.003 -2.180 ** -0.003 -2.098 ** -0.003 -2.279 ** -0.003 -2.105 ** 
LOSS 0.024 4.235 *** 0.025 4.275 *** 0.025 4.288 *** 0.024 4.094 *** 0.025 4.310 *** 
MB 0.000 1.657  0.000 1.223  0.000 1.231  0.000 1.275  0.000 1.189  
Oil & Gas 
0.022 2.149 **             
Industrial Goods & Services    -0.004 -1.069           
Food & Beverage       -0.009 -2.439 **       
Personal & Household Goods          0.017 1.344     
Health Care             -0.002 -0.372  
Constant 
0.102 7.235 *** 0.105 6.833 *** 0.103 6.855 *** 0.103 6.853 *** 0.104 6.892 *** 
Adj. R2 0.134   0.120   0.120   0.127   0.118   
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Table 7.8 (Continue) 
 Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) 
PM Coef. t P>t Coef. t P>t Coef. t P>t Coef. t P>t Coef. t P>t 
CSRI -0.061 -3.292 *** -0.062 -3.512 *** -0.061 -3.505 *** -0.061 -3.464 *** -0.061 -3.437 *** 
BRDEF -0.010 -2.558 ** -0.010 -2.643 *** -0.010 -2.604 *** -0.010 -2.553 ** -0.010 -2.746 *** 
AUDEF -0.004 -0.776  -0.004 -0.781  -0.004 -0.808  -0.003 -0.683  -0.003 -0.739  
OCF -0.047 -2.107 ** -0.047 -2.108 ** -0.047 -2.135 ** -0.046 -2.081 ** -0.048 -2.145 ** 
LEVG -0.019 -2.183 ** -0.018 -2.022 ** -0.018 -1.971 ** -0.018 -2.092 ** -0.017 -1.907 * 
ROA 0.011 0.448  0.010 0.403  0.012 0.465  0.012 0.458  0.012 0.463  
SIZE -0.003 -2.098 ** -0.003 -2.111 ** -0.003 -2.105 ** -0.003 -2.139 ** -0.003 -2.052 ** 
LOSS 0.025 4.339 *** 0.025 4.353 *** 0.025 4.320 *** 0.025 4.373 *** 0.025 4.340 *** 
MB 0.000 1.242  0.000 1.263  0.000 1.218  0.000 1.157  0.000 1.152  
Retail 0.003 0.456  
            
Media 
   -0.009 -1.632  
         
Travel & Leisure 
      -0.003 -0.649  
      
Telecommunications 
         -0.016 -2.665 *** 
   
Technology 
            0.003 0.376  
Constant 
0.102 6.688 *** 0.103 6.904 *** 0.103 6.873 *** 0.103 6.859 *** 0.102 6.415 *** 
Adj. R2 0.118   0.120   0.118   0.121   0.118   
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7.5.2 Sensitivity analyses   
In order to provide reasonable assurance that the preliminary results in Table 7.4 are 
robust to the specifications of different measures, further sensitivity analyses are 
required to investigate the robustness of the main findings. First, an alternative 
measure of CSR is used to investigate the robustness of the primary results. 
Therefore, following the study by Haniffa and Cooke (2005), the present study uses 
the content analysis approach to capture the level of CSR. The number of words (see 
Section 4.5.2.1 of Chapter 4) is used as an alternative measure of CSR to examine 
whether the alternative measure of CSR affects the main result regarding the 
association between CSR and EM. The multiple pooled OLS regression is performed 
on a number of words as an alternative measure of CSR. This variable is defined as 
"CSRW" in the regression model. Second, an alternative measure of discretionary 
accruals is used as the dependent variable to test whether the main results in Table 
7.4 are robust to different measurements or not. The Modified Jones model (MJM) is 
used as an alternative measurement for EM to investigate whether the alternative 
measure of EM has any effect on the preliminary results. Third, Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) with robust standard error is used as alternative estimator for OLS 
regression analysis.   
7.5.2.1 Alternative measurement of CSR 
The total score of CSR is found to be negatively and significantly related to 
discretionary accruals (Table 7.4). Following the previous studies, the number of 
words is used as an alternative measure for CSR in order to examine whether the 
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relation between EM and CSR is robust to different measurements or not. Table 7.10 
presents the results of the multiple OLS regression for the full sample.   
As can be seen from Table 7.9, the coefficient of CSRW is negatively related to the 
magnitude of discretionary accruals (coef. = -0.001, t = -2.584, p < 0.01), suggesting 
that firms with higher amounts of CSR information report lower levels of 
discretionary accruals than those firms with lower amounts of CSR information. This 
result is consistent with the primary results (Table 7.4).  
The coefficient of BRDEF is negatively and significantly associated with discretionary 
accruals (coef. = -0.010, t = -2.677, p < 0.01), consistent with the main results (Table 
6.5). The coefficient of AUDEF is negatively and insignificantly related to 
discretionary accruals. This result is in line with the main findings (Table 7.4). 
The coefficients of OCF, LEVG and SIZE are negatively and significantly related to the 
magnitude of EM, suggesting that firms with higher OCF, firms with higher LEVG and 
larger firms are more likely to report lower levels of discretionary accruals. The 
aforementioned results are consistent with the primary results (Table 7.4). Table 7.9 
also reveals that a positive and significant coefficient is found between LOSS and 
discretionary accruals, suggesting that firms that report losses tend to report higher 
discretionary accruals. This result corroborates the results of the main model (Table 
7.4). The ROA and MB coefficients are not significantly related to discretionary 
accruals. 
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Based on the above, the results of the OLS regression analysis model presented in 
Table 7.9 provide evidence that the primary results (Table 7.4) are consistent and 
robust to different measures of CSR.  
Table 7-9: Alternative proxy for CSR (number of words) 
PM Exp. Sing Coef. t P>t 
CSRW - -0.001 -2.584 *** 
BRDEF - -0.010 -2.677 *** 
AUDEF - -0.004 -0.797  
OCF ? -0.047 -2.065 ** 
LEVG ? -0.021 -2.207 ** 
ROA ? 0.013 0.473  
SIZE ? -0.002 -1.814 * 
LOSS + 0.026 4.37 *** 
MB ? 0.000 0.814  
Constant ? 0.085 6.462 *** 
 
    
Adj. R2  0.096   
PM = Discretionary accruals using Performance-adjusted model; CSR1 = Corporate social responsibility; BRDEF = Board of directors 
effectiveness coded as 1 if more than 50% of directors on the board who are not on audit committee are independent, and at 
least a sample median of directors on the board are financial experts; and 0 otherwise; AUDEF = Audit committee effectiveness 
coded as 1 if all the members are independent, and at least a sample median are financial experts; and 0 otherwise;  OCF = 
Operating cash flow; LEVG = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  ROA = Firm performance as 
measured by net revenue to total assets ratio;  SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural logarithm of total assets;  LOSS = Coded 1 
if firm has loss; and 0 otherwise;  MB = Market-to-book ratio. 
 
7.5.2.2 Alternative measurement of EM 
The PM model proposed by Kothari et al. (2005) is applied in this study as a primary 
model because the findings in chapter five reveal that it has a higher explanatory 
power compared with the JM and MJM models. Based on these results and the 
previous studies (Sun et al. 2010; Kothari et al. 2005), the PM is chosen as the 
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primary EM model. In addition, the findings in chapter five show that MJM is a 
secondary model in terms of its explanatory power compared with the JM. 
Therefore, MJM is used as an alternative model to investigate whether alternative 
measurement of discretionary accruals impacts the primary results or not. The MJM 
is commonly considered one of the most effective and powerful models for 
detecting EM practices; thus, it has been commonly used in previous studies (Abdul 
Rashidah  and Ali 2006; Xie et al. 2003; Peasnell et al. 2000a).  
The current study does not investigate any particular event; it focuses on the 
magnitude rather than the direction of EM. Following the previous studies (e.g. 
Dimitropoulos and Asteriou 2010; Sun et al. 2010; Klein 2002), the absolute value of 
the residual obtained from the yearly cross-sectional regression MJM as dependent 
variable is used as an alternative measure for EM.  
The results of the OLS regression model of CSRI and other independent variables on 
discretionary accruals using MJM are presented in Table 7.10. The overall R2 is 
around 14%, which is relatively comparable to the results obtained by Dimitropoulos 
and Asteriou (2010); Abdul Rashidah  and Ali (2006); and Frankel et al. (2002) and 
higher than that obtained from the main model (Table 7.4). The intercept is positive 
and significant at the 1% level. 
The coefficient of CSRI is negatively and significantly related to earnings 
management (coef. = -0.058, t = -2.808, p < 0.01), consistent with the main results 
(Table 7.4) and suggesting that firms which provide more information related to CSR 
are reporting lower levels of discretionary accruals. The BRDEF coefficient is 
negatively and significantly related to discretionary accruals (coef. = -0.013, t = -
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2.648, p < 0.01), implying that firms with higher BRDEF report lower levels of EM. 
This result is in line with those results in the primary model (Table 7.4). Although the 
direction of the AUDEF coefficient is opposite to the direction in the main analysis 
(Table 7.4), it is consistent with it in that it is insignificantly related to the magnitude 
of discretionary accruals.  
With regard to the control variables’ coefficients, the results presented in Table 7.10 
reveal exactly the same directions and significance as in the primary findings (Table 
7.4).  
In light of the above, the results of CSRI and other independent variables on 
discretionary accruals using the MJM as an alternative measure for EM are 
consistent with the primary results (Table 7.4), which indicates that the main results 
are consistent and robust to different types of discretionary accruals measurements 
and are not affected by the different measures of discretionary accruals.   
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Table 7-10: Alternative proxy for EM (MJM) 
MJM Exp. Sing Coef. t P>t 
CSRI - -0.058 -2.808 *** 
BRDEF - -0.013 -2.648 *** 
AUDEF - 0.006 1.223  
OCF ? -0.077 -3.294 *** 
LEVG ? -0.021 -2.329 ** 
ROA ? 0.012 0.429  
SIZE ? -0.004 -2.224 ** 
LOSS + 0.045 4.686 *** 
MB ? 0.000 0.411  
Constant ? 0.112 6.155 *** 
Adj. R2  0.140   
MJM = Discretionary accruals using Performance-adjusted model; CSRI= Corporate social responsibility score; BRDEF = 
Board of directors effectiveness coded as 1 if more than 50% of directors on the board who are not on audit committee are 
independent, and at least a sample median of directors on the board are financial experts; and 0 otherwise; AUDEF = Audit 
committee effectiveness coded as 1 if all the members are independent, and at least a sample median are financial experts; 
and 0 otherwise;  OCF = Operating cash flow; LEVG = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  
ROA = Firm performance as measured by net revenue to total assets ratio;  SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural 
logarithm of total assets;  LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has loss; and 0 otherwise;  MB = Market-to-book ratio. 
7.5.2.3 Alternative multivariate regression estimator 
The pooled OLS regression model is used as the primary model according to the 
nature of the study data. According to Gujarati (2003), the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression with robust standard errors (Huber-White standard errors)   
regression analysis model is one of the most commonly used models for correcting 
and controlling for heteroscedasticity problems. To provide further evidence of 
whether the main Pooled OLS regression model results (Table 7.4) are or are not 
affected by the different regression estimators, OLS regression with robust standard 
errors is used as an alternative multivariate regression estimator. In this regard, 
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Gujarati (2003) argues that OLS with robust standard errors provides better 
estimates because it controls for heteroscedasticity problems. Therefore, following 
the study by Dimitropoulos and Asteriou (2010), OLS regression with robust standard 
errors is used in the present study to examine whether or not the primary results are 
robust to different regression estimators.  
The results of the robust OLS regression, employed as an alternative measure to GLS 
regression are presented in Table 7.11. As can be seen from Table 7.11 below, the 
CSRI coefficient is negatively and significantly related to discretionary accruals (coef. 
= -0.058, t = -2.808, p < 0.01), suggesting that firms with a higher level of CRS report 
a lower levels of discretionary accruals. A significant and negative coefficient of 
BRDEF is consistent with the findings of Table 7.4, indicating that firms with higher 
BRDEF are more likely to report a lower magnitude of discretionary accruals. In line 
with the primary results in Table 7.4, the coefficient of AUDEF reveals an insignificant 
relationship with discretionary accruals.  
The coefficients of OCF, LEV, and SIZE are negatively significant, consistent with the 
results in Table 7.4. The coefficient of LOSS is positively and significantly related to 
the magnitude of discretionary accruals, consistent with the primary results (Table 
7.4). ROA and MB coefficients show insignificant relationships with discretionary 
accruals. 
In summary, the results of alternative multivariate regression analysis using OLS 
robust standard error regression are consistent with the primary findings presented 
earlier in Table 7.4, suggesting that the main results are robust and consistent with 
different regression estimators.  
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Table 7-11: The results of (OLS) robust standard error regression 
PM Exp. Sing Coef. t P>t 
CSRI - -0.067 -3.922 *** 
BRDEF - -0.010 -2.796 *** 
AUDEF - -0.004 -0.823  
OCF ? -0.047 -1.953 * 
LEVG ? -0.020 -2.159 ** 
ROA ? 0.017 0.837  
SIZE ? -0.003 -2.189 ** 
LOSS + 0.026 4.204 *** 
MB ? 0.000 0.937  
Constant ? 0.105 7.435 *** 
     
Adj. R2  0.118   
F-statistics  5.37   
P-value  ***   
PM = Discretionary accruals using Performance-adjusted model; CSRI= Corporate social responsibility score; BRDEF = Board 
of directors effectiveness coded as 1 if more than 50% of directors on the board who are not on audit committee are 
independent, and at least a sample median of directors on the board are financial experts; and 0 otherwise; AUDEF = Audit 
committee effectiveness coded as 1 if all the members are independent, and at least a sample median are financial experts; 
and 0 otherwise;  OCF = Operating cash flow; LEVG = Financial leverage as measured by total liabilities to total assets ratio;  
ROA = Firm performance as measured by net revenue to total assets ratio;  SIZE = Firm size as measured by natural 
logarithm of total assets;  LOSS = Coded 1 if firm has loss; and 0 otherwise;  MB = Market-to-book ratio. 
 
7.5.2.4 Controlling for endogeneity 
Several recent studies have realised that models containing EM and disclosure suffer 
from endogeneity bias (Choi et al. 2013; Cornett et al. 2008; Lobo and Zhou 2001; 
Kasznik 1999). The particular form of endogeneity problem between EM and CSR is 
that of simultaneity which occurs when both EM and CSR are determined either by 
internal factors such as managers’ overall policies or by external factors such as legal 
effects, regulations and rules related to the market for corporate control; it may 
even be determined by a combination of internal and external factors (Choi et al. 
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2013; McKnight and Weir 2009). Therefore, ignoring the existence of the 
simultaneity problem may lead to inconsistent, inefficient and biased inferences 
when addressing the relation between EM and CSR (McKnight and Weir 2009).  
In order to overcome this problem, previous literature has suggested several 
solutions to control for endogeneity bias. One of these solutions is the use of 
instrumental variables (IV) (Choi et al. 2013; McKnight and Weir 2009; Coles et al. 
2008; Linck et al. 2008; Himmelberg et al. 1999; Hermalin and Weisbach 1991). The 
other alternative is the use of simultaneous equations (Coles et al. 2008; Cornett et 
al. 2008; Kasznik 1999; Hermalin and Weisbach 1991). Although these two 
approaches are considered alternative solutions to solve the problem of 
endogeneity, Coles et al. (2008); and Himmelberg et al. (1999) used both 
instrumental variables and simultaneous equations approaches and obtained similar 
results. Therefore, following  the approach used by Choi et al. (2013); McKnight and 
Weir (2009); Coles et al. (2008); and Hermalin and Weisbach (1991), the present 
study uses the lagged values of endogenous independent variable (CSRI) as an 
instrumental variable (IV) to investigate whether or not the simultaneity problem 
affects the relation between discretionary accruals and CSR. 
In order to use the instrumental variable (IV) two-stage regression (2SLS) approach, 
it is necessary to use the Hausman test to test whether the endogeneity bias for the 
endogenous variable and independent variable exists or not (Gujarati 2003). When 
applied, the Hausman test gave a χ2 of 38.89 (p = 0.000), which suggests that the null 
hypotheses of no endogeneity between EM as dependent variable and CSRI as 
independent variable is rejected. Hence, the existence of the endogeneity problem 
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may affect the results of the regression model, thus causing the results to be biased, 
ineffective and inconsistent. Therefore, instrumental variable (IV) 2SLS regression is 
performed to control for the simultaneity problem as well as to investigate whether 
the existence of endogeneity in the main model has an effect on the results. 
The results of the second stage of 2SLS regression of CSRI and other independent 
variables on discretionary accruals are presented in Table 7.12. After controlling for 
the simultaneity, the coefficient of CSRI is negatively and significantly related to 
discretionary accruals (coef, = -0.096, z = -2.021, p < 0.05), suggesting that firms with 
higher levels of CSR report lower discretionary accruals. This result is in line with the 
previous results of GLS and OLS models reported earlier in Tables 7.4 and 7.11 
respectively, although the level of significance is lower compared with the previous 
results. Furthermore, it corroborates the findings of Choi et al. (2013), who find a 
negative simultaneity relation between CSR and EM. In other words, the result 
indicates that firms with higher discretionary accruals report lower CSR. With the 
existence of simultaneity, causality can run in both directions between discretionary 
accruals and CSR and both of them are endogenously determined, indicating that 
CSR can be one of the factors that influence discretionary accruals and, in the 
opposite direction, discretionary accruals can be a plausible factor impacting CSR.      
As expected, and consistent with the results of GLS and OLS models, the BRDEF 
coefficient is negatively significant (coef, = -0.010, z = -2.805, p < 0.01), suggesting 
that firms with higher BRDEF report lower discretionary accruals. An insignificant 
relation is captured between AUDEF and discretionary accruals, which is in line with 
the previous results of both GLS and OLS models.  
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With respect to the control variables, the results reveal relatively similar results, 
which suggest that these results are consistent with the main findings (Table 7.4). 
Although some coefficients reveal less significant levels, the direction and 
significance of the relationships with discretionary accruals remain the same. 
In summary, the instrumental variables (IV) 2SLS model results are consistent with 
the main results in Table 7.4, suggesting that the simultaneity problem between CSR 
and discretionary accruals does not affect the primary results of CSR and other 
independent variables on discretionary accruals.  
Table 7-12: Instrumental variables two-stage (IV 2SLS) model 
PM Coef. t P>t 
CSRI -0.096 -2.021 ** 
BRDEF -0.010 -2.805 *** 
AUDEF -0.004 -0.758  
OCF -0.047 -1.945 * 
LEVG -0.020 -2.173 ** 
ROA 0.016 0.778  
SIZE -0.002 -1.946 * 
LOSS 0.026 4.263 *** 
MB 0.000 1.184  
Constant 0.114 5.893 *** 
Adj.R2 0.115   
 
7.6 Discussion of Results 
This section provides the results of empirical findings on the association between EM 
and CSR in the FTSE 350 Index firms over the period of three years from 2008 to 
2010. The literature suggests two perspectives on the relation between EM and CSR: 
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long-term and managerial opportunism perspectives (Choi et al. 2013). The long-
term perspective argues that firms with high levels of CSR are not only focused on 
increasing current profits and managers’ benefits but are also aiming to build and 
improve strong future relationships with stakeholders. Therefore, such firms will act 
in a responsible way when reporting financial information. In line with this 
perspective, previous empirical findings show a negative association between EM 
and CSR (Choi et al. 2013; Pyo and Lee 2013; Kim et al. 2012; Hong and Andersen 
2011; Chih et al. 2008). On the other hand, the managerial opportunism perspective 
argues that firms may strategically engage in CSR to mask their opportunistic EM 
behaviour. In such cases, CSR is used as an entrenchment tool to hide this 
opportunistic behaviour and to protect firms’ managers against stakeholders’ 
potential vigilance and reaction. In line with this perspective, several previous 
empirical findings reveal a positive relationship between EM and CSR  (Jiang et al. 
2013; Heltzer 2011; Yip et al. 2011; Gargouri et al. 2010; Prior et al. 2008; Patten and 
Trompeter 2003).  
Two types of analysis are performed in this chapter to investigate the relationship 
between EM and CSR. These types are univariate and multivariate tests. The 
univariate test uses the t-test and Mann Whitney U test, while the multivariate test 
applies multiple pooled OLS regression analysis. In addition, several sensitivity tests 
are performed to compare and confirm that the main results are consistent and 
robust. In general, the findings are in line with the long-term perspective, which 
assumes a negative relationship between EM and CSR. 
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In respect to the level of EM, the findings of the univariate test reveal that firms with 
a high level of CSR have a low level of EM, and that the level of CSR is significantly 
different at the 1% level between High and Low EM firms. These results are 
confirmed when regression analysis is applied, and the results show a negative 
association between EM and CSR, implying that firms with a high level of CSR report 
a low magnitude of EM. This result is also supported through an examination of the 
association between the level of CSR sub-themes and EM. The results of regression 
analysis show that the levels of COM, EMP, ENV and PRO are negatively related to 
the extent of EM, suggesting that firms with a high level of such information report 
lower levels of EM. However, there is no evidence of such a relationship between 
the levels of CUS and OTH and the magnitude of EM, suggesting that the levels of 
CUS and OTH do not affect the level of EM. 
Regarding the effect of the type of industry on the association between EM and CSR, 
the findings reveal that industry type has no effect on the relationship between the 
two variables and that the primary findings are consistent and robust for the 
different industries. Furthermore, this chapter investigates the association between 
the direction of EM (i.e. income-increasing and income-decreasing EM) and CSR. In 
general, the findings show that firms with a high level of CSR engage in a low level of 
income-increasing and income-increasing EM, suggesting that firms with a high level 
of CSR are less likely to engage in EM in both directions. 
In order to test whether the primary findings are consistent and robust to the 
specifications of different measures, several sensitivity analyses are performed. 
These analyses are as follows: alternative measure for CSR; alternative measure for 
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EM; alternative multivariate regression estimator; and control for endogeneity 
problem between EM and CSR. In general, the results of these tests show that the 
main results are consistent and robust to different measurements. 
In respect of the effect of board of directors and audit committee effectiveness on 
EM, the results reveal that firms with a high level of board of directors’ effectiveness 
report a lower magnitude of EM compared with those firms with a low level of board 
of directors’ effectiveness. However, there is no an evidence that firms with a high 
level of audit committee effectiveness report a low level of EM, suggesting that the 
level of audit committee effectiveness does not impact the magnitude of EM. 
In light of the above, the findings of the present chapter are in line with the long-
term perspective, which assumes a negative relationship between EM and CSR. This 
assumption argues that a firm with a high level of CSR is focused not only on 
increasing current profits but also on improving the firm’s image and building strong 
relationships with stakeholders. In addition, this perspective is in line with the 
assumption provided by agency theory, which argues that CSR information is an 
essential tool to reduce information asymmetry between managers and 
shareholders when the interests of the two groups conflict.    
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7.7 Summary 
This chapter examines the relationship between EM and CSR in FTSE 350 Index 
companies for the period 2008-2010. The findings suggest that the level of CSR 
information has a negative impact on the level of EM. This is in line with the long-
term perspective, which assumes that firms issuing a high level of CSR information 
are more concerned about their relationships with stakeholders rather than simply 
focusing on increasing profits. Table 7.13 summarises the results of the hypotheses 
testing in this chapter. 
Table 7-13: Summary of Hypotheses and Results 
Hypothesis Results 
H1: There is a negative relationship between the level of EM and 
CSR 
Supported 
H2: There is a negative  relationship between the level of EM 
and COM sub-score 
Supported 
H3: There is a negative relationship between the level of EM and 
EMP sub-score 
Supported 
H4: H4’There is a negative  relationship between the level of EM 
and ENV sub-score 
Supported 
H5: ’There is a negative relationship between the level of EM 
and PRO sub-score 
Supported 
H6: ’There is a negative  relationship between the level of EM 
and CUS sub-score 
Not supported 
H7: There is a negative relationship between the level of EM and 
PRO sub-score 
Not supported 
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8 Chapter Eight                                                                   
Summary and Conclusions 
8.1 IntroductionPrevious studies provided two different perspectives with 
respect to the association between EM and CSR. The first perspective argued that 
firms with a higher level of CSR information engage in a higher magnitude of EM and 
proponents of this view found a positive association between CSR and EM (Jiang et 
al. 2013; Heltzer 2011; Yip et al. 2011; Gargouri et al. 2010; Prior et al. 2008; Patten 
and Trompeter 2003), On the other hand, proponent of the second perspective 
argue that firms with a higher level of CSR information have a lower level of EM, 
suggesting that CSR and EM are negatively associated (Choi et al. 2013; Pyo and Lee 
2013; Kim et al. 2012; Hong and Andersen 2011; Chih et al. 2008). These different 
findings have motivated the present study to examine whether or not the level of 
CSR relates to the magnitude of EM in the context of the UK, based on the FTSE 350 
Index firms during the fiscal years from 2008 to 2010. In order to achieve the study 
aim, the researcher devised the following primary research question: 
“Is there a relationship between EM and CSR in UK companies?” 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 8.2 presents an overview of the study 
findings. Section 8.3 discusses the implications of the research findings. The study’s 
limitations and areas for future research are presented in sections 8.4 and 8.5 
respectively.  
8.2 The Study Findings 
The practice of EM in UK companies  
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Chapter Five has presented the findings pertaining to this objective by using both 
univariate and multivariate analyses. Comparative analysis based on estimated 
results from the pooled OLS regression has been used to evaluate the three EM 
models: the Jones (1991) (JM), the Modified Jones (Dechow et al. 1995) (MJM) and 
the Performance - Matched (Kothari et al. 2005)(PM) models. Firstly, the findings 
have revealed that ∆REV-∆REC was the variable that made the strongest significant 
contribution to MJM and PM models, while PPT was the weakest variable in the 
three models. Comparing the coefficient of ∆REV-∆REC variable, it was discovered 
that the strongest contribution by this variable was to the PM model. Secondly, the 
findings have revealed that PM has the highest explanatory power in terms of 
Adjusted R2 with 35 per cent as compared to 29 and 31 per cent for JM and MJM 
respectively. In view of these findings, the PM model was used as a primary model in 
the present study to measure EM. 
Univariate analysis was based on the t-test to examine whether or not the means of 
high and low EM as well as positive and negative EM firms are insignificantly 
different from zero. In respect of the differences between high and low EM groups, 
the findings have showed that the differences between the means in the two groups 
were insignificant across years and industries. Regarding the differences between 
positive (income - increasing) and negative (income -decreasing) EM, the findings, in 
general, have revealed that across years and industries, the differences between the 
means in the two groups were insignificant at the 0.01 level.    
The level of CSR information in the UK 
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This objective has been addressed in chapter Six by testing the overall level and six 
themes of CSD as proxy for CSR through using both content analysis and disclosure 
index methods. The CSD themes were community (COM), employees (EMP), 
environment (ENV), products and services (PRO), customers (CUS), and others (OTH). 
According to the number of companies, the overall results have revealed that a 
higher number of UK firms are more interested in EMP, COM, ENV, and PRO, but are 
less concerned with OTH and CUS.  
As for the content analysis approach, the findings have showed that the EMP theme 
has the highest number of words, followed by the COM and ENV themes. The OTH 
and PRO are the fourth and fifth themes respectively, while the CUS theme has the 
lowest number of words. The findings of the disclosure index have revealed similar 
results to those of the content analysis. On average, the findings have showed that 
EMP has the highest score, followed by COM. The third score is awarded to ENV, 
while the OTH and PRO are awarded the fourth and fifth scores respectively. The 
lowest score was awarded to CUS. 
The relationship between the magnitude of EM and the level of CSR in the UK 
The third research objective has been addressed in chapter Seven by using both 
univariate and multivariate analyses. Seven hypotheses were identified to answer 
this question and the overall results have suggested that the level of CSR impacts the 
magnitude of EM. In particular, firms with high levels of CSR report a lower 
magnitude of EM.  
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Consistent with hypothesis 1 that there is a negative (positive) relationship between 
the level of EM and the total level of CSR information, the results have revealed a 
negative and significant relationship between the magnitude of EM and the level of 
CSR. This result implies that firms with a high level of CSR information report a lower 
level of EM. Hypothesis 2 has predicted that the level of EM is negatively (positively) 
associated with the level of the EMP theme. The results have showed that EM is 
negatively significant related to EMP, suggesting that firms with high level of EMP 
information report low levels of EM. 
In respect of COM information, the results have revealed that firms with a high level 
of COM information report a lower level of EM, thus supporting hypothesis 3 which 
has predicted a negative (positive) association between EM and the COM theme. 
Consistent with hypothesis 4, which has predicted a negative (positive) relationship 
between EM and the ENV theme, the results have indicated that companies with a 
high level of ENV information report a low level of EM.     
Hypothesis 5 has predicted that the association between EM and the PRO theme 
would be negative (positive). The results are in line with this hypothesis as they have 
revealed that the magnitude of EM is negatively significant related to PRO 
information, hence suggesting that firms with a high level of PRO information report 
a low level of EM. Contrary to hypothesis 6, which has suggested a negative 
(positive) relationship between EM and the CUS theme, the results have showed that 
there is no significant association between the level of EM and the level of CUS 
information. With respect to the OTH theme, the results have revealed that EM and 
the OTH theme are insignificantly related to each other, contrary to hypothesis 7 
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which has predicted that the association between the level of EM and OTH 
information would be negative (positive).  
When the study sample was divided into firms with positive (income - increasing) EM 
and firms with negative (income - decreasing) EM, the results have showed that 
firms with a higher level of CSR information engage in a lower level of income -
increasing and income - decreasing EM. In addition, the results of the potential 
impact of the type of industry on the association between EM and CSR have revealed 
that the type of industry does not affect the association between the two variables. 
The application of the alternative measurement of EM based on the MJM 
measurement has revealed that the main results are consistent and robust to the 
different measurements of EM. In addition, the results have revealed that the main 
results are consistent and robust to the different measurements of CSR, specifically 
when using the number of words as an alternative measurement to disclose scores. 
The study has also applied the alternative multivariate regression estimator and 
found out that the main results are not affected by the specific regression estimator. 
With regard to the endogeneity problem, the researcher has tested whether or not 
its existence impacts the main results of the study. It has been discovered that the 
main results are consistent and robust and are not affected by the problem of 
endogeneity between EM and CSR. 
8.3 The Study Implications 
 
The findings of this study have revealed that firms with a higher level of CSR 
information in annual and CSR reports are less likely to manipulate reported 
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earnings. These findings may have several implications. As CSR information is 
publicly observable, the findings of this study may have practical implications for 
firms’ executives in terms of evaluating their financial transparency and 
accountability, which may help corporations to enhance investors’ perception of the 
quality of financial reporting. In addition, the findings may be used by corporate 
governance boards to assess the quality of financial reporting based on the level of 
CSR information.  
Furthermore, the findings may provide an empirical support that enables 
shareholders and market participants to improve their decision - making when 
evaluating the reliability and quality of financial reports. Financial analysts may use 
the findings presented in the present study to evaluate how the level of CSR 
information, as a tool for concentrating EM practices, affects capital market 
decisions. If the market perceives that firms with higher levels of CSR information are 
associated with higher financial reporting quality, the reported financial statement 
may be viewed as more reliable for investment decisions and credit assessment.  
Furthermore, gaining a better understanding of the influence of CSR information on 
the manipulation of earnings can help authorities and regulators, especially in the 
UK, to develop their regulations and make further recommendations on CSR. The 
findings of the study can also be used as an empirical support for stock market 
authorities to evaluate the current CSR information requirements and their role in 
improving the quality of financial reports. From a research perspective, the findings 
are generally useful for researchers interested in investigating the different aspects 
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of EM to control the effect of the level of CSR information as one of the 
determinants of EM.  
8.4 Limitations of the study 
Although a considerable effort was made to ensure that the study aim was met and 
the research questions were answered, the study suffers from several limitations.  
Firstly, the sample size of this study is limited to the top UK FTSE 350 Index firms. 
Thus, the findings of the study may not be applicable to firms outside the FTSE 350 
Index because the level of CSR information may vary according to firm size.  
Secondly, the data used in this study is limited to the period stretching from 2008 to 
2010, with 2008 being considered by economists as the year when the global 
financial crisis started. Thus, there is a possibility that the findings may have been 
driven by the changes in the particular year(s) during or after such financial crisis. 
 Thirdly, since the accruals models have been criticised in the previous literature due 
to the likelihood of misclassifying total accruals into its components, discretionary 
and non - discretionary accruals, the dependent variable may have been subject to 
some measurement errors. In addition, the perspective of EM indicated in this study 
is related to opportunistic EM behaviour. However, managers may use EM to 
provide private information to the firm’s shareholders regarding future returns 
which, in turn, maximise the firm’s value. Therefore, the findings of this study are 
restricted to the assumption of opportunistic EM rather than the informative EM 
perspective. However, the existing literature has not provided a clear method for 
distinguishing between the opportunistic and informative EM perspectives.  
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8.5 Suggestions for Future Research 
There are several areas into which future studies on the association between CSR 
and EM might be extended. Firstly, although this study has addressed the 
endogeneity problem between EM and CSR, future research should consider using 
lagged data for all financial variables. In this regard, Dhaliwal et al. (2011) suggest 
that the use of lagged variables can control for the endogeneity problem.    
Secondly, as previously noted in the limitations, the results of this study are based on 
the perception of EM as opportunistic behaviour rather than looking at it from an 
informative perspective. Therefore, future research should investigate CSR and EM 
from an informative perspective. In addition, the current study has used total 
discretionary accruals as a proxy for EM to investigate the association between EM 
and CRS; therefore, future research should use different proxies for EM, such as 
short - term and long - term discretionary accruals as well as real EM activities, to 
address the association between EM and CSR. 
Thirdly, studies on the role of CSR and corporate governance in constraining EM can 
be tested by taking into account the complementary and substituting of the joint 
effect of both CSR and corporate governance on financial reporting quality. Such 
studies may contribute to the understanding of the effect of CSR and corporate 
governance mechanisms in association with the quality of accounting reports.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Checklist of CSD Themes 
Employee 
 Number of employees 
 Employee's salary  
 Health and safety  in the workplace 
 Employee equal opportunities 
 Employee benefits 
 Employee remuneration 
 Employee's satisfaction 
 Profit sharing/bonus scheme policy 
 Employee share ownership 
 Employee education and training  
 Accident in the workplace 
 Other  
 Community 
 Participation to community activities around the company 
 Community donations/Charity 
 Community health supporting 
 Local community education 
 Participation in government social campaigns 
 Awards related to community achievement 
 Other special community related activities 
Products/services 
 Product/service development(research and development)  
 Product safety 
 Product/service quality 
 Others 
Customers 
 Customer services 
 Customer compliant 
 Customer satisfaction 
 Others 
 
Environment 
 Materials used 
 Waste 
 Recycling 
 Packaging 
 Water consumption 
 Conservation of natural resources 
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 Impact in the environment 
 Designing facilities harmonious with the environment  
 Repairs/Protection to environmental damage 
 Energy consumption 
 Use of waste material for energy production  
 Development of new sources of energy 
 Carbon credits 
 Emission of greenhouse gases 
 Clean Development Mechanisms 
 certified Emission Reduction s 
 Actual environmental policies 
 Environmental goals, targets and objectives 
 Compliance with regulations and requirements 
 Environmental Partnerships 
 Environmental education 
 Environmental research 
 Environmental management 
 ISOs 14.000 
 Environmental auditing 
 Contributions to beautify the environment 
 Wildlife conservation  
 others 
Others 
 General  health  and  safety  information   
 General   disclosure   of   corporate   objectives /policies relating to the social responsibility of 
the company to the various segments of society  
 Report about the presence of corporate social responsibility committee and  its members and 
activities 
 Information  about  awards  received  by  the  company  concerning  its  social responsibility, or 
the presence of the company in one, or more, social indexes  
 
 
Appendix 2: Decision Rules for CSD 
 All CSR information must be related to the firms and its activities.  
 All disclosures must be specifically stated, they cannot be implied.  
 If any word has more than one possible classification, the word should be classified 
as to the activity most emphasized in the word. 
 Any disclosure which is repeated shall be recorded as a CSD word each time it is 
discussed. 
 All sponsorship activities to be included, no matter how much it is advertised.  
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Appendix 3: List of CSD Key Words 
CSD Category Key words 
Employee  Employee(s) 
 Human Resources 
 Salary 
 Wages 
 Remuneration 
 Bonus 
 Benefits 
 Profit sharing 
 Equal opportunities 
 Healthy 
 Safety 
 Accident 
 Workplace 
 Employee education 
 Employee training 
 Employee satisfaction 
 Employee police(s) 
Community  community 
 Participation 
 Donations 
 Charity 
 Community Health  
 Community education 
 Community training 
 Social campaigns 
 Community achievement 
 Community activities 
 Community police(s) 
Products/Services  Product (s) 
 Service(s) 
 Product development 
 service development 
 Product safety 
 Product quality 
 Service quality 
 Product police(s) 
 Service police(s) 
Customers  Customer(s) 
 Customer services 
 Compliant 
 Customer satisfaction 
 Customer police(s) 
Environment  Environment 
 Environmental  
 Material(s) 
 Waste 
 Recycling 
 Packaging 
 Water 
 Consumption 
203 
 
 Conservation 
 Natural resources 
 Impact 
 Harmonious 
 Repair(s) 
 Protection 
 Energy 
 New sources 
 Carbon 
 Emission 
 Greenhouse 
 Gas(s) 
 Emission 
 Clean 
 Environmental police(s) 
 Environmental goals 
 Environmental targets 
 Compliance 
 Environmental Partnership(s) 
 Environmental education 
 Environmental auditing 
 Environmental research 
 Environmental management 
 ISO 
 Environmental contribution(s) 
 Wildlife 
 Environmental police(s) 
Others  Social  
 Health   
 Safety   
 Objectives  
 Policies  
 Awards  received    
 social indexes 
 
